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Abstract 
 
This thesis identifies, in Nancy’s The Fall of Sleep, a crucial critique of phenomenology. 
A criticism that demarcates, or limits, phenomenology in declaring: “There is no 
phenomenology of sleep”. Taking-up this challenge, we consider a number of ways that 
phenomenologists have, and could, approach sleep. Our thesis, however, does not simply 
offer possible responses to the problem but also finds, in these answers, important insights 
into the essence of the charge itself. Sleep and phenomenology are found to be mutually 
de-limiting – each binds the other, whilst offering foundational insights into its counter-
part. Fundamentally, we bring phenomenologies of sleep, as opposed to simply 
phenomenology, into dialogue with this, Nancean, critique of phenomenology and with 
Nancy’s account of sleep itself. We describe the distinctly different slumbering 
interpretations of sleep present, and conspicuously absent, in the work of: Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Levinas. Part I, after initially elaborating the challenge, presents a direct 
Husserlian counter, via a recent reconstituting of Husserl’s late notes on sleep. The 
strengths and weaknesses of this phenomenological investigation sharpens the problem 
of sleep and leads us to pull back from consciousness-centred accounts. Part II, in 
contrast, develops our own hypothetical Heideggerian answer. This Part, the longest, uses 
Heidegger’s existential and comparative analytics to ask ‘Does Dasein sleep?’ This 
question reveals internal ambiguities of sleep – positioned between existence, life, and 
death. Part III withdraws from Heideggerian thinking through Levinas’s incisive, and 
early, interpretation of sleep. This Levinasian retracting opens the possibility of returning 
to Nancy’s challenge and corresponding description of sleep. Now this radical account is 
located in relation to, and in communication with, the somnological-phenomenological 
findings we have awakened in our thesis. The thesis ends by indicating a possible, future, 
return back from sleep to phenomenology – a dream, still hazy from sleep, of a somnolent 
phenomenology. 
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Part I: A Somnolent Challenge and a Husserlian 
Reply 
 
There is no phenomenology of sleep, for it shows of itself only its disappearance, its 
burrowing and its concealment. – Jean-Luc Nancy, The Fall of Sleep1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, translated by Charlotte Mandell, 2009, Fordham University Press, 
New York, p. 13 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction – (Re)awakening the Question of 
Sleep 
The meaning of the analyses of sleep, the dream, the unconscious, the past: not 
then to seek some inductive and dispersed solution to these problems, one by 
one; there are no separate solutions, the solution is philosophical (not 
psychological). – Merleau-Ponty2 
 
Sleep, perhaps, has never been philosophical. – Nancy3 
 
I: Sleep, Phenomenology, and the ‘Somnolent Turn’ 
 
This work attempts to hold together these two quotations and to describe – without 
dissolving – the somnolent tensions involved in any searching for, and after, sleep. 
Merleau-Ponty, in his lectures on Institution and Passivity, calls for a philosophical 
“solution”, a solution which is not a list of “separate solutions” but a whole. This 
quotation, in demanding a unified solution to the problem of passivity, offers us both a 
position from which we may distinguish our subsequent analyses, and a hint at what may 
be at stake in these discussions. Merleau-Ponty has, correctly, struck on the fact that these 
topics of analyses, and for our purposes sleep in particular, demand something other than 
“inductive and dispersed” solutions – the sleeper is not just a participant in a 
psychological experiment. In this sense Merleau-Ponty affirms, wholeheartedly, the 
problem of sleep, as a philosophical problem. However, as is clear from his dismissal of 
“separate solutions”, we, in opening this thesis on the phenomenology of sleep, must take 
our distance from him.4 Whereas Merleau-Ponty demands an answer to the puzzles 
passivity and its facets be offered as a unity, we here insist that such a unity cannot be 
presupposed at the origin of sleep. Such a presupposition would, necessarily, position 
sleep within a unity of wakefulness. In this sense, the philosophical problem of sleep – 
and what is at stake in our investigations from, and after, it – is doubled. Sleep becomes 
more than just an object of study, albeit a problematic and resistant one, for the waking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Institution and Passivity, Translated by Leonard Lawlor. Evanston: 
Northwestern Univ Press, 2010. p. 164.  
3 Nancy, Jean-Luc. ‘Identity and Trembling’ in The Birth of Presence, Translated by Brian Holmes. 
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993.p. 13. 
4 As this thesis progresses towards its closing consideration of the work of Nancy on sleep this distance 
will begin to close as the separation of sleep from related phenomena and questions comes under increased 
pressure. 
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philosopher. It takes on an existential element in the string of questions ‘who sleeps?’, 
‘who wakes?’, and ‘for whom are these questions available?’ 
 
Thus the problem of sleep becomes all the more significant and intractable – what 
relationships with sleep, with the sleeper, are presupposed when, and before, the waking 
philosopher seeks after the essence of sleep? As the temporal prepositions, ‘before’ and 
‘after’, indicate, from when, and furthermore where, is such investigating initiated? These 
temporal and spatial concerns reoccur throughout this thesis. The stakes, and the problem, 
of this investigation thus returns us to the perennial question of the philosopher – how to 
begin? Only after a good night’s sleep for certain, but how are we to take these words 
“sleep”, “night” and “good”, when so articulated? Or, in other words, how are we to 
awaken this question in its somnolent form? How are we to remember the forgotten 
question of sleep? 
 
A number of recent attempts have been made to return to a consideration of sleep 
within the humanities. In a lecture at Goldsmiths College, University of London, in 2013 
Matthew Fuller suggested, tentatively, that we might be beginning to see a “somnolent 
turn”.5 Fuller supports this contention by listing Jonathan Crary’s, 2013, 24/7: Late 
Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep6, Simon J. Williams’, 2011, The Politics of Sleep: 
Governing (Un)consciousness in the Late Modern Age7, and Kenton Kroker’s, 2007, The 
Sleep of Others and the Transformation of Sleep Research.8 We might, by way of 
returning us to the question of sleep as a problem for philosophy, offer our own list of 
recent attempts to address the question(s) of sleep. Corey Anton’s, 2006, ‘Dreamless 
Sleep and the Whole of Human Life: An Ontological Exposition’9, Jean-Luc Nancy’s, 
2007, Tombe de sommeil, published in English as The Fall of Sleep in 200910, and Nicolas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Fuller, Matthew. ‘Deep Sleep’, a lecture given as part of Goldsmiths’ ‘Objects and Relations: Visual 
Cultures Public Programme’, Thursday 21st November 2013. 
6 Crary, Jonathan. 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep. New York: Verso, 2013 
7 Williams, Simon J. The Politics of Sleep: Governing (Un)consciousness in the Late Modern Age. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
8 Kroker, Kenton. The Sleep of Others and the Transformation of Sleep Research.Toronto [Ont.]: University 
of Toronto Press, 2007. 
9 Anton, Corey. ‘Dreamless Sleep and the Whole of Human Life: An Ontological Exposition’, Human 
Studies, 29, pp. 181 – 202, Springer 2006. 
10 Nancy, Jean-Luc. Tombe de sommeil. 2006, Éditions Galilée, 9, rue Linné, 75005 Paris. Translated as 
The Fall of Sleep. 
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de Warren’s, 2010, ‘The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep’11. 
Such a list is, naturally, incomplete and selective.12 Nonetheless, these three pieces 
amount to, Heideggerian (Anton) and Husserlian (de Warren), phenomenological 
engagements with sleep, and to the temporal and conceptual surrounding of the pivotal 
recent work of philosophy on sleep – Nancy’s The Fall of Sleep. Of course, interest in 
sleep and its philosophical implications has not been restricted to sociological and 
philosophical accounts. The medical humanities, to name but one other field,  have also 
recently begun to recognise the need for a comprehensive investigating of sleep and its 
attendant, pathological and routine phenomena.13 
 
In opening, more concretely, the distance we earlier announced between our 
means of approaching sleep and that demanded by Merleau-Ponty, we must move away 
from such disparate and wakeful considerations of sleep. The reason for this narrowing, 
or sharpening, of the problem of sleep is the desire to avoid any inadvertent smuggling of 
wakeful (pre/post)conceptions into our description of sleep. This move away from those 
relations and interconnections between sleep and waking and towards sleep itself – 
whatever that might be – allows us to begin to isolate, and remove, those everyday notions 
which privilege the wakeful over the sleeping. Step by step, withdrawal by withdrawal, 
this process will return us to the problem of sleep, the problem of sleep without waking.14 
 
To return to, and clarify, the second of the quotations with which we began this 
chapter – the central problem of sleep is not that philosophy has ignored it but rather that 
it has methodically incorporated it into wakefulness without allowing the somnolent 
things themselves to appear. The worry is not that we must avoid converting the ‘content 
of sleep’ into the ‘content of waking life’ – otherwise no wakeful analysis of sleep would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 De Warren, Nicolas. ‘The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep’, in On Time – 
New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, ed. Lohmar, D. and Yamaguchi, I. 
Phaenomenologica, 2010, Springer.  
12 To name but one further, and missing, example Simon Morgan Wortham’s, 2013, The Poetics of Sleep, 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) could also be considered part of this recent renewal of 
philosophical interest. 
13 See, for example, the ‘Sleep, Agency, Activity’ roundtable at Durham University, 8th May 2014 jointly 
organised by the Centre for Medical Humanities and the Durham University Modern Languages 
department. A review of the event can be found here: http://centreformedicalhumanities.org/sleep-agency-
activity-roundtable-discussion-durham-university-8th-may-2014-review/. 
14 That this phrase, ‘sleep, without waking’, already indicates precisely one possible end of sleep – death – 
and not sleep itself perhaps already indicates the limits of this method of approach. We return to this 
question in the final chapter. 
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be possible at all – it is rather that we must return to an awareness of this process of 
transformation and of what it presupposes. Here the motivation for turning to 
phenomenology in an attempt to unravel this problem becomes clear – ‘what 
phenomenology is presupposed in our theoretical unpacking of sleep?’ Yet, as we 
consider below, phenomenologists are far from exempt from this wakeful tendency to 
cover over sleep, to cover up the sleeper. Heidegger, for example, in his description of 
how Dasein encounters time within the world seems to demonstrate the way that sleep all 
too often retracts from view:  
 
Concern makes use of the ‘Being-ready-to-hand’ of the sun, which sheds forth 
light and warmth. The sun dates time which is interpreted in concern. In terms of 
this dating arises the ‘most natural’ measure of time—the day.15 
 
Not ‘night and day’ but the singular “the day.” Of course, Heidegger will not remain with 
this “‘most natural’ measure of time” but the question must, nonetheless, be asked ‘can 
this point of origin – the day, wakefulness – acknowledge and grant sleep its place, time, 
and identity?’ 
 
 In 1997 the French journal Alter, Revue de Phénoménologie named its fifth edition 
Veille, sommeil, rêve.16 This title, in its tripartite interconnecting of waking, sleep, and 
dreams, illustrates that if we are to narrow our focus onto sleep we will require more than 
a wariness about the influence of waking presuppositions on our attempts to offer a 
phenomenology of sleep. The philosopher like anyone else is easily distracted from sleep. 
We turn away from the call of sleep and focus on something more edifying, something 
more illuminated – probably, these days a phone or computer screen. However, this 
turning away is not simply a feature of the insomniac present, it also characterises our 
post-sleep fascination with, our own, dreams. Anton, in his article on “dreamless sleep”,17 
argues that “Western scholarly thought tends to reduce sleep to the experience of 
dreaming.”18 Citing Descartes and Heidegger as evidence for this claim Anton suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. New York: 
Harper, 1962, p. 465 [412 – 413] 
16 Veille, sommeil, rêve, Alter revue de Phénoménologie, No. 5/1997 – Éditions Alter, groupe de recherché 
en phénoménologie, ENS de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, 31, avenue Lombart 
17 Anton, Corey. ‘Dreamless’, passim 
18 ibid, p. 183 
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that the “fascinating, mysteriously engaging, and often vivid” nature of dreams pulls us 
away from considering sleep itself, Anton’s dreamless sleep.19  
 
The examples of Descartes and Heidegger are useful. Most are familiar with 
Descartes invoking of the possibility of dreaming in the opening pages of the 
‘Meditations’ but many miss that his wording makes of sleep a mere carrier, or container, 
for dreams – “on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived”.20 This presumption 
allows and facilitates an all too quick slip between sleeping and dreaming, between the 
sleeper and the dreamer. However, more surprising is that Heidegger, who often situates 
his own thinking as a rejection of Cartesian structures and themes, seems, in his 1928 
lecture course on Leibniz The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, to make just the same 
slip. The quotation Anton offers merits repeating in full here – we will return to the 
relationship between world and the sleeper in Part II: 
 
…a single and common world belongs to the awake, but each of the sleeping 
turns to his own world. Here world is related to being awake and sleeping, as 
basic modes proper to factical Dasein. Awakeness is a condition of Dasein in 
which beings manifest themselves for everyone as one and the same within the 
same world-character; beings manifest themselves in a thorough-going harmony 
accessible to everyone and binding for everyone. In sleep, on the contrary, self-
manifesting beings have their own peculiar world-character for the individual, in 
each case a completely different way in which they world.21 
 
For Anton, this quotation illustrates the false dichotomy between wakefulness and 
dreaming sleep – a dichotomy that covers over dreamless sleep and brings with it other 
implications: sleep as “individual” or isolated, for example.22 
 
The dominance of the wakeful and our fascination with dreams and dreaming 
sleep illustrate the challenge for any philosophy of sleep itself. However, they also show 
why this neglect of sleep offers a specific opening to phenomenology. The history of 
phenomenology can be seen as a slow movement away from the conscious, wakeful, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 ibid. We return to the question of sleep, dreams, and dreamlessness later in this introductory chapter. 
20 Descartes, René. ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’, in Key Philosophical Writings, translated by E. S. 
Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, p. 135. 1997 Wordsworth Editions, Ware, Hertfordshire, UK. 
21 Heidegger, martin. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Translated by Michael Heim, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 172. Heidegger is interpreting Heraclitus fragment 89.  
22 This issue and the question of sleep’s relationship to separation, being-with, and community appears 
often in the following chapters and is one of the main reasons for the central role this thesis grants Nancy’s 
thinking. 
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subject and into the realm of the body, of bodily phenomena. It is to be hoped that by 
tracing this movement, which must not, of course, be assumed to be a progression, we 
may also approach the movement of sleep itself.23 It is to this shared movement and to 
the challenge contained within it that we now turn – to, that is, Nancy’s The Fall of Sleep. 
 
II: Noumenology, Self, and the Sleeping-Thing-in-Itself – Nancy’s 
Somnolent Challenge to Phenomenology 
 
As this Part’s epigraph demonstrates Nancy’s account of sleep presents a specific 
challenge to phenomenology, to the phenomenologist. This challenge must be reiterated 
not only here but repeatedly, like the repetitive rhythm of sleep, throughout what follows: 
“There is no phenomenology of sleep, for it shows of itself only its disappearance, its 
burrowing and its concealment.”24 This pronouncement, announcing the end and limit of 
phenomenology at the edge of sleep, itself appears in the middle of the third chapter of 
Nancy’s The Fall of Sleep, ‘Self from Absence to Self’. It marks not only the limit of 
phenomenology but also “the possibility, further and stronger than any phenomenality, of 
a deposition of intentions and aims as well as the fulfillment of sense.”25 In other words, 
Nancy does not here announce the end of his somnolent sojourn – his attempt to touch 
on, and tarry with, sleep. He does not mark an absolute limit beyond which we the wakeful 
reader, limited in that wakefulness, may never pass. 
 
Whilst we must defer the majority of our engagement with what follows this end 
of phenomenology for Nancy – with, that is, his own account of sleep – until our final 
chapter and closing sections, we can here consider what leads him to such a definitive 
closing off of phenomenology. If we are to evaluate the meaning, sense, and validity of 
this prohibiting of any somnolent phenomenology we must reflect on the immediate 
stages of Nancy’s text preceding this ban. We must work back from this “absence”, of 
phenomenology, to a consideration of the “self [soi]” which sleeps.26 
 
Nancy’s challenge draws plausibility from the proximity between sleeping and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The question of movement and its relationship to sleep reappears repeatedly throughout this thesis. 
24 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, p. 13 
25 ibid 
26 ibid, passim 
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blacking-out, fainting. The phrase, blacking-out, suggests the uniformity and 
indistinctness of the Hegelian “night in which… all cows are black”.27 A night without 
appearance. “Sleep does not authorize the analysis of any form of appearance 
whatsoever, since it shows itself to itself as this appearance that appears only as non-
appearing, as returning all appearing on itself and in itself, allowing the waking 
phenomenologist approaching the bed to perceive nothing but the appearance of its 
disappearance, the attestation of its retreat.”28 Yet, surely, a response is immediately 
evident: blacking-out, fainting, or being anesthetized, may indeed amount to such a 
dramatic severing of the stream of appearances but sleep seems an altogether more 
complicated phenomenon. It is, after all, precisely the question of sleep’s status as a 
phenomenon that we are here discussing. In particular, sleep offers dreams which, one 
might think, do nothing but appear, and often disappear just as quickly. Nancy, 
unsurprisingly, is not convinced – if, and much might be said to stand or fall on the 
plausibility of this conjunction, “the sleeping self” dreams “of itself” then it happens 
“according to an appearing that leaves no room for a distinction between being and 
appearing.”29 This has been clarified earlier in The Fall of Sleep with the observation that 
subjectivity, insofar as we can use that word, is, in dreaming, mingled with its world – it 
“does not distinguish itself… from what it sees, hears, and perceives in general.”30 
 
Thus we have two claims, or aspects of a single assertion, about the standard 
caveat that sleep lacks content except for dreams. Firstly, that this content cannot be said 
to appear in the sense in which we use it when waking, and, secondly, that this content is 
not appearance for a subject, it is not separable from a subject. These two directions of 
Nancy’s critique can be developed as relating to the two aspects of phenomenology – the 
priority of the world as phenomenally given and the constitution of this world by an egoic 
consciousness. Furthermore, Nancy’s point is not, and must not be mistaken for, the 
contention that sleep is contentless, simple absence. In fact, later in his somnolent 
investigations Nancy will make the following striking claim: 
 
What the sleeper sees is this eclipsed thing. He sees the eclipse itself: not the fiery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Phenomenology of Spirit, Translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1977, ‘Preface’, p. 9  
28 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, p. 13 
29 ibid 
30 ibid, pp. 7 – 8 
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ring around it, but the perfectly dark heart of the eclipse of being.31 
 
This “eclipsed thing” is, and here he returns to Kantian formulations, nothing but the 
“Kantian thing”, the ‘thing-in-itself’.32 The sleeper, so Nancy claims, is beyond 
phenomenology and phenomenological analysis because it is “as in self as the Kantian 
thing can be, that is the being-there, posited, the very position independent of all 
appearance and all appearing.”33 In sleep, and the sleeper, Nancy finds, not the 
nothingness of an abyss, but rather the self of the thing-in-itself. We need not grant such 
an interpretation of Kant to see the rhetorical power it holds in regards to any 
phenomenological engagement with sleep. 
 
Nancy is, here, following in the footsteps of a long tradition of seeing sleep as a 
turning in, a return to the self. Where Nancy differs from this tradition and many others 
is in denying that this sinking back into the self [soi] means a maintaining of the “I” [je]. 
Further to his dismissal of the special status of sleep and dreams Nancy denies that the 
supposed “consent of the “I,” which… usually assents to sleep and desires it” can be 
retained during the fall into sleep, into self.34 With this “losing of its consent” so too goes 
“being one’s own”, “self-ness [propriéte de soi],” this is the loss of properness and 
properties.35 This insistent fall to the thing-in-itself, for Nancy, “demands the dissipating 
of questioning and the anxiety that animates it. “Who am I?” disintegrates in the fall of 
sleep, for this fall carries me toward the absence of questions, toward the unconditional 
and indubitable affirmation—alien to any system of doubt, to any condition of 
identification—of a being-in-self [être-à-soi] that tolerates no unpacking, no analysis of 
its structure.”36 Here it is that the true challenge of sleep appears, in all its lack of 
appearing. A challenge that is not just to phenomenology, but to all “system[s] of doubt”, 
to all philosophy and its questioning. As Nancy himself had put it twenty one years earlier 
in ‘Identity and Trembling’ “Sleep, perhaps, has never been philosophical.”37 Our recent 
questions, which were supposed to raise existential as well as somnolent concerns, seem 
now unable to gain purchase.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ibid, p. 24 
32 ibid, p. 13 
33 ibid 
34 ibid, p. 12 
35 ibid 
36 ibid 
37 Nancy, Jean-Luc. ‘Identity and Trembling’ in The Birth of Presence, p. 13 
38 ‘Who sleeps?’, ‘who wakes?’, and ‘for whom are these questions available?’, see p. 6, above. 
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Phenomenology cannot, à la the natural sciences, dismiss the question of the first-
personal perspective and seek after the sleep of some other, some set of qualities to be 
studied. As such, phenomenology appears hamstrung: it can either project over the sleeper 
a phenomenological tapestry, or eiderdown, from waking; or, it can accept the limits of 
phenomenology and announce with, surely false, certainty that sleep, like death, should 
be seen as the edge of phenomenological life and that this should be unproblematic. Of 
course, it might be thought that other answers, other approaches, other hopes of a 
phenomenology of sleep remain. It is to these that we now turn. 
 
III: One step forwards in two steps back 
 
How best to begin a phenomenology of sleep? The question of beginning, of birth, 
of awakening, has been our focus already. We have seen that to begin from sleep, as every 
day’s everyday endeavours must, does not automatically grant the philosophies of the day 
a hold, or a grasp, on that which they implicitly assume. Yet, all investigations must limit 
their scope and this one has proposed to do so by stepping back from the question of 
philosophy’s engagement with sleep, from somnolent philosophy, and instead focusing 
on phenomenology and its means of approaching, touching, or even accounting for, sleep. 
Why phenomenology? Having elaborated Nancy’s critique of phenomenology’s access 
to sleep we might believe that we would be better served by turning to other fields of 
research when it comes to sleep – psychoanalysis, or neuroscience, to name just two 
examples. 
 
Our reason for insisting on phenomenology itself begins from a mere appearance, 
a somnolent semblance of similarity, an apparent analogy of form.39 Sleep withdraws 
from waking and from the commitments of the day. It pulls back from the worries, beliefs, 
and conceptual structures which frame our waking lives. The sleeper, stripped bare of 
such, is both more vulnerable and innocent than the waking self whilst also being more 
free. But free for what ends? The end of sleep announces one of two things: the return of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This very “insistence”, which might seem so wakeful, so demanding, in fact, also calls from sleep. The 
nagging insistence to return to sleep. The need and desire to put aside other questions and, essentially, other 
explanations and shift from the vertical to the horizontal. We return to this shift in Parts II and III. 
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waking life, or the end of life, an end before waking. This dual end, this ambiguous telos, 
of sleep will both hamper and fuel our analysis in what follows. However, pulling back 
from this question of ends for now,40 we can see the structural similarity which returns 
us, insistently but gently, to phenomenology. Phenomenology begins with its own 
withdrawing, with its own stepping away from established commitments and frames of 
reference. The suspensions of Husserlian phenomenology, of phenomenology at its birth, 
are at once both like the fall to sleep and unlike it. 
 
This formal similarity can be broken down into at least two connections and one 
point of difference. First, the suspension in sleep and the phenomenological suspensions 
share a temporariness which is significant in both cases. The sleeper is not a permanent 
and static being separable in space from other such entities. Instead sleep connects to us 
through space – we are coextended with the sleeper – whilst differing in time. This 
interplay of somnolent-wakeful space and somnolent|wakeful time is without permanence 
and fixity – it truly is a play of difference. In the case of the phenomenologist the 
suspension, with which they begin, is also impermanent, fleeting and easily slips away 
again. The practicing phenomenologist must, like Husserl, return time and again to the 
reduction, to suspension. This brings us to the second point of similarity between sleep 
and the opening gambits of phenomenology – they are both incomplete. To begin with 
phenomenology this time, let us cite the often quoted lines from Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘Preface’ to his Phenomenology of Perception: 
 
The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of 
a complete reduction. This is why Husserl always wonders anew about the 
possibility of the reduction. If we were absolute spirit, the reduction would not 
be problematic.41 
 
This lesson, the most important according to Merleau-Ponty, is itself applicable to sleep. 
This may at first appear counter-intuitive – surely sleep is complete exactly in the two 
situations which amount to its ends named above: reawakening and death. However, 
through the course of this thesis we will argue that such a sharp de-limiting of sleep’s 
borders does not stand up to scrutiny. The sleeper is not quite so isolated as first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The question of the ends of sleep raises inevitably the issue of what would be appropriate ends, or goals, 
for any phenomenology of sleep. 
41 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception, Translated by D.A. Landes. Abingdon, 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2012, pp. lxxvii – lxxviii 
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impressions suggest. 
 
However, to get a better initial idea of what is meant by this incompleteness of 
sleep, this never being finished, it is helpful to turn to the point of contrast between sleep 
and phenomenological procedures of suspension. In the latter case these are, at least in 
the Husserlian model, performed suspensions. One undertakes the reductions, it is a 
project, even if it is a necessarily incomplete one. However, in the case of sleep one might 
doubt that it even amounts to a project without end – a journey without a destination. In 
an important sense, the sense which has motivated our who-centred questions above, sleep 
is not something we perform, it is not an act or an undertaking for me. As our 
investigations continue these two points of similarity and one of difference can be seen 
as underlying the more concrete engagements with phenomenological philosophy and 
with sleep. 
 
Such an apparent and unstable proximity between sleep and the phenomenological 
practice of suspension suggests our own preferred method of initiating this testing of the 
limits of Nancy’s ban on, or limiting of, the phenomenology of sleep. We propose to 
begin with two suspensions, with the withdrawing of two fascinating questions. These 
suspensions will allow us to approach the phenomenon of sleep without distraction, 
without being drawn out beforehand into questions which, perhaps only superficially, 
relate to but are not central to our somnolent concerns. The two suspensions can both be 
understood as the suspension of questions of relation. They are the suspension of, firstly, 
the question of sleep’s relationship with dreams and, secondly, the question of sleep’s 
relationship with the body. 
 
We have already discussed why we might wish to avoid the thorny question of 
how dreams relate to sleep: are they within sleep, between it and waking, or simply 
projected back over it from waking – to consider just one beginning of the many puzzles 
that our night-time reveries raise. However, Nancy too seems to validate this 
phenomenological procedure of pulling back, withdrawing, from our standard conjoining 
of the questioning of sleep with that of dreams. As we saw above, Nancy is dismissive of 
the typical move to return to the play of appearances through appeal to the apparitions of 
REM sleep. Importantly, this suspension, like the epoché, does not take-up a position on 
sleep’s relationship with dreaming, it does not decide beforehand whether this 
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relationship is fundamental, auxiliary, internal, external, somnolent or wakeful. Our 
proposed suspension is of the question of this relationship itself. 
 
The second proposed suspension, with which this thesis takes its beginning, is the 
suspension of the question of sleep’s relationship to the body. Sleep is often taken as a 
‘bodily phenomenon’, as a concern that would not trouble us if we were immaterial, if 
“we were absolute mind”.42 In fact, in Christian theology those granted access to heaven 
will neither eat nor sleep again. This permanent insomnia, the reward of the faithful, is 
indicative of the way in which the Judaeo-Christian tradition has strongly associated our 
need for sleep with our material fallenness. The question remains, of course, what exactly 
the truth of this association is. However, once again this suspension is not a taking of one 
side against another in this debate – in the questioning of sleep’s relationship to the body. 
Instead, here as in the case of dreams, our suspension is of the question in its entirety not 
of a particular answer to it. 
 
The consequences of these initial phenomenological manoeuvres are twofold. 
Firstly, they allow us to limit the scope of our investigations. They hold us back from 
leaping into the discussions of dreams and scepticism with Descartes and later, from the 
Anglo-American tradition, Norman Malcolm and many others.43 They keep us, too, from 
a substantial engagement with the psychoanalytic work of Freud and his followers.44 
Likewise, the withdrawal from the body allows us to fend off the cries of ‘but we know 
what sleep does to the brain’ from the ever insistent neuroscientist. Though, consequently, 
it also requires us to hold off from any sustained engagement with the nuanced and 
fascinating phenomenology of the body offered throughout the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
As such these suspensions limit, without closing down completely, the question of sleep 
– they separate it. In so doing they directly contradict the demand made by Merleau-Ponty 
in our opening quotation for a unified philosophical solution to the problem of passivity. 
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43 Malcolm, Norman. Dreaming. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1959. This book and the articles which 
Malcolm published around it spawned an entire genre of post-Wittgensteinian responses to the Cartesian 
discussion of dreams. 
44 For our purposes this works both to limit our discussion of Freud and psychoanalysis as such, and also 
to prevent a potentially distracting detour through Nancy’s early work on Lacan and its relation to his 
sustained interest in sleep. In particular, his 1973 Le titre de la lettre, published as The Title of the Letter in 
English (Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. The Title of the Letter. A Reading of Lacan. 
Translated by Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 
	   17	  
Yet, and here we remain in close proximity to Merleau-Ponty, these suspensions 
share in the most important lesson of the phenomenological reduction – they illustrate 
“the impossibility of a complete reduction.”45 These reductions will not, and cannot, 
mitigate against the very possibility of all relations between sleep, dreams and the body. 
In fact, and here we take our initial starting point from Nancy rather than from the 
phenomenological tradition, it will be a fundamental feature of this thesis to observe – 
but without the detachment of an unconcerned observer – the falling, or slipping, away 
of these suspensions. The incompletion and temporary nature of our double suspensions 
is here shown to amount to their finitude. It is indeed a question of finitude. Nonetheless, 
we cannot here prescribe in advance a finite response to the question of sleep without first 
undertaking just such a response. However much these suspensions fall away they offer 
a point of contact with both phenomenology and with the sleeper. They grant us a place 
to begin our somnolent sojourn. Here we find the wherewithal to, like Nancy, “Never… 
shrink from a challenge”, to take on some of his “temerity” and to throw “caution” to the 
wind in tracing this fall to, through, or out of, a phenomenology of sleep.46 
 
IV: Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis traces a series of actual and possible phenomenological responses to 
Nancy’s somnolent challenge. It reconstructs a phenomenology of sleep, in diverse guises 
and with varying degrees of success – there is as much to be learned from the limitations 
of such accounts as from their successes. The thesis is divided into three distinct parts. 
Part I establishes the problem for any phenomenology of sleep as articulated in Nancy’s 
The Fall of Sleep (Chapter 1) before offering a specific, Husserlian, response via Nicolas 
de Warren’s article ‘The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep’ 
(Chapter 2). This initial testing of the limits of Nancy’s claims establishes what is at stake 
in, and the demands on, any Husserlian phenomenology of sleep. Part II, the largest of 
this thesis, leaves the actual and targeted response of de Warren and his tentative 
somnolent phenomenology for the hypothetical question ‘does Dasein sleep?’ This 
question, and the move to the consideration of Heideggerian thought, takes us both a step 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception, p. xv 
46 Derrida, Jacques. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. 
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further from phenomenology as a topic for historical examination and a step closer 
towards treating it as a living philosophy. Tracking the surprising absence of sleep in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Chapter 3) we turn to his deferred treatment of the question 
of life in the influential 1929/30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics. This step away from the absence of sleep and on to a potential, and yet 
bound, presence allows us to undertake a hypothetical and speculative Heideggerian 
phenomenology of sleep through the development of a revealing and concealing 
somnological-zoological analogy (Chapter 4). This following of Heidegger along his 
animal paths and the opening up of a somnolent track within, and yet also out of, his 
thinking reminds us that sleep is Janus-faced and looks not just towards the passivity of 
death but also to the movement and activity of life. 
 
The final part, Part III, begins by establishing a distance from our hypothetical 
Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep via Levinas’s intriguing account of sleep. In 
Levinas’s early post-war texts, Existence and Existents and Time and the Other, we 
encounter a new question, the question of the alterity of sleep. This turn to sleep’s alterity 
offers another phenomenological means of approaching sleep – one which aims to begin 
from the sleeper rather than subtract back from waking life to sleep. In this way, we 
encounter a Levinasian demand, never fully articulated or followed, to initiate philosophy 
from the somnolent. However, this encounter returns us to Nancy’s effort to undertake 
exactly this and allows us to, in the closing sections of this thesis, explore the striking 
points of contact and distance between Nancy and his phenomenological predecessors 
(Chapter 5). In the final analysis this thesis throws into relief these moments of contact, 
these moments when sleep, phenomenology, and Nancy’s work touch but without ever 
becoming a singular, unified, object. 
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Chapter 2 
‘The Inner Night’ or ‘Dissolution of the Self’? A Critical 
Reading of Nicolas de Warren’s ‘The Inner Night: Towards a 
Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep’ 
 
The truly difficult questions are the questions we continually postpone, and 
never truly face.1 
 
I: Introduction 
 
This epigraph both applies to the question of our thesis, the question of sleep, and 
frames the debate explored in this chapter. The question of sleep has not only been 
repeatedly postponed and side-lined in the history of philosophy but even on those, rare, 
occasions when it has been addressed such accounts often treat sleep as a derivative and 
secondary concern, they fail to “truly face” the question head-on. Such partial and 
secondary treatments of sleep tend to demote the importance of sleep in relation to waking 
life and in so doing to presuppose answers to, rather than engage with, the problem of 
sleep. Sleep, as it often does in everyday life, slips into the hazy background milieu of 
lived-experiences. 
 
 Yet a phenomenological topic or question which cannot find its origins in the 
writings of Edmund Husserl is simply not looking hard enough. Husserl wrote so 
prodigiously that we should not be surprised to discover sleep did not evade his attention. 
However, given the nature of Husserl’s phenomenology – an examination of the essential 
structures and genetic processes of givenness for the unity of consciousness – we might, 
nonetheless, be surprised at how close it came to doing so. Husserl postponed any 
sustained discussion of sleep until the 1930s, relatively late in his philosophical career 
and, even then, these late fragments on sleep are just that: fragments; short, “preliminary”, 
and never published as part of any larger project.2 Postpone the question Husserl surely 
did, but to what degree did his work on sleep truly face-up to sleep, and furthermore, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 De Warren, Nicolas. ‘The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep’, p. 276 
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which the problem of sleep is explicitly addressed – for example, in manuscript D-14 – Husserl’s 
phenomenology of sleep remained in a preliminary stage of formation.” ibid, p. 286 
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what extent could it do so? This chapter will undertake to assess these questions through 
a close reading of Nicolas de Warren’s, intriguing article ‘The Inner Night: Towards a 
Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep’, which is itself a direct response to the challenge 
from Nancy with which we have introduced this thesis. 
 
 One of the many strengths of de Warren’s article is that it provides an overview 
of Husserl’s concrete pronouncements on sleep as well as an account of their context 
within Husserl’s mature phenomenology. Not content to merely describe Husserl’s 
contribution to the phenomenology of sleep, de Warren also aims to use this preliminary 
work as a foundation for a complete phenomenological description of sleep. This grander 
task matches our own, although he explicitly excludes this goal from the scope of this, 
particular, article: “...I make no pretense to develop a complete phenomenological 
account of sleep”.3 
 
 Already de Warren’s approach to sleep shares another key feature with our own. 
It takes seriously the problem of sleep and as such rules out any direct phenomenology 
of sleep without this closing off any, and all, phenomenology of sleep. Such an “indirect 
approach” to sleep emerges out of de Warren’s opening discussion of the limits of our 
access to sleep: “we never, strictly speaking, experience our own condition of being 
asleep, that we are never conscious of being asleep while we sleep, but only experience 
sleep in the transitions of falling asleep and awakenings”.4 The role of these transitions 
will remain central to de Warren’s proto-phenomenology of sleep. Yet it is in Husserl’s 
metaphorical use of sleep, in his phenomenology of time-consciousness, that de Warren 
finds his avenue of approach to sleep itself. Metaphors afford us a means of discussing 
one set of concepts in terms only directly applicable to another. In this way de Warren 
acknowledges the privileged position of waking for the philosopher and yet gains a rich 
literary and philosophical reservoir for the investigating of sleep. “Whether in literary 
prose, in philosophical discourse or in ordinary talk, the condition of sleep is commonly 
characterized as a distance or retreat; as a state of rest and relaxation; as an absence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ibid, p. 276. The question of completeness and sleep is a particularly interesting one. Specifically, the 
implicit assumptions that de Warren makes about the nature of sleep by claiming the ability to offer only a 
partial account of sleep will be considered below. 
4 ibid, p. 274 
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differentiation; as a depth or submersion; as a state of non-being.”5 Whilst, of course, not 
an exhaustive list of the metaphorical engagements with sleep, de Warren, nonetheless, 
finds here one way of beginning an indirect phenomenology of sleep. 
 
 To further explore de Warren’s approach to sleep it is necessary to contrast it with 
the view he ascribes to Jean-Luc Nancy. 
 
If sleep is the condition in which nothing appears to me – in which I am not even 
for myself – is a phenomenology of sleep possible? In Jean-Luc Nancy’s words: 
“Il n’y a pas de phenomenology du sommeil, car il ne montre de soi qui sa 
disparition, son enfouissement et sa dérobade.” [“There does not exist a 
phenomenology of sleep since the self shows of itself only in its disappearance, 
its fleeting and its absence.”]6 
 
Nancy dismisses any phenomenological account of sleep whatsoever. De Warren 
explains this dismissal by reference to the Sartrean distinction between pour soi and en 
soi, or self and non-self. For Nancy, sleep collapses this distinction and thus prevents 
anything ‘appearing’ for anyone. This, de Warren points out, rests on Nancy’s 
“conception of sleep as the complete absence of any experience”.7 The central point of 
Nancy’s argument, which de Warren will take issue with, is that in sleep the self is, 
however temporarily, dissolved – “[t]he self does not retire to itself, but retires from itself 
in succumbing, or falling, into its own self-oblivion.”8 De Warren reads Nancy, as we did 
in our previous chapter, as describing the sleeper as a “‘thing in itself’”, as lacking “any 
relation to anything else, including itself.”9 
 
 It is this understanding of sleep that drives the refusal of any phenomenology of 
sleep and against which de Warren develops his alternative, Husserlian, account. De 
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Warren acknowledges in the opening pages of his article, as we have above, the intuitive 
weight of Nancy’s view of sleep as a dissipation of self. However, “Strictly speaking, if 
a phenomenology of sleep were impossible, the metaphorical meaning of sleep within 
phenomenological descriptions would remain without traction.”10 That our metaphorical 
descriptions of sleep seem apt at all – and it seems from their historical staying power 
that they do – would suggest that we have some minimal access to sleep. The absolute 
divide between the waking self and sleep, which Nancy describes, would surely prevent 
even this mediated, metaphor justifying, opening into sleep, and thus into the 
phenomenology of sleep. 
 
 It is, however, not obviously convincing that sleep being accessible to 
metaphorical description automatically equates to sleep being accessible to 
phenomenological description. Furthermore, Nancy, given the style of The Fall of Sleep, 
would surely not deny such metaphorical access to sleep. Thus the question becomes the 
move from indirect access to indirect phenomenological access. In other words, the 
disagreement, at least at this early stage in our assessment of de Warren’s article, appears 
to revolve around what would qualify as a phenomenology of sleep. By the end of this 
chapter we will, with de Warren, have identified one possible way of ascertaining this. 
Yet, the core contrast between Nancy and de Warren rests, primordially, not on a 
terminological or methodological question but rather a constitutive or topological one, on 
where one places the sleeper in relation to the waking self, or, as we will see, in relation 
to consciousness. Nancy sees sleep as dissolving the self and thus a radical break or 
difference between the waking and sleeping selves. In contrast, de Warren argues that 
sleep and waking are both fundamentally within consciousness, a position he unearths 
from Husserl’s mature writings. 
 
 De Warren begins by considering Husserl’s specific metaphorical use of sleep in 
his phenomenology of time-consciousness. With this in hand he moves on to discuss the 
specific fragments on sleep from manuscript D-14, and then, lastly, offers his own 
extension of Husserl’s phenomenology of sleep, through a comparison with the 
imagination. These three moves each clarify further both Husserl’s and de Warren’s 
understanding of sleep and where these differ from Nancy’s. In what follows we trace 
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each stage of de Warren’s argument in turn before considering the implications for the 
debate between Nancy and de Warren and, lastly, the connotations of this debate, more 
broadly, for sleep and a phenomenology thereof. However, before this tracking of de 
Warren’s course, a brief excursus, on that which de Warren explicitly excludes from his 
article, is required. 
 
II: Excursus: Limitations or Omissions? 
 
The quotation with which this chapter opens amounts, in its context in de 
Warren’s article, to an acknowledgement that many questions concerning and 
surrounding sleep will be excluded from ‘The Inner Night’. Any piece of work, let alone 
a journal article, must place limits on its scope and at the end of de Warren’s introduction 
we are furnished with his own. Three questions, or groups of questions, will be excluded 
from consideration, of which we will consider the two most significant to us. We must 
now briefly consider to what degree, if any, these explicit limits may guide us as we 
consider de Warren’s argument in more detail in what follows. 
 
 Firstly, de Warren, is: 
 
...concerned exclusively with dreamless or profound sleep. The 
phenomenological constitution of dreams and other manifest occurrences during 
sleep – somnambulism, nightmares, sleep talking, etc. – represent “higher order” 
problems of constitution that are here excluded.11 
 
Dreams have, so we have argued, long been the misguided focus of discussions of sleep. 
With this in mind de Warren’s decision to exclude dreams and all other ‘sleep 
phenomena’ from his consideration of sleep is surely to be applauded. Not only does such 
a decision shift the focus back onto the neglected heart of sleep but it also raises the 
essential problematic of the relationship between this aspect of sleep and those very 
phenomena which tend to have been treated in, relative, isolation – dreams etc. De 
Warren’s description of these phenomena as “higher order” advances the view that the 
neglected heart of sleep – the abyss of sleep – is prior to, or more primordial than, dreams. 
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 However, importantly, this decision to focus on dreamless sleep is not equivalent 
to the suspension of the question of the relation between sleep and dreams we offered in 
our previous Chapter.12 De Warren, in contrast, implicitly delimits that relationship by 
claiming that it is possible to isolate ‘dream-less sleep’ from ‘dream-full sleep’. One 
might wonder whether, conversely, this impinging relationship that dreams seem to 
demonstrate on the other – negative – side of sleep is not mirrored in the other direction. 
To clarify, perhaps the constitution of sleep, as a whole, is such that the negative heart of 
sleep cannot be conceived without these “higher order” phenomena which de Warren is 
here excluding from his article. This holistic and interconnected conception of sleep 
would militate against a sharp separation between two distinct parts of sleep and thus 
prevent a clear exclusion of dreams from de Warren’s article. Furthermore, as we will 
see, de Warren’s own argument might in fact benefit from the inclusion of dreams and 
other ‘sleep phenomena’. 
 
 There is a more general concern about this category of “dreamless or profound 
sleep”. In presuming the possibility of this exemption de Warren must show that one of 
the common metaphorical descriptions of sleep, which he himself cites, “as an absence 
of differentiation” is mistaken.13 For if sleep indeed constitutes an inner night where 
differentiation fails then it makes no sense to talk of different types of sleep such as 
dreamless, ‘disturbed’, or content-full, sleep. De Warren cites Hegel as saying “sleep is 
the condition in which the soul is plunged in its unity without difference...”.14 If sleep is 
a condition within which differentiation is impossible then we must ask how one could 
distinguish between different types of sleep without this surpassing the definitional 
constraint? If this is correct it would seem to demonstrate that de Warren holds a hidden 
premise that sleep does not amount to the dissolution of self and other as Nancy argues. 
Yet to presume thus, prior to arguing, suggests that de Warren is narrowing the scope of 
the debate between the two positions – by excluding dreams from his article – in an 
unjustified manner.  
 
 There are at least two replies open to de Warren. Firstly, he might argue that 
phenomenologically we clearly do distinguish between those periods of sleep which 
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contain dreams and those which do not. Thus any description of sleep which prescribed 
against distinctions of type of sleep would be phenomenologically bankrupt. 
Alternatively, de Warren might argue that the indistinguishable character of sleep is of a 
specific concept of sleep – one which we in fact never undergo. This “absolute sleep” is 
the sleep which Hegel has in mind and is what de Warren will call “the limit of falling 
asleep.”15 “In the absolute of sleep, all the cows are indeed black” but in falling asleep – 
a process which for de Warren will come to include all states which we in fact pass 
through during times when ordinary language describes us as ‘being asleep’ – some cows 
are black and some have white spots.16 De Warren will argue the latter of these options 
whilst using the former phenomenological claim to support his contention about the 
distinction between the actual processes of ‘falling asleep’, which we experience nightly, 
and the limit condition for these – ‘absolute sleep’. We return to this issue below. 
 
 Secondly, de Warren “makes no pretense to develop a complete 
phenomenological account of sleep” and will not assess all metaphorical uses of sleep.17 
These are, of course, reasonable limitations and yet, nonetheless, they raise specific 
questions about what follows. At this stage we need only sketch the concerns that arise 
from such constraints. Much of de Warren’s following argument will rest on his 
contention that sleep is temporary.18 Whilst we will more critically discuss this claim later 
it is important at this stage to recognise that sleep’s supposed temporary nature can only 
be established by at the very least a ‘conceptual framing’ of sleep. Such a ‘conceptual 
framing’ amounts to the delimiting of the borders or limits of sleep so as to distinguish as 
clearly as possible between what is to be taken as sleep and what is not. This is not to 
argue that de Warren must provide a complete account of sleep but rather that his later 
claims will rely on a comprehensive conceptual circumnavigation – though not a 
conceptual filling in – of sleep. Furthermore, this temporary nature of sleep is particularly 
related to one of the specific metaphorical descriptions of sleep which de Warren excludes 
from the discussion – sleep as a temporary death. In note 7 de Warren excludes the 
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relationship between sleep and death from consideration.19 This particular exclusion, 
along with the other two, is called into question through the following discussion. 
 
III: Time-consciousness and the Metaphor of Sleep 
 
We should begin, with the second section of de Warren’s article, in sketching 
Husserl’s philosophy of time-consciousness. It is important to note that Husserl’s 
understanding of time-consciousness developed and changed significantly as his 
phenomenology shifted from what he himself called a ‘static phenomenological method’ 
to a ‘genetic phenomenology’ or ‘phenomenology of genesis’.20 Specifically, Husserl’s 
appreciation of the centrality of time-consciousness for the constitution of consciousness 
itself developed out of his initial – static – interest in what he called ‘time-objects’ – de 
Warren uses the example of a melody. Within a melody every note has its own givenness 
in the ‘now-phase’ but that is not the limit of its givenness. Every note is given emptily 
in protention before its original presentation in its ‘now-phase’ and is retained in 
retentional consciousness after its ‘now-phase’ has passed. One can think of this as the 
logical extension of Husserl’s concept of apperception over time. Some objects – like 
melodies – show quite clearly that what is intuitively given to us phenomenologically is 
not reducible to a ‘snap-shot’ or moment in time. More is revealed phenomenologically 
than the mere now, just as more is revealed when we see a book than merely the front 
cover. This in turn led Husserl to see that any “perceptual act of consciousness possesses 
an internal architecture of three non-independent forms of temporal apprehension: 
retention, original presentation, and protention.”21 De Warren is quick to point out that 
these forms of temporal apprehension are related in the “passage or sinking away” of the 
now – the flow of time.22 These forms are all intuitive but in different ways. Original 
presentation provides the presence of the now which is then given in retentional 
consciousness as a now-phase which is “just-past” – essentially this is not a remembered 
representation of the original presentation but rather another, different, form of intuitive 
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givenness – and which was prefigured by protention as a “now-phase as not-yet-given, as 
given in an empty manner, or “emptily” in character.”23 
 
 From this time-object orientated account Husserl came to see that “the possibility 
of consciousness as such, as intentionality, is temporal through and through, and, in this 
regard, constituted in time-consciousness.”24 This key shift in Husserl’s thinking will be 
of essential importance for de Warren’s argument. To see why, let us consider the 
corresponding noematic and noetic sides of time-consciousness. De Warren shows these 
two sides of Husserl’s philosophy of time-consciousness thus: “Husserl specifies that 
along with the necessary retention of an earlier now-phase as just-past, consciousness 
retains itself...”.25 This ‘self-retaining’ of consciousness involves preserving the now-
phase of each time-object and thus we have a “double-intentionality of retentional 
consciousness”.26 On the noematic side, that which is given temporally, we have cross-
intentionality. Whereas on the noetic side, that of the act of consciousness as receiving 
givenness, we have length-intentionality. If the former involves a crossing-out, 
modification, of the original presentation of a now-phase into a now-phase as just-past 
then the latter establishes “a “stretch-continuum” in which different phases of 
consciousness, along with their nested intentional correlations, over-lap in the mode of 
sedimentation.”27 
 
 It is this length-intentionality which underpins Husserl’s shift from static 
phenomenology to genetic. It is necessary to understand how this process of 
sedimentation of lengthwise retentional consciousness connects to the distinction 
between self and other. It is precisely this “stretch-continuum” which allows the 
unification of a pole of consciousness over time. If Husserl had only cross-intentionality 
then he would be unable to account for the most fundamental feature of (the noetic side 
of) time-consciousness – that temporal intervals, and in fact all experiences, are given for 
one unified pole of consciousness. Time-consciousness is individualising. Thus time-
consciousness, as genesis, amounts to the condition for the possibility of any unified 
consciousness. For de Warren, this “constitutive function” of retentional consciousness is 
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of the upmost importance.28 The relationship between time-consciousness and self-
consciousness is far from simple in Husserl’s work. Yet, for de Warren, and for our us, it 
is enough to see that this relationship avoids certain difficulties as well as “establishing 
the sense in which the past transcends consciousness of the now, and, in this temporal 
transcendence, of how consciousness transcends itself.”29 
 
 It is in retentional consciousness that the process of sedimentation or the ““de-
presentification” of the intuitive fullness and “living presence” of an original 
presentation” occurs and it is here that Husserl introduces the metaphor of sleep.30 
 
Husserl relies on an array of characterizations to describe this function of 
retentional consciousness as “de-presentification:” going to sleep, sinking into a 
depth, emptying of intuitive affectivity and vivacity, and erasing all 
differentiation.31 
 
De Warren sees Husserl as using these metaphors to describe the transformative process 
of “de-presentification” that we undergo within time-consciousness from the intuitive 
fullness of the “original presentation” through the givenness, in “near retention”, of the 
now-phase as just-past / no longer, to “the undifferentiated unity of far retention... which 
extinguishes all differentiations”.32 Husserl’s aim is to describe the three stages of present, 
just-past but still “within the arc of living present”,33 and the past proper – still within 
consciousness: the past remains through sedimentation. This results in two stages of 
retentional consciousness – “near retention” and “far retention”. Husserl’s metaphorical 
use of sleep is thus the description of this process of transformation within retentional 
consciousness from near retention – “falling asleep” – to far retention – “being asleep”. 
 
 It is here that de Warren’s argument proper, through Husserl’s metaphorical use 
of falling asleep and being asleep, opens. He argues that Husserl places the metaphors of 
wakefulness, falling asleep, and being asleep “within the over-arching wakeful life of 
consciousness”.34 We can now see that these three correspond to three stages of time-
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consciousness – original presentation, near retention, and far retention, respectively – 
however, it is essential to understand that this metaphorical use of sleep to describe the 
sedimentation of the present into the past operates at a number of levels for de Warren. 
This “sinking into the “realm of the dead” or “dormant horizonal sphere”” operates on 
both the noematic and the noetic sides of life.35 In retentional consciousness we have a 
process of slipping away not only of the intuitive fullness of the given but also “the self-
givenness of consciousness for itself.”36 Fundamentally the distinction between the 
metaphor of the “realm of the dead” and the “dormant horizonal sphere” allows Husserl 
to distinguish the sedimentation of consciousness from its dissolution or destruction.  
 
 First, however, another aspect of the metaphorical use of sleep shows itself: sleep 
is not something which comes from outside of consciousness for Husserl but rather is – 
just as we saw when considering the relationship between time-consciousness and self-
consciousness above – an aspect of the constitutive function of retentional consciousness. 
 
In the over-lapping running off of consciousness along the length-wise 
intentionality of (self)-retention, consciousness covers over its own 
accomplishment of the living present. The metaphor of sedimentation means a 
“covering over” or “self-forgetting” of consciousness: consciousness “de-
presentifies” itself in its own temporal self-constitution.37 
 
This connecting of the process of retention with the constitution of self-consciousness 
through the metaphor of sleep shows that for Husserl, and for de Warren, sleep is 
essentially an active and internal part of the process of self-constitution which 
consciousness develops. In giving sleep – as a metaphorical device – such primacy in the 
constituting of consciousness Husserl brings to light what de Warren calls “an original 
difference, and tension, between the self-abstention and self-presence of 
consciousness.”38 This internalising of sleep – which is a hallmark of all three of de 
Warren’s Husserlian descriptions of sleep – has the notable advantage that it accounts for 
what might be called the horizonal presence of sleep as absent. That is that it shows sleep 
as always with us, as that which we – as waking consciousness within the day – have 
come from and are on our way to. This, always, sits alongside, and in tension with, the 
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wakefulness of life, or, in other words our openness to the world and to ourselves. 
Reminding us of retention’s constitutive role in self-consciousness shows, for de Warren, 
that “the falling asleep of consciousness, as a characterization of retentional 
consciousness, does not intrude onto an already constituted wakeful sphere from the 
outside.”39 
 
 As mentioned above, Husserl’s use of the metaphor of being asleep cannot be 
conflated with a complete submersion in the “realm of the dead”. Far retention does not 
amount to the loss of the past but rather the sedimentation of the living present as past 
and thus the constituting of consciousness. In far retention consciousness creates, through 
a process of covering-over and self-forgetting, a past for itself. “In this regard, the 
metaphor of sleep defines the sense in which the past that I have become is “unconscious” 
without being beyond the reach of consciousness.”40 In elaborating this point, de Warren 
uses the example of locking your front door, forgetting whether you have locked the door 
and rushing back to check. Through far retentional consciousness we put our past to sleep 
as a past which is not annihilated – we might remember that we have locked the door – 
but which is still not directly conscious for us in contrast to the manner in which the now 
of the present is, it is temporarily lost or put into stasis. It is to this question, the question 
of memory and the sedimented past, that we must move in order to clarify one of the most 
important aspects of Husserl’s metaphorical uses of sleep. 
 
 De Warren describes two functions of far retention. The first Husserl called 
“original association” and amounts to the passive association of the past with a present 
experience such as seeing something as familiar or resuming an activity after an 
interruption. This associating of past with present requires that the past – whilst not held 
present for consciousness – is still available to us. This tacit knowledge, that far retention 
allows, underpins the very possibility of remembrance which is itself the second function 
Husserl gave far retention – “remembrance presupposes the dual service of near and far 
retentions.”41 This shows, according to de Warren, that sleep is used metaphorically as 
constituting “the possibility of return”.42 As we will see this ties in with his key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ibid, p. 282 
40 ibid 
41 ibid, p. 283 
42 ibid 
	   31	  
characterisation of sleep as temporary and, as such, as constituting the possibility of a 
return to waking life. This conception of sleep is in turn used, metaphorically by Husserl, 
to found the description of remembrance as an “awakening”.43 
 
 Remembrance is for Husserl operative on both the noematic and noetic registers 
in that what is remembered is not merely the givenness of the noematic object of 
experience but also the act of experience itself – the consciousness, or self, of the past. 
This return to presence of the self resembles waking in that we are brought back not only 
to the world but also to ourselves. For de Warren and Husserl, the self that does the 
remembering must be the unifying pole of consciousness which we each individually are, 
whilst the world may have changed quite dramatically in contrast. This is summarised by 
de Warren thus: “Remembrance is an awakening – consciousness is once again “alive” 
and “given,” as if a particular act of consciousness regained its consciousness, not in its 
original form or characterization, but in a reproduced form, as given again in a now that 
it no longer calls its own.”44 This shows that despite the retaining of a co-identity between 
these two temporally distinct selves there nonetheless is an essential difference between 
the regained consciousness and the consciousness which undertakes the remembrance 
itself. Such a difference demonstrates that the possibility of remembrance is not only 
based on the passive sedimentation of the past through retention but also on an active act 
of remembrance in the present. “Remembrance is based on the consciousness of a 
difference, or distance, between the remembered past (self) and the self that remembers; 
the difference between the remembering consciousness that is literally awake and the 
metaphorical re-awakening of a past consciousness.”45 This clarifies Husserl’s use of the 
metaphors of sleep and waking as being placed within or “situated within a wakeful 
consciousness as such.”46 
 
 De Warren closes Section II of ‘The Inner Night’ with an exploration of what is 
meant by “wakeful consciousness as such”. Perhaps most importantly this type of wakeful 
consciousness must be distinguished from the metaphorical use of waking which Husserl 
uses in relation to sleep, retention, and remembrance. Furthermore, Husserl is explicit in 
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contrasting ‘waking consciousness’ with attention. Whereas attention is directed towards 
objects and may be more or less acute, wakefulness as such is “the openness of 
consciousness to experience as such”.47 However, the two most important features of this 
wakeful consciousness – to which de Warren will return – are; its independence, as 
opposed to mere distinctness, from attention and that it is a “form of time-
consciousness.”48 We may lack attention completely whilst still being a wakeful 
consciousness. Yet, wakefulness still constitutes a form of time-consciousness – and thus 
constitutes the self-other distinction – in that it “is a consciousness of the temporal 
duration of experience – the experience of intervals, not only of objects in time, but of 
consciousness itself to the extent that consciousness itself comes to pass, and is 
intrinsically self-conscious of its temporality, in the registering of the temporal duration 
of objects.”49 This is what Husserl calls “a living toward” and thus we may see how 
temporal objects supervene on this wakeful consciousness as such. However, not only 
temporal objects but also all other, subordinate, aspects of time-consciousness rely on this 
basic level of wakefulness for Husserl. In the following section we will follow de 
Warren’s analysis of the place of sleep, as a type of time-consciousness, within the 
overarching structure of time-consciousness already described. 
 
IV: Affectivity, Imagination and Sleep 
 
Our proceeding assessment of Husserl’s philosophy of time-consciousness has 
already shown how the importance of time-consciousness altered for Husserl. Under the 
static phenomenological method time-consciousness is but one of many potential regions 
of consciousness which may be analysed, however, by the 1930s Husserl’s shift to genetic 
phenomenology had led him to see time-consciousness as foundational and constitutive 
of consciousness. His focus on the monadic unity of streaming consciousness, on the 
genesis of consciousness, led Husserl to regard the inclusion of the distinction between 
sleep and waking as “...a “necessary expansion” and “a correction” of his analysis of time-
consciousness (D-14/3).”50 This correction was the result of the realisation that sleep, and 
the gaps in memory which come with it, bring into question the unity of streaming 
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consciousness. “This problem of sleep, of how consciousness falls into sleep, is situated 
in the context of a reflection on the constitution of the life of consciousness as a whole, 
indeed, of consciousness as a life, in its self-constituting stream of temporality, which is 
constituted through alternating periods of sleep and wakefulness, of night and day.”51 
Husserl’s worry is that sleep might “present the problem of the temporary interruption or 
suspension of time-consciousness”.52 Such an interruption threatens the unity of the 
whole of consciousness in that it raises the problem of what holds these separate temporal 
intervals together as one unified pole. As we saw in our introduction to this Chapter 
Husserl made a provisional attempt to explain this unity and of sleep itself in manuscript 
D-14. De Warren contrasts this attempt with what he calls the “master-metaphor” of sleep 
and waking which relates to the “constitution of time-consciousness in Husserl’s 
thinking.”53 In the following section Husserl’s own, phenomenological, description of 
sleep will be elaborated, as will de Warren’s own proposed extension to it. 
 
Husserl’s initial response is through the analogy of the chain. Just as a physical 
chain is composed of interlinked pieces, time-consciousness, for Husserl, only amounts 
to a unified whole in that “there is over-lap in the sense that earlier periods of wakefulness 
can be recalled in the form of remembrance.”54 This ‘mediation’ of the past through 
remembrance offers an initial answer to the problem of sleep as a gap or suspension of 
consciousness. De Warren cites an extract from D-14 which he translates as: “Today has 
the remembrance of yesterday in itself, yesterday has the remembrance of the day before, 
etc. all of theme [sic] in mediation”.55 This route is required for precisely the reasons de 
Warren offered at the beginning of his article – sleep itself “is not “lived through” or 
experienced.”56 The analogy of the chain has the added advantage that it shows sleep to 
be “itself a temporary phenomenon”.57 As we saw above this conception of sleep is 
extremely important at various points for de Warren.58 Here the focus on the temporary 
nature of sleep shifts the discussion from what is sleep itself onto the neighbouring 
phenomena of falling asleep and waking-up. 
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We have to understand how consciousness falls asleep and awakens; and what 
kind of self-modification of temporality is sleep. Sleep becomes a central 
problem for Husserl due to his view of consciousness as fundamentally “self-
constituting” and “consciousness through and through.”59 
 
This problem – the problem of the self-modification of temporality in sleep – is clearly a 
result of genetic phenomenology’s return to the primacy of the “distinction between “Ich 
[ego] und Ichfremdes [and ego-foreign]” (D-14/7b).”60 
 
 The distinction between self and other – Sartre’s distinction between pour soi and 
en soi again – is for Husserl dependent on the constituting unity of time-consciousness. 
However, it is precisely within this distinction that Husserl’s own account of sleep – as 
de Warren finds it in D-14 – is developed. “Consciousness is being-affected” in that the 
constituted consciousness is not alone in the world but is rather amidst a plethora of 
“hyletic sensations” which, each to differing degrees, reach, or ‘call’, out to it.61 
 
The world is not mute; it affects consciousness in different ways, clamouring for 
attention and engagement. It is... in heeding the call of affections, [that the ego] 
awakes to the world.62 
 
De Warren takes this description of affectivity from the lectures on passive synthesis. 
However, the world is affective not in a regimented or orderly manner, rather “the basic 
structure… of affection is conflict.”63 Sensations, for Husserl, “struggle for existence 
(“Kampf ums Dasein”)”, for intuitively our ‘attention’, and as such a “landscape” of 
saliencies is constructed to which “an awakened ego (“wache Ich”)” may respond in 
different manners or not at all.64 And yet, fundamentally, this is a ““double concept” of 
affectivity (D-14/10b)” as it concerns the noematic force of affections and the noetic 
interest of the ego.65 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 ibid 
60 ibid 
61 ibid 
62 ibid 
63 ibid 
64 ibid, p. 289 
65 ibid 
	   35	  
 It is in relation to this ““double concept” of affectivity” that Husserl situates the 
sleeping and waking distinction drawn in D-14: 
 
The distinction between sleep and being-awake is a “fundamental distinction in 
affectivity” (D-14/10b). Sleep and being-awake are two modes of affectivity, or 
being-affected.66 
 
This, intuitive, connecting of the concepts of sleep and affectivity generates a second pair 
of definitions for waking and sleeping.67 Wachheit, waking,68 is defined by Husserl as the 
state of the ego when it is “constantly “answering” or “responding” to affections”.69 This 
is contrasted with sleep which is the condition when “[a]ffections touch the ego, yet they 
are lacking in force.”70 De Warren interprets this distinction thus: 
 
In sleep, consciousness has insulated or immunized itself, not from affections 
per se, but from the force of affections. In this manner, the ego has a “distance” 
(“Abständigkeit”) towards the hyletic sensations, and, thus a distance from the 
world.71 
 
Here we see the mature Husserl’s understanding of sleep from the noematic side, as 
reconstructed by de Warren, and, thus, we must now consider the noetic side – the interest 
of the ego in these affections. 
 
 Affection must, Husserl argues, include interest – the active ‘turning towards’ of 
the ego – as well as forceful affections. This ‘turning towards’, we must not forget, is not 
to be taken as some kind of reflective decision on the part of the ego – though these 
decisions would, themselves, be impossible without this aspect of consciousness. Instead 
it is our interests as such which form the nexus of interests we describe as a self or a 
system of values. Consider the phenomenon of unexpectedly hearing one’s name called 
out. In this instance the affective force is precisely the result of a nexus of interests that 
equate to the self being associated with, or named by, the sound just heard. One looks for 
the source precisely because it is of ‘interest’ – on this pre-theoretical and pre-cognitive 
level. “If we consider both sides of affection – force and interest – we are able to establish 
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the sense in which sleep is not only the “forcelessness of affections” but also the 
“disinterestedness” of consciousness, not only for affections, but with regard to itself.”72 
 
 This disinterestedness of consciousness “with regard to itself” is key for 
understanding de Warren’s relationship to Nancy’s conception of sleep. However, it is 
also one of the essential steps which allow him to connect Husserl’s metaphorical use of 
sleep with the explanation of literal sleep through the structure of affectivity. This 
“double-sided” nature of sleep allows Husserl to see falling asleep as a process of 
““letting go” or “sinking away” (“Sinken-Lassens”) [which] is a mode of my entire life 
of consciousness.”73 However, such accounts of sleep – such as “allowing the world and 
myself to slip away and come to a rest”74 – should once again remind us of the connection 
between metaphorical deployments of sleep and death, or even of suicide, and thus also 
of de Warren’s explicit exclusion of this relationship from consideration. 
 
 This understanding of falling asleep as a process of “sinking away” connects with 
Husserl’s metaphorical use of sleep to elucidate the process of sedimentation through 
retentive consciousness. The comparison goes further: just as the de-presentification 
process approaches a limit of undifferentiation and forcelessness so too does the process 
of falling asleep – as Husserl understands it in relation to affectivity. Falling asleep 
approaches the limit of forcelessness of affectivity as we have seen and as such a 
distinction emerges which rests at the heart of de Warren’s interpretation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology of sleep. This is the distinction between “absolute time-consciousness – 
the self-manifestation of the immanent stream of consciousness – and wakeful 
consciousness”.75 As we saw above wakeful consciousness consists in an openness to the 
world and sensations as such.76 In contrast to this Husserl describes the temporality of 
sleep as: ““forceless unawake temporalization” (“kraftlose unwacher [sic] Zeitigung”) 
(D-14/12a).”77 Essentially both these forms of temporality operate within absolute time-
consciousness for Husserl. In this sense “the temporalization of consciousness in its 
absolute self-constitution is more basic than the distinction between wakefulness and 
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sleep”.78 However: “Sleep is an affection of consciousness in which affections lack force, 
but also, self-affection of consciousness itself – its self-temporalization – must also lack 
force, and thus, in this sense, be seen as temporarily neutralized from within, as if 
consciousness absented itself from itself, that is, rendered itself immune to the affective 
force of its own self-affection.”79 Thus it is within time-consciousness as such – absolute 
time-consciousness – that sleep and waking operate, just as, what de Warren called the 
“original difference, and tension, between the self-abstention and self-presence of 
consciousness”80 operates through retentional consciousness within time-consciousness 
as a whole. 
 
 This “mirroring” of the sinking away of retentional consciousness and falling 
asleep as sinking away extends, according to de Warren, to the process – or “transition” 
– itself.81 The transition is – as with near and far retention – between falling asleep and 
being asleep. De Warren’s claim is that being asleep is never an actualisable, or actual, 
mode of consciousness. Just as the process of sedimentation of far retention is not to be 
simply equated with the permanent loss or destruction of intuitive givenness, so too for 
Husserl and de Warren the loss of consciousness in sleep is temporary and partial. In this 
manner de Warren describes being asleep as an “ideal limit of complete self-
abstention.”82 
 
 De Warren’s claimed reconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenology of sleep is 
based on extracts from fragment D-14 and, given the highly ambiguous nature of these 
fragments, it is useful to reproduce them in full here: 
 
As Husserl writes: “Sleep itself is the limit of this mode, the limit of a complete 
relaxation of affection and lack of action, the relaxation of the will and its 
absence.” (D-14/22). In sleep, consciousness has become transformed into a “the 
limit of a wakeful mode of the will’s relaxation that is not directly experienced 
because every experience is itself in the mode of a wakeful activity.” (D-
14/23).83 
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We will return to these difficult quotations shortly, but for now it is enough to see that 
sleep is presented as a limit – an ideal limit. It is from this claim that de Warren’s most 
interesting and radical claim about sleep is made. Namely, that we “are never truly 
entirely asleep much as we are never entirely awake.”84 As mentioned above,85 de Warren 
is here precluding what he terms “absolute sleep” in favour of a constant “process of 
falling asleep”.86 This appears to be a moment of extreme contrast between the Husserlian 
account of sleep and Nancy’s. Furthermore, it is here that the most fundamental problems 
with de Warren’s arguments begin to emerge. Before comparing these analyses let us 
consider de Warren’s parting words – his extension of Husserl’s preliminary 
phenomenology of sleep. 
 
 Husserl has, so de Warren argues, given us a structural account of sleep in relation 
to “de-presentification” and “self-abstention”.87 However, what remains to be considered 
is the manner, or “how”, of the enacting of this structure and the related process in the 
case of sleep. De Warren’s proposed expanding of Husserlian phenomenology of sleep 
amounts to the suggestion that a fruitful comparison between the “function of “de-
presentification” in the imagination and its temporality” and that in sleep might be 
possible.88 In imagination we explicitly extract ourselves from the “original presentation” 
and construct an imaginary object – and an imaginary act of consciousness – merely out 
of retention and protention. In this sense imagination “is constituted in a “headless” 
temporalization.”89 This is analogous with sleep in that imagination is a “modification of 
consciousness” which lacks “presence” and as such resembles the “more radical, or 
profound” de-presentification of consciousness in sleep. 
 
We have the temporary suspension of the arc of the living present, but we still 
have the dimensions of far retention and far protention... ...when I awake and 
open my eyes, I find all of my yesterdays in far retention return to me as well as 
all my tomorrows there before me, as if, despite the self-oblivion from which I 
am just emerging, the unity of my life, as a project of temporalization that has 
been and still will be, returns to itself, but not from where I had, the evening 
before taken leave of myself.90 
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In this, de Warren’s last argument, the imagination’s functioning as a modification of 
time-consciousness has the advantage that unlike sleep the imagination has received a 
significant amount of attention, in Husserl’s work. So de Warren’s method of slowly, 
piece by piece, developing the structure of sleep through various metaphors and 
analogies, progresses. 
 
V: “No one puts himself to sleep: sleep comes from elsewhere.”91 
 
With de Warren’s three strides towards a phenomenology of sleep outlined we 
can now draw out the core commitments of these arguments and compare them with 
Nancy’s position. Such comparison leads us to, first of all, consider de Warren’s explicit 
criticisms of Nancy’s position and how they relate to his reconstruction of a Husserlian 
phenomenology of sleep. 
 
 De Warren’s objections to Nancy’s conception of sleep can be seen as threefold: 
the first is methodological; the second is – what I have been describing as – topological;92 
and the third is functional. The methodological objection from de Warren is that Nancy 
is too quick to proclaim a phenomenology of sleep impossible. The topological critique 
aims at Nancy’s placing of sleep outside of consciousness and, fundamentally, the self-
other distinction. Finally, the functional objection relates – in impinging on the 
topological worry – to the function of the concept of sleep and the specific question of 
‘how one wakes-up again from sleep?’ Given its centrality and the clarity of the 
disagreement we will deal first with de Warren’s topological concern. 
 
 Sleep’s place – or the place of sleep – in relation to the constitution of self 
occupies the heart of the debate between Nancy and de Warren.93 The title of our section 
demonstrates Nancy’s view of sleep as coming from outside the self and as dissolving or 
dissipating the key separation between self and other through its operation. If sleep indeed 
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“comes from elsewhere”, and in so doing dispels the distinction between self and non-
self, then we can quickly see why it is that de Warren is concerned. Husserlian 
phenomenology is committed to the thorough-going nature of consciousness and, all 
importantly, consciousness as “self-constituting”.94 Sleep cannot act from the outside of 
consciousness – dissolving and reassembling it – and consciousness still be, exclusively, 
self-constituting. 
 
 We have already seen how, in his first approach to sleep, de Warren demonstrates 
that Husserl’s metaphorical use of sleep operates within the overarching framework of 
time-consciousness. Retentional consciousness is involved, as a key gear in a grander 
mechanism, in the self-constituting of consciousness as the unifying pole of experience 
and thus is not outside or prior to the self and non-self distinction. The sedimentation of 
lived experience through retentive consciousness is described, by Husserl, as falling 
asleep – precisely because it mirrors the temporary nature of sleep and it operates within 
the self-constitution of a consciousness. Consciousness constructs a history for itself 
which survives the tapering off of the living present and remains accessible through 
sedimentation, as opposed to dissipating or being destroyed. Of course, this process of 
de-presentification, metaphorical falling asleep, operates during literal waking 
consciousness. 
 
 But what of Husserl’s actual understanding of sleep as the temporary self-
abstention from those ‘interests’ which make us ourselves, and thus from the field of 
forceful affections as well? “Nancy’s view of sleep as the condition in which the self has 
– temporarily – retired from itself is only possible when situated within the distinction of 
pour soi and en soi, or, in other words, Ichlichkeit [I-sensitivity] and hylé [traditionally 
matter, but for Husserl the noematic side of the phenomena].”95 With sleep established as 
the loss of forceful affectivity for consciousness sleep is placed within consciousness. 
Thus the distinction between ‘waking consciousness’ and the ““forceless unawake 
temporalization”” of sleep is situated within “absolute time-consciousness”.96 “When 
Husserl speaks of “unwache Zeitigung” [un-awake temporalization] he means the 
expression “unwache” as equivalent to “lifeless” and “unconscious,” but not in the sense 
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of lacking consciousness, or, indeed, of lacking an intrinsic self-consciousness, but rather 
in the sense of without force.”97 In what does this foundational absolute time-
consciousness consist? Before considering this, however, we must see that this 
disagreement between Nancy and de Warren is not merely topological but also connects 
with the question of activity and passivity in sleep. 
 
 In moving into this interpretation of the debate between Nancy and de Warren we 
will, quite naturally, progress into an assessment of the benefits of each position. Nancy 
sees sleep as acting from without and as thus exerting an influence or power over us. In 
this regard, contrary to de Warren’s consciousness that “has insulated or immunized 
itself” from the world and from itself, Nancy sees the self as at the mercy of sleep.98 This 
disagreement touches upon a core ambiguity at the heart of sleep.  
 
 My sleep – just as my death – is my own. No one can sleep another’s sleep for 
them. This, alongside the kind of language we use when discussing sleep, ‘how did you 
sleep?’, ‘I’m just going to sleep’, and ‘go get some sleep’, lends support to de Warren and 
Husserl’s conception of sleep in which we undertake, or partake in, the act of sleeping. 
This understanding of the sleeper also coheres with the internalising of sleep which we 
saw above – sleep is part of our lives in a manner which strikingly distinguishes it from 
death.99 Nancy’s description of sleep risks, it seems, transforming sleep into an alien or 
intrusive force which comes over us from without – much as anthropomorphised 
portrayals of hooded and scythe wielding death do. This draws upon Nancy’s connecting 
of the notions of fall and sleep. One undergoes a fall, it happens to you, but you do not 
actively engage in falling.100 This tellingly applies to sleep in that de Warren’s active 
picture of consciousness putting itself to sleep seems to diminish the affective 
phenomenological side of sleep. In this sense sleep displays a genuine and fundamental 
tension in that it is part of our lives and yet is not ‘lived through’ or actively partaken in 
as are the aspect of our waking lives.101 The sleep walker walks but would we say that 
they act during such somnolent strolls?  
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99 The question of sleep and death returns like a revenant, and will continue to haunt our analyses. 
100 The interesting, and perhaps special, case of ‘falling’ in love deserves more consideration than we can 
here offer. 
101 This tension and the problematic of in what way sleep is lived through motivates our fourth chapter, 
which focuses on Heidegger, life and sleep. 
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 This tension and how it relates to Nancy and de Warren’s accounts of sleep is 
exacerbated in considering the third of de Warren’s critiques of Nancy – the functional 
worry: ‘how can Nancy’s conception of sleep account for a return from sleep, for waking 
up.’ De Warren’s charge is that Nancy’s conception of sleep – as external to, and a radical 
emptying out of, consciousness – leaves the self “petrified into the darkness of a “thing 
in itself.”102 If sleep consists in such a radical alterity from the waking self as Nancy 
suggests then de Warren’s worry is quite simply this: ‘what allows a return from such a 
state?’ There are three important components of de Warren’s alternative account of 
waking-up. His most direct response is a clear result of his internalising of sleep which 
we have discussed above: 
 
Consciousness can only awaken on the condition that consciousness has put 
itself to sleep, taken in its transcendental significance: consciousness has 
constituted a temporary retirement from itself. This temporary character of sleep 
points to the phenomenological veracity of its constitution within absolute time-
consciousness.103 
 
This empowering of a transcendental consciousness over the subordinate stages of time-
consciousness has advantages and disadvantages as seen above. However, two clear 
problems emerge from this extract. The first is what exactly should we take this 
“transcendental” consciousness to consist in, and furthermore, what allows it to return 
from, or survive, its self inflicted “self-oblivion”?  
 
 De Warren’s answer to this worry is wrapped up with the other two components 
of his account of sleep’s conceptual role. The first of these can be seen in his repeated 
insistence on the “temporary character of sleep”. Sleep, metaphorically, constitutes for 
Husserl “the possibility of return”104 and so de Warren may describe sleep as an 
“interval”105 and thus as one component part of time-consciousness as such. In having a 
beginning and an end sleep constitutes a period, interval, or time within life.106 Waking 
consciousness is promoted to the status of the norm of time-consciousness and this relies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 ibid, p. 292 
103 ibid, p. 293 
104 ibid, p. 283 
105 ibid, p. 287 – 8 
106 Here our insistence – in this Chapter’s excursus – that de Warren undertake a conceptual framing of 
sleep finds support. 
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on the perceiving of sleep as a temporary absenting from the form of time-consciousness. 
What cannot be doubted is that this fits with our commonly held beliefs as waking 
philosophers but it is far from clear that sleep should be seen as temporary in any more 
primordial manner than waking consciousness exists temporarily between periods of 
factical absence, including, fundamentally, those prior to our birth and after the 
disappearance of our consciousness. 
 
 The last of de Warren responses to his functional worry draws on his interpretation 
of Husserl’s D-14 fragments as describing sleep itself – being-asleep – as an “ideal 
limit”.107 As such the “absolute sleep”, de Warren sees Nancy as seeking, is dismissed in 
favour of the constant interplay of falling-asleep and waking-up. In this manner for 
Husserl, according to de Warren, “we never reach sleep itself”.108 The advantage of such 
an account is that it acknowledges the extent to which sleep is always with us whilst 
maintaining that the varying degrees of sleep never amount to a complete absenting of 
self. This latter claim is what allows him to see consciousness – absolute time-
consciousness – as continuous across sleep and waking, and to describe sleep as the 
“possibility of a return”. For all the advantages of such a view one might see it as reducing 
the force or status of ‘sleep’ – the literal condition or process which we each live through 
– in parallel with de Warren’s prioritising of waking time-consciousness. 
 
 Of course, just as the advantages of such an account are clear so too are its 
limitations. Surely any phenomenology of sleep which results in the claim that we never, 
in fact, actually are asleep – or reach the condition of “being-asleep” – is in a sense self-
defeating. Though, it might be very quickly retorted, on de Warren’s behalf, that he is not 
denying that we sleep but only that, a la Nancy, the concept of sleep be taken as a moment 
of radical nonconsciousness. Here the twin charges of triviality and counter-intuitivity 
appear to threaten de Warren’s account. Let us draw into the picture the comparison 
between sleep and death, explicitly excluded from consideration by de Warren. Is not the 
demoting of ‘being-asleep’ into a conceptual limit which is never in fact actualised in life 
to implicitly equate ‘being-asleep’ with death? Such an implicit equating would be 
supported by the functional worry – ‘how does one wake-up again’? It would seem that 
de Warren’s method of distinguishing sleep from death, in that the former is temporary 
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whilst the latter permanent, is to equate fully asleep with death and then deny that we 
ever, whilst living, achieve such a state. Such a move risks being seen as either trivial – 
in that it denies that sleep and death are one and the same – or as counter-intuitive – in its 
claim that we never actually sleep. Had de Warren explicitly discussed the question of 
the relationship between sleep and death this problematic result of his account of sleep 
might have been brought to light. 
 
 This worry can be rephrased thus: each step de Warren takes closer to a Husserlian 
phenomenology sleep seems to correspondingly pull him further away from sleep itself. 
And a phenomenology which behaves in this way surely cannot be said to be adhering to 
Husserl’s spiritual battle cry: “back to the things themselves”. As we noted above the 
disagreement between Nancy and de Warren centres around the shift from metaphorical 
or figurative access to phenomenological access.109 It is the price paid by de Warren for 
this shift which can be called into question. Is the drawing of sleep into phenomenology 
worth the price of acknowledging, or perhaps enforcing, a constitutively wakeful, or 
vigilant, absolute consciousness? For Husserl this is no price at all but merely the re-
emergence of his conception of self – the monadic ipseity which allows him to say: ‘yes, 
I slept last night.’ Yet, for us, for those seeking to begin phenomenology, and philosophy, 
from sleep – to awaken a somnolent phenomenology from within the light entranced 
tradition of metaphysics and philosophical enquiry – such an account of sleep cannot have 
truly faced, that is begun in, or issued from, the sleeper. Instead it must stem from the 
imperious and ever watchful gaze of transcendental consciousness. And yet this very 
denial of sleep, which for Husserl and de Warren underpins the very possibility of sleep, 
will reappear in our later Chapters, in their archaeologies of somnolent phenomenology. 
In these Chapters to come we will examine those who, unlike Husserl and de Warren do 
not require a necessary prioritising of a single transcendental consciousness. We will, in 
short, follow phenomenology’s steps away from consciousness in the hope that with these 
steps new insight into the radical finitude of sleep and its relationship to self may be 
brought, if not to consciousness, then at least into some form of relief – cast as a shadow 
in the hazy half-light of night. 
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 This dispute, or risk, of de Warren’s analysis is brought out by his most concrete 
description of sleep – sleep as temporary, as the “headless” gap between periods of 
waking. This claim has a peculiar circularity to it: without it sleep cannot be characterised 
as an interval within time-consciousness, and yet it this very universality of absolute time-
consciousness which forms the unity, or continuity, against which sleep is seen as 
temporary at all. Furthermore, de Warren’s account of sleep has focused predominantly 
on the relationship between sleep and far retention. This applies not just to Husserl’s 
metaphorical use of sleep but also to the image of sleep as a self-sedimenting of the self 
and, perhaps most tellingly, de Warren’s comparison of sleep with the “headless” 
temporalisation of imagination. Through the last of these de Warren argues that in sleep 
one loses the original presenfication of life but retains far retention and far protention and 
as such absolute consciousness is also retained. However, de Warren has, at most, only 
succeeded in demonstrating how far retention operates in regard to sleep, far protention’s 
operation is conspicuously absent. This would not be such a concern if it were not for the 
importance of the ‘temporary’ claim about sleep. Surely sleep’s temporary nature must 
be based on not only the maintaining of an internal history for consciousness through a 
process of sedimentation but also the projecting of a future for this history through far 
protention. Furthermore, such a protentive side of sleep – our fall into sleep – would 
surely be marked by the fact, the fact of finitude across and within sleep, that sleep is 
never certainly temporary: we might die before we wake.110 The worry is that the headless 
time-consciousness of sleep, as de Warren would have it, requires an equi-primordiality 
between far retention and far protention which is not only lacking but might also call into 
question this very understanding of sleep. 
 
 To conclude, de Warren’s reconstruction of a Husserlian phenomenology of sleep 
is impressively incisive. He not only succeeds in opening potential avenues for employing 
large swathes of Husserl’s work in relation to sleep but he also identifies and interprets 
some of Husserl’s explicit remarks on sleep, and suggests an intriguing extension of the 
account found in these. This is all grounded in a direct opposition to Nancy’s radical 
notion of sleep as the dissolution of self and is directed towards a recognition not only of 
phenomenological access to sleep but also of sleep’s essential position within our lives. 
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Furthermore, ‘The Inner Night’, in the process of excavating a phenomenology of sleep 
from within Husserl’s late work, begins to disrupt any sharp delimitation between sleep 
and waking – the processes of falling-asleep and waking-up are neither restricted to literal 
times of sleep nor indeed to those of waking but cross, span and knit together this age old 
duality. This problematizing of the sleeping-waking distinction returns throughout this 
thesis. 
 
 However, de Warren’s commitment to the Husserlian foundations, from which his 
opposition to Nancy derives, brings with it problems of its own. In particular, his 
ascription to an ever vigilant transcendental consciousness which watches over the 
sleeper within – the ‘Inner’ of de Warren’s ‘The Inner Night’ – could be seen to itself 
result in his “never truly fac[ing]” the “truly difficult questions” of sleep itself.111 The 
choice we are left with – between Nancy’s exile of phenomenology from sleep and de 
Warren’s banishing of being asleep from literal ‘sleep’ – may seem to some as no choice 
at all. However, if seen, instead, as two extreme poles on a spectrum of approaches to the 
relationship between sleep and phenomenology then we are well placed to consider those 
other possible accounts which lie either between these poles or, in fact, disrupt the 
foundations upon which such a dichotomy is based. 
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Part II: Does Dasein Sleep? 
 
We are not condemned to sustained flights of being, but are constantly refreshed by 
little holidays from ourselves. We are intermittent creatures, always falling to little ends 
and rising to little new beginnings. – Iris Murdoch, The Black Prince1 
 
‘Whatever is sleeping’ is in a peculiar way absent and yet there. – Martin Heidegger, 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics2 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Murdoch, Iris. The Black Prince, Vintage Books, London 2006, pp. 231 – 232 
2 Heidegger, Martin. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, translated by William McNeill & 
Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 60 
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Introduction – Heidegger’s somnolent path not taken 
	  
	   With Heidegger’s Being and Time phenomenology famously takes a new and 
controversial direction: towards fundamental ontology through the existential analytic. 
In the light of this existential analytic Heidegger’s silence on sleep, at least in Being and 
Time, might be seen as even more surprising than Husserl’s ponderous and belated 
engagement with sleep and the phenomenological problems associated with it. The 
existential analytic returns us to the everyday structures of life and to their existential 
significance. In light of this move from scientific disengaged enquiry towards 
engagement with and in the normalcy and minutiae of lived experience, the apparently 
ever wakeful nature of this lived experience is all the more striking. If we are indeed “not 
condemned to sustained flights of being” then Heidegger, at least in his middle work, 
appears to have missed this fundamental feature of our existence. Yet the interesting 
question is not whether Heidegger missed sleep out of the existential analytic but rather 
why he did, and how he could have.  
 
 Perhaps a clue can be found in the second of this Part’s epigrams: “‘Whatever is 
sleeping’ is in a peculiar way absent and yet there.”3 Whatever, not whoever, sleeps in 
Heidegger’s questioning of sleep. Following on from this demonstrative presence of sleep 
in Heidegger’s work we might perform a small substitution upon this instance of 
engagement with sleep so as to state that ‘Sleep (itself) is in a peculiar way absent and yet 
there (in Heidegger’s work)’. This Part aims to bring out the peculiarity of this vacillation 
between presence and absence of sleep in Heidegger’s middle period. Furthermore, we 
may hope that in, initially, examining Heidegger’s curious, and frustratingly brief, 
analyses of being-asleep and being-awake we may catch a glimpse of, and begin to scout 
out pathways [Wege] or at the very least the marks of such [Wegmarken], through his 
thinking and towards a thoroughgoing phenomenology of sleep.4 
 
 How then can sleep be said to be, peculiarly or otherwise, absent from Heidegger’s 
philosophical work? By way of an initial answer to this we might turn to brute numerical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ibid, emphasis added 
4 Heidegger, Martin. Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. See 
also Off the Beaten Track, Edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Such marks, as we will see, may not be exclusively man made. 
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facts and point out that sleep is mentioned but once in Being and Time and even then it is 
imprisoned in quotation marks. We should be doubly wary of drawing any 
phenomenological account of sleep from this lone appearance of the word as Heidegger 
is here talking in a metaphorical manner, and does so in order to formulate a question. 
Specifically, a question designed to respond to the claim that Dasein is not always aware 
of its guilt and thus may not be primordially guilty: “or does not the primordial Being-
guilty make itself known in the very fact that guilt is ‘asleep’?”5  
 
 Michel Haar also notes the absence of sleep from the existential analytic: 
 
But cannot – indeed must not – these people occasionally stop, the one from 
blackening the pages, the other from hammering the footwear that he repairs? 
And not only in order to eat, sleep, or bring a stop to the most humbly 
productive activities, of which the analytic of Dasein breathes not a word...6 
 
Of course, Haar is not alone in commenting on the odd silence that the existential analytic 
maintains with regard to seemingly important details of the everyday life of that “entity 
which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its 
Being”.7 For example, Levinas – to whom we will turn in the opening sections of our next 
Part – took Heidegger to task for precisely those two occasions when we stop our 
productive engagements with the world and beings (and perhaps, in the latter case, even 
being) and eat or sleep our fill.8 For defenders of Heidegger this silence must surely rest 
on his famous distinction between the ontic and the ontological or, more accurately, the 
existentiell and the existential. This appeal leads to a series of interconnected though not 
quite identical questions, questions which guide the progression of this Part. ‘Can sleep 
be reduced to an existentiell mode of Dasein’s being?’ ‘Does sleep operate under the same 
existentiales as waking Dasein and require only alternative existentiell instantiations of 
these, or does something more radical occur in, or to, Dasein’s existence itself when we 
drift off?’ ‘Is there an existential significance to sleep, for Heidegger?’ 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 332 [H286]. Though this appears to be merely a metaphorical use 
of the being-asleep being-awake dichotomy it is worth noting the rhetorical use sleep is put to here. 
6 Haar, Michel. The Song of the Earth, translated by Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993, p. 18 
7 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 27 [H7], emphasis added 
8 Though Haar makes no reference to Levinas in his book it seems plausible to suppose that he is here 
thinking of Levinas’s now famous analyses of nourishment, in Totality and Infinity, and sleep and insomnia 
in, amongst other places, Existence and Existents. 
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 Returning to our initial thesis: that ‘sleep (itself) is in a peculiar way absent and 
yet there (in Heidegger’s work)’, what of the ‘and yet there’? Sleep is present in 
Heidegger’s philosophy in multiple ways. However, rather than enumerate all of these or 
provide examples of every use of the word in Heidegger’s canon we are better served, 
philosophically, by providing two prominent, and exemplary, examples of sleep’s 
presence in Heidegger’s work. Firstly, sleep is presupposed in some of Heidegger’s most 
important rhetorical and metaphorical moves. Secondly, we will consider one of 
Heidegger’s few actual engagements with the question of sleep in his 1929 to 1930 lecture 
series, his first after taking-on Husserl’s chair at Freiburg.9 With these two engagements 
with sleep in hand, and, in fact, the very distinction between them problematized, we will 
be in a good position to question the ‘peculiarity’ of this absence-and-yet-presence of 
sleep in Heidegger’s work. Finally, the twin routes of inquiry this Part follows will be 
clarified. 
 
 Heidegger opens Being and Time, by harking back to a perplexity in the face of 
being: 
 
But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the 
expression ‘Being’? Not at all [keineswegs]. So first of all we must reawaken 
[wecken] an understanding for the meaning of this question.”10 
 
This reawakening has been much discussed in the literature as, indeed, has been the 
forgetting of the question of the meaning of being that it presupposes. However, we might, 
in our turn, ask what is the significance of this for our understanding of sleep. Clearly, 
sleep is not explicitly invoked in such talk of awakening or reawakening but is rather 
conspicuously present in its absence. Without becoming bogged down in the details of 
this specific reawakening of that which sleeps, and its relationship to Heidegger’s 
fundamental question, we can nonetheless begin to see that sleep is at once related to 
forgetfulness, or forgetting, and thus, at least potentially, may be connected to 
Heidegger’s use of aletheia [ἀλήθεια], and, of course, it is used in a metaphorical sense.11 
This metaphorical sense of sleep is employed and examined at the beginning of Part One 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Heidegger, Martin. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
10 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 1 [H1] 
11 We are returned, as we were in examination of de Warren’s article, to the presence of the metaphor of 
sleep. 
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of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics lecture course12 and it is here that we find 
our second epigraph.13  
 
 Promising only that we have not forgotten about the connecting of sleep to 
forgetfulness, forgetting and aletheia, let us now look at the second of our provisional 
examples of sleep in Heidegger’s work – his longest examination of sleep as phenomenon 
until 1966.14 Once again, sleep appears by way of the need to awaken something. This 
time Heidegger seeks, on our behalf, to awaken a fundamental attunement 
[Grundstimmung] in our philosophising – this will famously turn out to be ‘profound 
boredom’, the fundamental attunement of our age, or at least of Heidegger’s.15 In Sections 
16 and 17 of FCM we see both Heidegger’s move back from the project of awakening 
such an attunement to the necessary notion of that which sleeps, and, all importantly, his 
subsequent withdrawal from this stepping back. As such here we have both Heidegger’s 
fall into sleep, his sojourn within the realm of sleep, and his subsequent return to wakeful 
life. Thus the rhetorical, metaphorical, use of sleep and Heidegger’s consideration of sleep 
itself are here intimately entwined. 
 
 Section 16 sub-section a) opens by considering, pre-theoretically, what we 
understand by attunements, or moods [Stimmungen]. They are “least of all” something 
we “invent” or “simply call up”.16 Rather attunements are that “into which we slip 
unawares”.17 We cannot summon up any attunement that takes our fancy and so 
Heidegger hypothesises that for an attunement to be for us, in our awareness, it must 
always “already be there”.18 Attunements are not created by us but rather we discover 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 FCM from here on. 
13 It is worth noting that Heidegger had already employed this motif of awakening through similar terms in 
his earlier lecture courses – for example Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Translated by John van 
Buren. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 12, and The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 
Translated by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2010, p. 134: “generates [weckt, and thus more accurately ‘awakens’] astonishment” – as well as, of course, 
Being and Time as we have already shown. I am indebted to Paul J. Ennis for the former of these examples, 
and to Christos Hadjioannou for the latter. 
14 Heidegger would go on to discuss sleep in his Heraclitus Seminar with Eugen Fink, 1966/67. Here we 
can do little more than point towards this fascinating text, leaving it for a longer future analysis. As we have 
discussed in our introduction, sleep’s very status as a phenomenon is uncertain. The word phenomenon 
stands, as such, as a preliminary place holder. 
15 “It is a matter of awakening a fundamental attunement which is to sustain our philosophizing, and not 
the fundamental attunement. Accordingly, there is not merely one single attunement, but several.” - 
Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 59 
16 ibid, p. 59 
17 ibid 
18 ibid 
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ourselves already in them, already attuned thus. Yet, this only displaces the problem by 
one step as we must now ask ‘how we are to discover, ascertain, these attunements?’ 
Many, Heidegger supposes, will see this as unproblematic – it is as simple as ascertaining 
whether the hammer is on the desk or not. However, on what ground does this faith in our 
ability to ascertain attunements, those of others or even our own, rest?19 “It could be that 
it pertains to ascertaining an attunement not merely that one has the attunement, but that 
one is attuned in accord with it.”20 Observation, “in the end” for Heidegger can do nothing 
for us when it comes to attunements and he “see[s] already that any so-called objective 
ascertaining of a fundamental attunement is... [an] impossible undertaking.”21 Why 
impossible? To see this we must understand that for Heidegger, attunements are not 
something ‘out there’ in our perceptual fields upon which we might turn our gaze and 
thus ascertain – regardless of whether this is an external sensory gaze or an internal 
introspection – but rather the tone or tune of that very field, of that which is given to, and 
withheld from, us.22 
 
Thus we shall not speak at all of ‘ascertaining’ a fundamental attunement in our 
philosophizing, but of awakening it. Awakening means making something 
wakeful, letting whatever is sleeping become wakeful.23 
 
 With this, characteristic, step back from ‘knowledge about’ and towards 
existential letting be Heidegger opens the question of sleep, or more exactly, the question 
of “‘Whatever is sleeping’”.24 We have seen, in our opening quotation, that whatever is 
sleeping is both absent and yet there. In sub-section b) of Sc. 16 the “and yet there” shows 
that when “we awaken an attunement, this means that it is already there.”25 This presence, 
this sleeping presence, is, necessarily a presence as absence. Whatever is sleeping is, 
Heidegger insists, both not-being-there and being-there – Nicht-Da-sein and Da-sein.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Though this very distinction, between the attunements of others and our own, will be problematized in 
Heidegger’s account of attunement. 
20 ibid, p. 60 
21 ibid 
22 As Heidegger goes on to make explicit seven pages later: “An attunement is a way, not merely a form or 
a mode, but a way [Weise] – in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper 
being at hand of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and determines the manner and way 
[Art und Wie] of his being.” - ibid, p. 67, emphasis added 
23 ibid, p. 60 
24 Not only characteristic in terms of withdrawing from the possibilities of propositional knowledge but 
also in the use of the metaphor of awaking. 
25 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 60 
26 ibid. For our purposes it is enough to see, once again, the intertwining of Heidegger’s discussion of 
attunements – and thus a metaphorical use of the sleeping versus waking alternation – Dasein, and that of 
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Of course, we cannot, nor does Heidegger, simply leave such a seeming contradiction 
without comment. Instead, and intriguingly, it is here that he calls the principle of non-
contradiction into question. Here “we must not only put in question this venerable 
principle of metaphysics, which is based on a quite specific conception of being, but also 
cause it to shatter [erschüttern] in its very foundations.”27 That it is the possibility of sleep 
which “shatters” such a fundamental principle of metaphysics should not go unnoticed. 
It, in fact, offers us the first clues towards a questioning of the truth of sleep. A 
questioning which we will not begin in this Part but which could play an important part 
in any future, positive phenomenological discussion of sleep. 
 
 But have we not got carried away with all this talk of “shattering” and the 
overturning of the fundamental principles of metaphysics? Cannot this apparent 
contradiction be simply dispelled by considering sleep and waking through the 
commonplace dichotomy of unconsciousness and consciousness? Heidegger thinks not. 
However, it is this turn to consciousness and unconsciousness that allows Heidegger one 
of his first hints, in this Part of the lecture course, toward the, now infamous, ‘comparative 
examination’ to which we turn in Chapter 4.28 After all “one must recall that the state of 
affairs [die Sachlage] here is quite different from the case of a stone.”29 Whereas 
something is a property of the stone or not, in the case of entities like us Heidegger claims 
that things are not so straightforward; we “can have something and at the same time not 
have it, that is, not know of it.”30 The unconscious, in this sense allows for something to 
be both there and yet not-there for Dasein. Importantly, this notion of the unconscious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sleep itself. As we will see all of these share a relation of non-equivalence to the traditional distinction 
between unconsciousness and consciousness. 
27 ibid, p. 61 
28 Simon Glendinning argues that this philosophical method can already be discerned in Being and Time: 
“We shall again choose the method of contrasting it [a primordial structure of Dasein’s being] with a 
relationship of Being which is essentially different ontologically – viz. Categorical – but which we express 
by the same linguistic means.” p. 81 [H55], cited in Glendinning, Simon. On Being with Others – 
Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 1998, Ch. 4, fn 4, p. 157. It is worth noting that 
whilst Glendinning is correct to point out that the method of ontological comparison is not something which 
sprang in Athenian fashion, fully formed, from Heidegger’s head in the winter of 1929, this does not, in 
itself, commend the equally misconceived view that Being and Time already demonstrates the enactment 
of such a method. Instead, the method enacts an alternative path from that undertaken in Being and Time. 
That Heidegger also saw this to be the case is made clear on pages 176 – 178 of FCM. “Yet all of these 
paths necessarily have their own specific limitations and difficulties. This is because each of these paths 
comes from without, that is, each one brings with it the principles and perspectives that are characteristic 
of ordinary understanding.” Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 178. We appeal to just this shift in method in 
moving from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4. 
29 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 61 
30 ibid 
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and its content can be so conceived – as this “strange ‘at hand and yet at the same time 
not at hand’” –  precisely because we may become “conscious of something 
unconscious.”31 This seems a plausible account of sleep, for is not sleep understood – at 
least, traditionally, in distinction from death – as having the potential to reawaken? As 
we have seen Heidegger’s rhetorical move, namely, seeking that which is sleeping in 
order to understand how one can correctly awaken it, seems to implicitly rely on such a 
conception of sleep. Sleep would thus amount to an absence of consciousness teeming 
with the potential for consciousness.32 
 
 However, for Heidegger, consciousness and unconsciousness only “seems to be 
equivalent” to waking and sleeping.33 In a few brilliant lines Heidegger points out that 
“the concept of the nonconscious... is much too broad” and that “sleep is not simply 
[cannot be reduced to] an absence of consciousness.”34 Firstly, absence of consciousness 
seems to cover many more phenomena than just sleep. For example, fainting, 
anaesthetised unconsciousness, drunken stupor, and, of course, death. Asides from death, 
these examples amount to a reducing of ‘consciousness of’. Our intentional consciousness 
is stifled in such situations. It is this stifling of intentional consciousness which, in its 
proximity to sleep, leads us to equate sleep with nonconsciousness. However, as the 
essential example of death – that “difficult problem”35 – shows, nonconsciousness cannot 
just equate to sleep for it must also include something which we have genuine interest, at 
least those of us who ever wish to sleep again without fear, in distinguishing from sleep. 
Secondly, Heidegger, like so many before him turns to dreams to show that consciousness 
is not truly exiled from sleep. The porous nature of sleep means that “a peculiar and in 
many cases extremely animated consciousness pertains precisely to sleep”.36 
Nonconsciousness is both too broad and too narrow a concept to be applied to sleep. This 
double rejection of nonconsciousness must remain in the back of our minds, and not 
unconsciously, during the interrogation of Heidegger to come. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ibid  
32 Of course, Husserl’s question, which was discussed in our first chapter, on how, given such a conception 
of sleep, we ever wake-up again or return to our waking selves must be kept in mind at this point. Whenever 
Heidegger calls upon the word consciousness, which is comparatively rare in itself, we should keep an eye 
on Husserlian phenomenology and how Heidegger means to relate to or, more often, distance himself from 
it. 
33 ibid 
34 ibid 
35 Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 273 
36 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 61 
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 Given Heidegger’s famous withdrawal from philosophy’s traditional focus on 
consciousness and the objects thereof we should not be surprised that he sees bringing 
attunements to consciousness as not only the wrong way to proceed but in fact as 
achieving “the contrary of an awakening. The attunement is thereby precisely destroyed, 
or at least not intensified, but weakened and altered.”37 This age old worry that we may 
not reproduce precisely in thought that which was previously distinct from it but instead 
alter our target in the process of bringing it to consciousness is, as the unfortunate pun 
illustrates, one which we, as interested in sleep, should be particularly awake, to.38 One 
of the very difficulties of sleep is that we are never simultaneously sleeping and 
philosophising about sleep. Instead Heidegger reminds us that to “awaken an attunement 
means... to let it become awake and as such precisely to let it be.”39 Perhaps here a hint 
toward the somnolent pathway for which we are searching is offered through the 
similarity between this letting be, as distinct from a shaking awake, and not only a ‘letting 
awake’ but also a ‘letting sleep’.40 
 
 This is almost exactly what Heidegger now does – he lets sleep be. Here, after 
perhaps two or three pages, more of a nap than a true sleep, Heidegger awakes from the 
question of sleep. After reminding us of both his positive – that whatever is to be 
awakened must already be there and yet not there – and negative – it cannot be treated 
through the dualism of consciousness and unconsciousness – results, we are told that the 
question of sleep must be dropped. Two reasons are given for this. First, it would “make 
the problem too complicated here at the outset”.41 And secondly, for “fundamental 
metaphysical reasons.”42 It is the nature of these fundamental metaphysical reasons which 
will guide us in what follows. Heidegger draws from the negative thesis, that 
unconsciousness does not equate to sleep, the further conclusion that we have already 
gone wrong in our very conception of man. So long, that is, as we define man as distinct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 ibid 
38 And yet perhaps, as Chapter 4 argues, we should instead be particularly alive to such worries. On our 
guards against mechanically steamrolling over the trembling and tiny, though no less essential, distinctions 
of life. 
39 ibid 
40 David Farrell Krell goes some way towards unpacking this possibility in the following lines: “How does 
one cause a sleepyhead to stir? Or must one let the sleeper come round?” – Krell, David F. Daimon Life – 
Heidegger and Life-Philosophy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992 p. 108 
41 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 62 
42 ibid, p. 63 
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by virtue of having consciousness. Here we again see his famous critique of man as the 
rational animal.43 However, in terms of sleep this has, for Heidegger the following further 
consequences: 
 
…the task of clarifying such phenomena as sleeping and waking cannot be 
addressed extrinsically as one particular question. Rather, such clarification can 
occur only on the presupposition that we possess a fundamental conception of 
how a being must be structurally determined such that it can sleep or be awake. 
We do not say that the stone is asleep or awake. Yet what about the plant? Here 
already we are uncertain.44 
 
 ‘What being is such that it may sleep?’ has come to take the place of the question 
‘What is sleep?’ Heidegger’s insistence that this question – the fundamental question of 
our thesis – be put on hold until the differences between stones, plants, animals and 
humans can be ascertained, whilst frustrating, in fact, or so this Part will show, provides 
us with the fundamental directions, or Wegmarken, for any Heideggerian analysis of 
sleep.45 With this withdrawing from “entering into the problem of sleep... [Heidegger 
attempts] to clarify on another path [Wege] what it means to awaken an attunement.”46 
However, before sketching this alternative path with which Heidegger continues his 
assessment of awakening attunements we must note Heidegger’s characteristic appeal to 
Aristotle, in this instance to Aristotle’s treatise ‘On Sleep’.47 Perhaps more so than 
anything claimed about sleep so far what Heidegger recalls from Aristotle’s account, and 
recalls with great admiration, will guide our investigations in this chapter. 
 
 Aristotle’s first “remarkable” claim is that “sleep is an ἀκινησία [akinesia, not-
move, quiescence, or rest].”48 This, of course, connects sleep to movement, kinesis, and 
essentially retains the negative status of sleep which we have already explored. This 
import of sleep, its status as a cancelling out, as an a-kinesia, will support the main thrust 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, passim, for example p. 74 [H48]. Also see the ‘Letter on Humanism’, 
in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, pp. 239 – 276. 
44 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 62. Note the similarity of the first couple of lines of this quotation to our 
first Chapter’s epigraph from Merleau-Ponty’s Institution and Passivity, see p. 5, above. 
45 “Such language testifies to the fact that in sleep human beings are inevitably bound up with the animal, 
vegetable, and mineral worlds. Already here, in the question of slumber and somnolence (93 – 94), those 
regions of being which by metonymy or synonymy we call stone, animal, and man come to the fore.” - 
Krell, David F. Daimon Life – Heidegger and Life-Philosophy, p. 108 
46 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 63 
47 Aristotle. ‘On Sleep’, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. 1991, pp. 1004 – 1012 [453b12 – 458a32] 
48 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 62 
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of our argument as found here whilst at the same time – in its similarity to Heidegger’s 
appeal to another Ancient Greek term which involves a negation, ἀλήθεια – also 
suggesting an alternative orientation to Heidegger’s thought, a somnolent undertow. To 
see how this claim will structure this Part we must consider that Heidegger juxtaposes 
this Aristotelian account of sleep with those based on consciousness and unconsciousness. 
Aristotle’s account, instead, describes sleep as “a δεσµός [desmos, bond, fetter, collar], a 
being bound [Gebundenheit], a peculiar way in which αἴσθησις [aisthēsis, perception] is 
bound. It is not only a way in which perception is bound but also our essence, in that it 
cannot take in other beings which it itself is not.”49 Aisthēsis, broadly, understood as 
perception is, in sleep, bound. This bondage, it will be argued, is remarkable in its 
proximity to the daze of captivation [Benommenheit] which Heidegger reserves for the 
animal.50 
 
 Should Heidegger’s detour [Umweg] into the question of sleep, as found in the 
opening section of Part One of FCM, be characterised as but another of the “false trails 
[Holzwege] [or], paths which suddenly stop, which lead up a blind alley”?51 Heidegger, 
as we saw above, certainly argued that the pathway we have undertaken in this thesis 
amounts to a false start, since it begins with a question “which cannot be addressed 
extrinsically as one particular question.”52 And the questioning of sleep in Heidegger’s 
lecture course is clearly a path “which suddenly stop[s]”. But what is to stop us, accepting 
his strong claim about the necessarily non-extrinsic nature of inquiring after sleep, at least 
for now, and, nonetheless, taking Heidegger’s use of the term Holzwege in the different 
and later sense that he would go on to use it? 
 
“Wood” is an old name for forest. In the wood there are paths, mostly 
overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden.  
They are called Holzwege. 
Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest. It often appears as if 
one is identical to another. But it only appears so.  
Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths. They know what it means to 
be on a Holzweg.53 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 ibid, pp. 62 – 63 
50 See all of Chapter 4 below, but Sc III in particular, pp. 124 – 134. 
51 ibid, p. 8 
52 ibid, p. 62. Here Heidegger’s similarity to Merleau-Ponty’s position, in Institution and Passivity, is 
striking. 
53 Heidegger, Martin. Off the Beaten Track, p. v 
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This latter use of the term Holzweg does not mean merely a false path or a dead end but 
rather suggests an overgrown, covered over and dimly lit, pathway, one which comes “to 
an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden”, a sleepy pathway certainly, but perhaps, 
also, a sleeping pathway, a pathway through and surrounded by life. Now we are at an 
appropriate stage to outline how, given the peculiar presence and absence of sleep in 
Heidegger’s philosophy, this Part progresses. 
 
 Taking our lead from what presence there is of sleep in Heidegger’s work, as well 
as following his own instructions that the question of sleep not be treated in isolation, we 
will attempt to discern two sets of pathmarks [Wegmarken] towards the awakening of a 
sleeping path through, and out of, Heidegger’s thought. These two sets of marks 
correspond to the two parts of his pivotal lecture series, FCM. As we have already 
indicated Heidegger’s initial description of sleep is intertwined and clearly connected 
with his notion of attunement, or mood. Following from this Chapter 3 opens by 
considering the complex relationship between sleep, moods or attunements [Stimmungen] 
and disposition [Befindlichkeit]. In so doing the relationship between sleep and the Dasein 
analytic more generally will begin to take shape. Chapter 3 ends with a consideration of 
Corey Anton’s ambitious, though flawed, attempt to expand the existential analytic to 
include sleep. With this very human set of marks towards a phenomenology of sleep 
discerned Chapter 4 turns to the sleepy pathmarks left by animals, that is, to Heidegger’s 
complex and controversial thesis that ‘the animal is poor in world’. Is the sleeper also 
‘poor in world’? And how, if at all, does this poverty relate to the complex relationship 
between Da-sein and animal-being? With these two sets of clues unearthed this Part 
concludes via a consideration of the controversies surrounding this pivotal lecture course. 
Perhaps this end, our – as yet – un-awakened Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep, is 
neither a Weg, nor a Holzweg, but instead a Keinesweg, a ‘no way’ or aporea [ἀπορία]. 
We conclude by assessing this ‘no way’, this impasse to any future Heideggerian 
phenomenology of sleep.
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Chapter 3 
‘How did you sleep?’ – Moods, sleep, and the existential 
analytic 
 
The fact that moods can deteriorate and change over means simply that in every 
case Dasein always has some mood.1 
 
I: Sleeping Attunements and Attunements of Sleep 
 
By the beginning of Section 16, sub-section c) Heidegger has awakened from his 
brief engagement with the question of sleep and returned to “another path” towards 
understanding what it means to awaken a fundamental attunement. But how did 
Heidegger sleep? This question, which in its more everyday form we encounter as 
frequently as we meet others each morning, beyond pointing us back to the above analysis 
of Heidegger’s explicit account of sleep (with its positive and negative theses), pushes 
further the question of the relationship between sleep and attunement. Just as I may ask 
‘how was the weekend?’, or ‘how is your mother doing?’ I may also ask ‘how did you 
sleep?’ However, our answers to these questions might be thought to differ in, 
fundamental, quality as well as in, less controversially, depth or quantity. ‘How did you 
sleep?’ seems to, in its mirroring of other similar questions, enquire after a content of 
sleep which appears missing. This content, whether lacking or present in abundance, must 
amount to the basic content, or tone, of Dasein’s Being-there – in other words, the manner 
in which Dasein is attuned, its mood. “Attunements are the fundamental ways in which 
we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Attunements are the ‘how’ [Wie] 
according to which one is in such and such a way.”2 This allows us to formulated the 
following question: ‘what is the mood, or are the moods, of sleep?’ 
 
 Before attempting to directly address this question, and its attendant related 
questions, we must return to the last sub-section of Section 16 of FCM. Here Heidegger 
explicitly lays out his alternative to thinking about attunements through the sleeping and 
awaking metaphor. His alternative route involves considering instances of not-being-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 173 [H134] 
2 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 67 
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there that operate whilst we are awake.  We are asked to think of those times when we 
are simply ‘not-there’, whilst in company say. Those periods of ‘phasing out’, of 
withdrawal or absence, are couched in the there-being of our existence, as Da-sein.3 
Essentially, these, like sleep, cannot be put down to a shift from consciousness to 
unconsciousness but are, instead, prior to that distinction. Heidegger argues for this by 
suggesting that whilst absent we may still remain extremely conscious, of ourselves or of 
something else, for example. Madness too appears to demonstrate varying degrees of 
consciousness whilst always manifesting some form of being-away. 
 
 If attunement is both being-there and not-being-there, Heidegger need not appeal 
to sleep and waking at all to see that this ambiguity within the character of attunements 
is prior to the consciousness/ unconsciousness distinction rather than the result of it. “Yet 
man has the potential to be away in this manner only if his being has the character of 
being-there [Da-sein].”4 This step away from sleep has the advantage, for Heidegger, that 
it pulls attunements away from binary ‘on versus off’ conceptions of our states of 
consciousness. We, traditionally, think of sleep and waking through such a binary 
distinction and Heidegger needs to show that being-away “is not something which 
happens arbitrarily from time to time, but is an essential characteristic of man’s very 
being”.5 Of course, for our purposes this very conception of attunements when applied 
through the question of the attunements of sleep may have the converse effect of pushing 
our conception of sleep away from that very feature of it which, perhaps, led Heidegger 
to leave it behind. 
 
 Heidegger is determined to rescue attunements from the clutches of consciousness 
dominated accounts of man and return them to their rightful place: at the very core of our 
being. “Attunement belongs to the being of man.”6 This shift to the essence of man was, 
as we saw, prefigured, for “fundamental metaphysical reasons”7, in the previous sub-
section of Section 16. Already there we saw that this move relied on the comparative 
analysis of man with the stone, and, later, with the animal. Attunements cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 That Heidegger moves from sleep to such phenomena suggests a certain affinity which when developed 
through a preliminary phenomenological account of reverie, phasing-out and day-dreaming, would offer 
insight into the question of the delimiting of sleep and waking. 
4 ibid, p. 63 
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
7 ibid 
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correctly discussed as though they were objects present-at-hand, or properties of 
something present-at-hand such as a stone. Thus the, apparent, contradiction of the being-
there and not-being-there of attunements (as sleeping) is, initially, resolved by showing 
that the language of contradiction which trades in a particular type of presence and 
absence – that of the present-at-hand – is ill suited to describing human being, in its being. 
Resultantly, it is just as ill suited to discussing attunements – “if attunement indeed 
belongs to the being of man we may not speak of it or take it as though it were at hand or 
not at hand.”8 
 
 Yet, Heidegger is not blind to the appeal of the accounts of attunements which he 
is ruling out. He acknowledges that attunements have long been identified as “emotional 
states” and that psychology “has always distinguished between thinking, willing, and 
feeling.”9 “Attunements – are they not like the utterly fleeting and ungraspable shadows 
of clouds flitting across the landscape?”10 Surely they are “the third class of lived 
experience.”11 And “merely... the adornment of our thinking and willing”.12 However, the 
appeal of these ways of thinking about ‘feelings’ emanates from the already entrenched 
conception of man – as the rational animal – which they flesh out. Heidegger is insistent 
that this is not the correct way to understand human being and in Section 17 he offers his 
alternative account of attunements. 
 
 What, however, does all of this have to do with the relationship between sleep and 
attunement? As we have seen Heidegger’s move away from sleep allows him to challenge 
the relevance of consciousness to questions of attunement without arguing about the 
essence of sleep and also whilst moving towards an interrogation of the being of man as 
Dasein. And yet, before leaving sleep behind waking and sleeping are brought, for but a 
second, into contact with being-there and being-away: “Nor are being-there and being-
away identical with waking and sleeping. Why we nevertheless rightly conceive of them 
in these terms will become apparent later.”13 That these pairs of terms are not identical 
should not surprise us but the ambiguity in the last sentence must give us pause – indeed 
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this can only be said to “become apparent” in the closing paragraphs of the course.14 
Firstly, which way round should we take this final sentence? Do we rightly conceive of 
waking and sleeping in terms of being-there and being-away? Or should we rather 
conceive of being-there and being-away in terms of waking and sleeping? If the former, 
as Heidegger’s essentialist claims about Dasein’s being-away suggest – in “the end, this 
being-away pertains to the essence of being there [Dasein]”, then we must look to account 
for sleeping and waking within the horizon of Dasein’s special, attuned existence, as both 
being-there and being-away.15 However, and this will relate to the undercurrent or 
somnolent path not travelled that we catch glimpses of throughout this Part, if Heidegger 
means that we must conceive of being-there and being-absent in terms of waking and 
sleeping then Heidegger’s choice to begin examining attunements through sleep was not 
merely accidental, was not merely a wrong turn down a sleepy Holzweg. Instead it 
indicates towards a conception of sleep which underpins the very possibility of 
attunement, and thus the possibility of Dasein. 
 
 Returning to the former interpretation what might we hope to learn about sleep by 
reading it through the lens of this new conception of our being which Heidegger offers in 
Being and Time? Though we already have many of the tools necessary, to begin this 
exploration of a Heideggerian account of sleep, let us now turn to Section 17 of FCM to 
find Heidegger’s explicitly positive account of attunement and with it some possible 
comparisons with sleep – remembering that attunements, as sleeping, are both being-there 
and not-being-there as we have seen in the previous section. 
 
 Attunement is the prior, oftentimes background, tone which structures our being 
as Dasein.  
 
Thus we have the positive correlate of our first negative thesis, namely that 
attunement is not a particular being. In positive terms, attunement is a 
fundamental manner, the fundamental way in which Dasein is as Dasein.16  
 
This identifying of attunements with our being as Dasein raises interesting questions 
about the status of sleep. To begin with this “first negative thesis, namely that attunement 
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   63	  
is not a particular being.” Applying, as this does, to the notion of properties of objects just 
as much as whole objects, we can see that any attunements of sleep must operate, as 
attunements, at a level of being where the rules of presence-at-hand are not appropriate. 
Following this through we can see that such attunements of sleep would not, presumably, 
be subject to the limits we might expect. For example, they need not be confined to at-
hand periods of sleeping but may rather spread throughout Dasein, whether sleeping or 
awake. The rewards of such a notion of the moods of sleep are multiple and significant. 
Even at this early stage we can see that these moods of sleep might provide 
phenomenological access, during the day, of a sort, which we had previously thought 
impossible, that is: contemporaneous access to sleep. Sleep, Hypnos, intuitively indeed, 
is not strictly limited to the reign of his mother night, Nyx, but can and will wander even 
out into the light of the sun. 
 
 Before attempting to assess the conditions for the possibility of such attunements 
let us consider another three phenomenological results that might be garnered from the 
extension of attunements into the realm of Hypnos. Firstly, attunement is “not at all 
‘inside’ in some interiority, only to appear in the flash of an eye; but for this reason it is 
not at all outside either.”17 Heidegger uses the examples of grief, good humour and of a 
person who “puts a damper on everything” in order to show that attunement is not 
restricted to the individual and merely private but rather reaches out across our, often 
taken to be hermetically sealed, shells of interiority.18 Attunement “imposes itself on 
everything” and is “but the way of our being there with one another.”19 Now when applied 
to sleep this raises fascinating questions about the seemingly obvious privacy of sleep. If 
sleep is truly attuned, then sleep cannot be purely private. It might be argued that this 
should not surprise us given that sleep is not death and that the sleeper – perhaps all the 
more so given their questionable status as an agent – is archetypal of one who is affected 
(overcome). The question of the relationship between privacy and sleep is one which 
must, since long before Descartes, haunt any philosophical encounter with sleep. 
 
 Secondly, sleep’s secondary status, like that of attunements, which have been seen 
as “like the utterly fleeting and ungraspable shadows of clouds flitting across the 
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landscape”20, is called into question by the suggestion of moods of sleep. “Rather because 
attunement is the originary way in which every Dasein is as it is, it is not what is most 
inconstant, but that which gives Dasein subsistence and possibility in its very 
foundations.”21 If we have considered moods to be not even secondary but tertiary in 
relation to “thinking” and “willing” – “the third class of lived experience”22 – then 
sleeping life certainly has also been given short-shrift when compared with the 
prioritising of wakeful life. Furthermore, if attunement takes on a new priority as “that 
which gives Dasein subsistence and possibility”, then so too surely do the attunements of 
sleep. Sleep, unlike wakeful reason and our wilful acting, now takes on a new 
significance. Once again, the significance of sleep opens a new face to us under this 
Heideggerian picture. 
 
 Lastly, and certainly most significantly for what will follow, attunements are 
forever with us – “we are never without attunement.”23 This brief pronouncement echoes 
our Chapter’s epigraph from Being and Time in radicalising the second of Heidegger’s 
alterations to our understanding of attunements. Attunements, as prior to thinking and 
willing, are primary and essential to Dasein as existing. Heidegger is adamant that even 
in “that lack of attunement in which we are neither out of sorts nor in a ‘good’ mood” we 
are still attuned.24 In fact, Heidegger goes further by making the following striking 
assertion: “And precisely those attunements to which we pay no heed at all, the 
attunements we least observe, those attunements which attune us in such a way that we 
feel as though there is no attunement there at all, as though we were not attuned in any 
way at all – these attunements are the most powerful.”25 At least two points must be drawn 
out of this claim. Firstly, it could be held to contrast significantly with Heidegger’s earlier 
characterisation of moods in Being and Time. Whatever one says about existential 
anxiety’s [Angst] distance from the present-at-hand psychological anxiety treated by the 
ontic sciences we must still acknowledge that anxiety, as Heidegger describes it in Being 
and Time, is not something to which we may “pay no heed at all”. Anxiety overcomes 
and disrupts the usual flow of our everyday coping and as such cannot be ignored, whilst 
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one is gripped by it that is, nor reintegrated into our lives (without converting it into fear 
or fears). This may relate to Heidegger’s shift from anxiety to boredom in the three years 
between the publication of Being and Time and the lectures that make-up FCM.  
 
 Secondly, surely whatever would qualify as the attunement(s) of sleep would be 
exactly those “attunements we least observe”, those which “feel as though there is no 
attunement there at all”. This also suggests that such attunements of sleep, as opposed to 
the sleeping attunements with which Heidegger began this part of his lecture course, 
would be central to understanding “the grounds of our Dasein”.26 After all, “because it 
[attunement] leads us back into the grounds of our Dasein, the essence of attunement 
remains concealed or hidden from us”.27 In this way Heidegger reiterates the importance 
of sleeping attunements as the self-concealing pathmarks into the very ground of our 
being. Yet, for all this focus on the self-concealing of attunements, of their sleeping, 
Heidegger offers no account of the attunements of sleep themselves. Could it be that 
“precisely those attunements to which [he] pay[s] no heed at all, the attunements [he] 
least observe[s]… are the most powerful”? 
 
 When we combine this question with Heidegger’s repeated – in Being and Time 
and FCM – claim “that in every case Dasein always has some mood” we find ourselves 
at a crossroads on the somnolent path of this Part. One way tests the limits of such an 
account of the attunements of sleep by sounding it against the analysis of animal modes 
of being found in Part Two of FCM. The other path, which will occupy us for the 
remainder of this Chapter, draws an alternative conclusion from the analyses of 
attunement offered above. This second way considers Heidegger’s statement that Dasein 
is always in a mood as evidence against the possibility of attunements of sleep and in 
favour of Dasein being constitutively and existentially wakeful. In other words, when 
Dasein is, the sleeper is not, and when the sleeper is, Dasein is not. Two potential 
critiques of the existential analytic result. Either, Heidegger’s analytic is incomplete in 
failing to offer an account of the specific character of the attunements of sleeping Dasein, 
or Heidegger fails to specify another limit to the scope of the analytic by pointing out that 
we are, with mundane regularity, stripped of our Dasein status. Does Heidegger not 
describe sleeping Dasein or does Dasein not actually sleep? 
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II: Disposition, Moods and Sleep 
 
The appeal of the second route and its attendant claim begins to become manifest 
if we return to Heidegger’s account of attunement, translated as mood by Macquarrie and 
Robinson, as found in Being and Time. Specifically, if we consider the, by the time of 
FCM, dropped concept ‘disposition’ [Befindlichkeit] and its relationship to both 
attunements and the other existentiales that Heidegger identifies.28 Disposition is, on the 
side of Dasein’s thrownness and facticity, that structure of Dasein’s being, existentiale, 
which ontologically distinguishes it from the being of the present-at-hand. In this sense, 
we can see already that Heidegger, in FCM, will go on to employ the notion of attunement 
for the same purpose – to distinguish Dasein in its modes of being from that which is 
simply ‘at-hand’. However, in Being and Time, a distinction is drawn between this 
existential structure, disposition, and the existentiell manifestations of it, moods or 
attunements [Stimmungen]. “Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially 
by the attunement of a disposition.”29 This openness will, of course, be of central interest 
to us in what follows. For now, it is enough to ask what this initial distinction between 
disposition and attunement signified in Being and Time. 
 
 Disposition, unlike attunement, is not specific or particular but is, rather, a 
fundamental feature of Dasein existence, as existence. It approaches and then veers away 
from the status of an essential property of the essence of Dasein. Approaches – for it is 
an empty structure which is both necessary and insufficient, without a corresponding 
attunement, for Dasein status. Yet, veers away, for as we know from our above discussion 
of attunements, as found in FCM, we go wrong if we discuss the modes of being of Dasein 
as if they follow the structures of ‘at-handness’ found in our theorising about the world. 
Instead, Dasein, as disposed, demonstrates its “thrownness”, which is “meant to suggest 
the facticity of its being delivered over.”30 It is essential that this “facticity” is 
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29 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 176 [H137], translation modified 
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distinguished from the “factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand”.31 
Richardson clarifies this notion of facticity as follows: 
  
Here distinguish the fact of There-being and its how. Both its origin and destiny 
remain obscure, but this much is clear: the irreducible fact that There-being 
already is, facticity. Already is! hence is not itself the author but the recipient of 
this facticity.32 
 
 How does this clarification of Heidegger’s terms help us in considering the 
possibility of attunements of sleep? We must now ask not whether during sleep Dasein 
factually is, but rather whether the facticity of Dasein in its disposedness applies during 
sleep? What Richardson calls the “fact that There-being [Dasein] is” seems to be, 
precisely in its difference from the factuality of our continued life whilst sleeping, which 
can be observed and reported by scientists in their sleep labs, at the very least disrupted 
in sleep. Perhaps even, as Nancy – following Hawthorne – suggests through the phrase 
“temporary death”, sleep is precisely an, however temporary, annulment of facticity.33 
 
 Put in another way: perhaps the facticity of waking Dasein indicates not only that 
Dasein always in its existence “Already is!” but also that it was always ‘Already not!’. 
Disposition seems to involve not only an always already present facticity but also a prior 
and primordial absence of facticity. Once again, this is not a question of the fact of 
consciousness and its absence, instead we are here questioning the manner in which sleep 
relates to that from which, or out of which, we are the recipients of “this facticity.” 
Facticity is for Heidegger disclosed in disposition and yet reading back from the 
descriptions of this facticity we must ask whether the sleeper also has: this facticity; 
facticity disclosed to it (which amounts to the same thing); and thus, disposition at all? 
This way of questioning points towards the central manner in which Richardson interprets 
Heidegger’s discussion of disposition – as “one component of” the “luminosity” of 
Dasein.34 That is: in terms of Dasein’s disclosedness and of what is disclosed to Dasein 
in being disposed. 
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32 Richardson, William J. Heidegger – Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 64 
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42 for Nancy’s interesting and controversial development of this idea. Nancy takes the title of this chapter, 
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 Disposition discloses Dasein in its facticity and this raises difficult questions for 
any notion of the moods of sleep given that which they are supposed to spring from – the 
very facticity of being-there – might be thought lacking. But what else is disclosed in 
Dasein’s disposition and to what degree does this match our emerging and limited 
phenomenology of sleep? This is where Heidegger, and we with him, must move from 
the existential structure of disposition to the necessary existentiell filling out of that 
structure by attunements. Heidegger delimits three specific ways in which attunements 
disclose. They disclose: (1) “Dasein in its thrownness”35; (2) “Being-in-the-world as a 
whole” which “makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something”36; and, 
(3) “circumspective” encountering, or the encountering of “something that matters to 
us.”37 Of these three we have already considered one aspect of thrownness, our facticity, 
which we might think absent in the case of the sleeper. But what of the other two? 
 
 In the case of (2) Heidegger is explicit, as we saw above, that attunements are not 
to be taken as the darting traces of some illusory apparition luring us away from the clarity 
of reason but rather as that upon which any disclosure of the world, and our being-in-the-
world, is possible. We just took this characteristic of attunements as evidence for 
distinguishing attunements from the private emotions of psychology, and much of 
philosophy, but now we might think that the demand that the attunements of the sleeper 
disclose the world and our being-in-the-world “as a whole” asks too much. Firstly, we 
must note that being-in-the-world necessarily includes, for Heidegger, being-with and as 
such, as noted above, the sleeper, if attuned, is disclosed as already involved with other 
Daseins. Why should this reiteration of what we found so promising above for the 
possibility of attunements of sleep tell against such a possibility here? Surely, das Man, 
the “dictatorship of the “they”” rules just as much over the bedroom, hammock or chaise 
longue as it does over the public square?38 Yet, it can be easily conceded that going to 
sleep is just as interpersonal as any of our other everyday activities without reducing the 
apparent appeal of the notion that, to modify an old cliché, ‘everyone sleeps alone.’ 
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of sleep. 
35 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 175 [H136] 
36 ibid, p. 176 [H137] 
37 ibid, p. 177 [H138] 
38 ibid, p. 164 [H126] 
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 Following this final intuition, it might be thought that Heidegger’s requirement 
that attunements disclose Dasein as interrelated in the necessary attunement of their 
dispositions should be seen as evidence against the sleeper being so attuned, and having 
disposition as an existential structure of their being. Furthermore, attunements disclosure 
of “something that matters to us”, (3), seems to support the present direction of analysis. 
Heidegger has by this point in Being and Time already described circumspection as our 
everyday involvement with entities as ready-to-hand, in, for example, the well known 
case of the hammer. In what sense do the sleeper’s attunements, if there be such, disclose 
entities of this kind, entities intertwined within “referential totalities”?39 The challenge is 
to show how such disclosure of referential webs of meaning, significance and concern, 
could ever sit comfortably alongside the intuitive character of sleep as a ‘laying aside of 
one’s burdens’ – “Sleep that knits up the ravell’d sleave of care”.40 Alongside, that is the 
intuition which underpins Michel Haar’s appeal to sleep at all, as we found it in our 
Introduction.41 One possible solution to this challenge might be the suggestion that in 
sleep these totalities are disclosed as meaningful and worthy of care but our care for them 
itself is suspended? The situation is not so simple. 
  
 Remembering that sleep cannot be merely a shift from consciousness to 
unconsciousness one sees that the sleeper’s lack of conscious access to such totalities of 
reference does not equate to an ontological lack of access. In support of this point consider 
the everyday notion of ‘sleep patterns’. We often awake at regular times, times which fit 
our waking lives and routines. Many will have experienced the odd sensation of having 
woken-up and then in that post-sleep haze subsequently hearing the blaring of the alarm, 
which we seem to have predicted, and thus made superfluous, within, across or 
throughout sleep. Of course, for much of human history alarm clocks were not available. 
Stories like sleeping beauty are notable precisely for playing on the distinction between 
healthy, regular and temporary, sleep and pathological, indeterminate, sleep. 
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 However, before weighing this as evidence – for the continuation of the 
disclosure, of at least “something that matters to us”, throughout sleep – an essential 
caveat is required. We spoke just now of conscious, unconscious and ontological access 
to referential totalities of beings whilst sleeping. We also suggested that sleep maintains 
the disclosure of such totalities whilst slackening or reducing to near nil our own care for 
those same totalities. However, for Heidegger the world and those entities within it are 
discovered already meaning-laden and as such referential totalities are not found and then 
considered meaningful or not by an individual Dasein. In fact, it is far from clear what a 
referential totality would be if we cared nothing for it. Consider the following: a 
referential totality, one surrounding an alarm clock say, always already includes not only 
the clock itself but also that it was constructed with a purpose and that such a purpose, 
aiding in waking us up at specified times, points towards other purposes, going to work, 
and so on and so forth. Such a web, indeed a web of meaning or significance, deprived of 
significance is no web at all.42 
 
 Of course, these webs of meaning make reference to other Daseins and thus to 
being-with. This acts as a reminder that our approach so far has attempted to analyse 
sleep’s relationship to disclosure one type of disclosure at a time, in relation to (1), (2), 
and (3) as identitifed above. Whatever the analytic virtues of such a method it also carries 
with it the risk that we forget the unity at the heart of Heidegger’s notion of disclosure. 
The unified character of disclosure becomes clear when we see that any access to 
meaningful totalities, (3), must also amount to access to being-in-the-world as a whole, 
(2), and thus to our own Dasein as factically thrown into such existence, (1). Before 
returning to the last of these Heideggerian terms, “existence”, it is necessary to consider 
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another way in which our narrow consideration of Dasein and the question of sleep 
requires broadening.43 
 
III: Sleep and the Existential Unity of Dasein 
  
We must extend our examination of sleep and Dasein to take into account the 
unity of the existentiales of Dasein. These are the fundamental existential structures of 
Dasein’s being and so far we have limited our discussion to the existentiale of disposition 
[Befindlichkeit]. Heidegger is clear, however, that disposition, whilst a fundamental 
structure of Dasein, is not the only such structure. Dasein is not only always already 
disposed: 
 
Every understanding [Verstehen] has its mood [Stimmung]. Every disposition 
[Befindlichkeit] is one in which one understands [verstehend]. The 
understanding which one has in such a disposition has the character of falling 
[Verfallens]. The understanding which has its mood attuned [gestimmte] in 
falling, Articulates [artikuliert] itself with relation to its intelligibility in 
discourse [Rede].44 
 
Alongside disposition Heidegger enumerates, in Being and Time, three other, 
equiprimordial, existentiales: understanding [Verstehen], falling [Verfallen], and 
discourse [Rede]. The unity of these existential structures is announced just prior to the 
temporal interrogation of them, each in its turn, in Division II.45 There Heidegger shows 
that each existentiale relates to a particular temporal priority situated within an ecstatic 
temporal unity. Put far too quickly the past, future and present relate to, respectively, 
disposition, understanding, and falling. However, these primary temporalisations of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 “Existence” can be seen as the “other side” of Dasein’s thrownness when compared with our, up until 
now, focus on facticity. 
44 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 385 [H335], translation altered. 
45 In fact, the very order in which Heidegger discusses the respective temporal characters of these 
existentiales should be seen as significant given that this amounts to his second turn around the hermeneutic 
spiral of the existential analytic and thus any alteration to the structure of the first – in Division I Heidegger 
describes first disposition, then understanding, then discourse and then, finally, falling, see Dv I, Ch. V – 
could indicate a shift in emphasis or priority. By way of beginning such a consideration of this shift in the 
ordering of the existentiales we might suggest that Division I offers a consideration of disposition, which 
“temporalizes itself primarily in having been” (ibid, p. 390 [H340]), first, whereas Division II begins with 
the temporal analysis of understanding – and understanding “is primarily futural.” (ibid, p. 387 [H337]) 
When this is seen alongside Heidegger opening Division II with his famous analysis of being-towards-
death we might begin to suggest that Division II reverses Division I’s prioritising of Dasein’s facticity and 
instead analyses thrownness primarily in relation to its potentiality for existential projection. 
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existentiales can always be either authentic or inauthentic. Thus Heidegger’s own more 
detailed summary is as follows: 
 
Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in 
awaiting). Dispositions temporalize themselves primarily in having been 
(whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots 
primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of 
vision).46 
 
Essentially almost within the same breath Heidegger reminds us that “in every case” such 
primary temporalisations, say of understanding in relation to the future, also involve the 
other two temporal characters, past “having been” and present “Present”.47 In “every 
ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole”, and thus temporalizing “does not 
signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’.”48 
 
 What of the temporal ecstasis of discourse? With an eye on our overarching 
question it might be thought that the question of discourse, the existential structure which 
grounds Dasein’s ability to “Articulate” its understanding intelligibly, would be one of 
the most important difficulties facing any account of sleeping Dasein. Discourse, we are 
told, “does not temporalize itself primarily in any definite ecstasis.”49 It would appear to 
be the exception amongst the existentiales. However, Heidegger is quick to add that 
“Factically, however, discourse expresses itself for the most part in language, and speaks 
proximally in the way of addressing itself to the ‘environment’ [“umwelt”] by talking 
about things concernfully; because of this, making-present has, of course, a privileged 
constitutive function.”50 This would seem to position discourse alongside falling and, 
certainly, it is correct to see language as articulating itself, necessarily, out of Dasein as 
falling. However, it is essential to see that this inauthentic, factically common, mode of 
discourse is not akin to the primary ecstatic temporalisations of the other three 
existentiales. Instead discourse “in itself is temporal, since all talking about …, of …, or 
to …, is grounded in the ecstatical unity of temporality.”51 This unity, which we have just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 ibid, p. 401 [H349], translation modified. The first of each of the pairs of terms following each existentiale 
amount to its authentic temporalisation, whereas the second to its inauthentic, except in the final pair where 
this arrangement is reversed (making-present is inauthentic whereas the moment of vision is authentic). 
47 ibid, p. 401 [H350] 
48 ibid 
49 ibid, p. 400 [H349] 
50 ibid 
51 ibid 
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clarified above, shows that discourse is best seen as always disclosing the ecstatical unity 
rather than prioritising any particular dimension of temporality. As such, discourse is not 
confined to “making-present” but rather allows the possibility of insight into the ecstatic 
unity of Dasein in its existential structure. 
 
 With the existential and ecstatic unity of Dasein described we must now, once 
more, ask how sleep can fit into this comprehensive picture of Dasein’s being? We have, 
it would appear merely returned again to the crossroads in our somnolent questioning of 
the existential analytic, described above.52 Our very return to such a division in potential 
analysis of sleep indicates the depth of an ambiguity at the heart of sleep, it is both within 
our lives, and thus might be thought part of Dasein, and yet also a break, a little holiday, 
from those lives. This ambiguity, and its relationship to the notion of ‘life’, will be 
discussed below. However, with our newly fleshed out account of the existential structure 
of Dasein we can now see that our partial questioning of the place of sleep within this 
structure through the possibility of moods of sleep was just that, necessarily, partial. 
Again we must decide between attempting to unearth a subterranean, hibernating, place 
of sleep within the existential analytic and its ecstatic temporality or arguing that such a 
possibility is structurally excluded by Being and Time’s existential analytic. What are the 
strengths of these two opposing positions? 
 
 To begin with the former approach. What then could amount to the existentiells 
of sleep? Starting, once again, with the attuning of sleeping Dasein’s disposition. The 
sleeping attunement could resemble what Heidegger calls ‘bare mood’. “The ‘bare mood’ 
discloses the “there” more primordially, but correspondingly it closes it off more 
stubbornly than any not-perceiving.”53 The thought is that something like this ‘bare 
mood’, only more radically ‘closed off’, could amount to the attunement of sleep. Just as 
we often walk right past someone we know when in such a mood, and miss many other 
aspects of the world which we might wonder at when, later, they are recalled for us, so 
too in sleep are entities simply not there for perception. It often takes something quite 
startling to return us to waking and even with such a return it is far from clear that the 
source of our awakening is, itself, ‘there for perception’. If we return to Heidegger’s 
admiration for Aristotle’s account of sleep we found in FCM, there sleep as the closing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See p. 65, above. 
53 ibid, p. 175 [H136] 
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off of perception is nuanced: sleep is “a peculiar way in which αἴσθησις [aisthēsis, 
perception] is bound. It is not only a way in which perception is bound but also our 
essence, in that it cannot take in other beings which it itself is not.”54 The question is 
whether such connections with perception tell for or against the possibility of outlining 
an attunement of sleep? As we saw above attunements necessarily disclose and this 
disclosure of entities, the world and Dasein underpins all perception. Thus any attunement 
of sleep must be prior to, and the source of, all our perceptions whilst sleeping – in this 
case the peculiar lack of them.55 Certainly this resembles the more stubborn closing off 
that Heidegger grants ‘bare mood’. However, the binding of perception, we are told in 
FCM, is also a binding of “our essence” and a cutting of us off from “other beings which” 
we ourselves are not. This sounds more like an annulment of the disclosure of attunement 
and disposition than a mode there of.56 
 
 Turning to sleeping Dasein’s understanding. Understanding for Heidegger 
fundamentally concerns projecting on the basis of our having found ourselves thrown into 
attunement. Thus, assuming that we are attuned in sleep as discussed in the first part of 
the last paragraph, any understanding of sleep must be out of a closed off and turned 
inwards mode of Dasein’s being. This turning inwards seems to sit well with the theories 
underlying psychoanalytic practices of dream interpretation. Dreams, the understandings 
of sleep, as windows to the soul, or inner self. Of course, such a conception of sleep and 
its understanding relies on dualistic notions of self and world which Heidegger spent the 
better part of his career criticising.  
 
Let us return to his own account of understanding. Heidegger paid special 
attention to the etymology of his technical terms and so must we. Specifically, in the case 
of understanding [Verstehen] we are dealing with a word consisting of the prefix Ver- and 
the word stehen, ‘to stand’. In this instance the prefix functions to demonstrate the 
transition into a state.57 In this sense it plays the same role as the English prefix ‘for-’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, pp. 62 – 63 
55 Excepting, that is, dreams which are not straight-forwardly perceptual and certainly do not amount to the 
tide of perceptual content which floods over us in waking life. 
56 This connection between the closing off of entities and the binding of our essence in sleep will be 
discussed below in our examination of Heidegger’s account of the animal’s curiously bound, captivated, 
and benumbed, mode of being. 
57 Heidegger would certainly be uncomfortable about this word ‘state’ as it suggests a settled and isolated 
form whereas, as we will see momentarily, understanding is tied not to a settled moment in our lives but 
rather to our ever changing and fluctuating potentialities for being this way or that way. That this ambiguity 
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found in words such as forgiving, forgetting, formulating. However, it is the word stehen, 
‘to stand’ that should interest us here. Heidegger is explicit about the connection between 
understanding and standing: 
 
In German we say that someone can vorstehen something – literally, stand in 
front of or ahead of it, that is, stand at its head, administer, manage preside over 
it. This is equivalent to saying that he versteht sich darauf, understands in the 
sense of being skilled or expert at it [has the know-how of it]. The meaning of 
the term “understanding” [Verstehen] as defined above is intended to go back to 
this usage in ordinary language.58 
 
This connection with Vorstehen, connects Verstehen with the ‘before’ or ‘in front of’ of 
the German vor and as such the connection between understanding, projection, and the 
future comes through clearly. However, Heidegger is more interested in demonstrating, 
here, that understanding, as he uses it, goes back to the skilful coping, or managing, that 
underpins all actions (think of walking as an underlying and yet essential way in which 
we skilfully cope in this way, and which involves a host of remarkably skilful actions 
which are only revealed as such in, following Dreyfus, so called ‘breakdown 
scenarios’).59 
 
 Fundamentally, the etymology of understanding, both its connection to standing 
and to skilfully reckoning with and managing of the world tells against the possibility of 
a somnolent existentiell understanding. Sleep usually amounts to a giving up of just that 
posture, standing, upon which our understanding stands. Sleep, in its bodily enactment, 
often amounts to a lying down and as such to a mirroring of the laying down of our 
burdens for which sleep is so often praised. We will return to this question of “posture” 
and “stance” below, as it is intimately tied to Heidegger’s separating of Dasein from 
animal life.60 The thought is not so simple, nor so naïve, as the claim that the sleeper does 
not stand and thus the sleeper cannot understand. Instead the thought is closer to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is fundamental to the word will be brought out in Chapter 4’s consideration of Heideggerian approaches to 
sleep, where we will consider the difficult prefix Ver- in more detail. See pp. 136 – 138, below. 
58 Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 276. Italicised square brackets enclose 
the translator’s comments.  
59 Dreyfus, L. Hubert. Being-in-the-World, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991, Chapter 4, Section II, pp. 
69 – 83, and passim.  
60 See, for example, Krell, David F. Daimon Life, pp. 122 – 123. And, McNeill, William. The Time of Life, 
Heidegger and Ēthos, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 38. “The honey that appears 
to a bee as its food may not appear to a cat at all – not even as something toward which it could be indifferent 
(for this would presuppose the cat being able to adopt a stance toward the honey, as well as the honey being 
given for the cat as being honey).” 
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reverse of this. The sleeper’s lack of understanding, which amounts to being unable to 
stand-up to and through the possibilities of life, leads to their prone posture.61 Here we 
see the beginnings of a Heideggerian take on the significance of sleep’s bodily 
comportment.  
 
 We must interrogate the concept of skilful coping. Explicitly, whether the sleeper 
can be said to so cope with life. As Heidegger put it in his summer of 1927 Marburg 
lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: “the Dasein, has its own being in 
a certain way under control, as it comports itself in this or that way toward its capacity to 
be, as it has already decided in this or that way for or against it.”62 Here we must recall 
our brief phenomenological sketch of waking-up just prior to one’s alarm clock going off. 
At the time we saw it as indicating some kind of regularity and ordering over and through 
sleep. Now we might think to frame this within the structure of understanding as evidence 
in favour of Dasein status continuing throughout sleep along with the skilful coping 
involved in getting-up on time with relative regularity. In other words, if sleep can be 
regulated (patterned through having “already decided” to get up at such and such a time) 
then it cannot be beyond Dasein’s understanding. 
 
 “To understand means, more precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, in 
this projection to keep oneself at all times in a possibility.”63 This projecting oneself upon 
a possibility seems to support the notion of sleep’s understanding as a skilful coping with 
waking-up, sleeping ‘enough’, and the like. This is due to the reasons why one awakes, 
regularly or less regularly, when one does. We awake in time for our job because we wish 
to be the kind of person who can be relied upon. We do not wish to lose our job as it is 
part of the larger scale projecting of our self onto possible modes of being. And thus sleep, 
like eating, drinking, working and chatting, fits neatly into our projects of understanding. 
Leaving aside, for now, both questions of pathological sleep – insomnia, night terrors and 
the like – and the essential discussion of in what manner, or way, we regulate sleep and 
thus project across it, what of the understanding within or of sleep. This distinction of 
inside and outside sleep itself might be thought suspiciously reminiscent of dualistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Polt, Richard. Heidegger, An Introduction, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 68. “In order 
to do so, we have to be fit to stand up to what we are doing – we have to be capable and competent.” 
62 Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 276 
63 ibid, p. 277 
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thinking. However, we must, like Heidegger himself, remember that understanding, as an 
existential structure of Dasein’s being, cannot be temporary or partial. We, once more, 
ask ‘what is the existentiell understanding of sleep?’ 
 
 Returning to our alarm clock example. What would it mean, for Heidegger, to say 
that the sleeper “hears” the alarm clock? We must keep in mind that “Dasein hears, 
because it understands.”64 Yet does, phenomenologically, the sleeper hear the alarm 
clock, itself? That is to say do we, when asleep, hear anything as that thing? There are 
those moments when we awake and later realise what woke us, the drilling out in the road 
or the loud crash in the next room of our partner dropping something. Sometimes such 
sounds seem like they work themselves into our dreams as noises of quite different sorts. 
Fundamentally though the “experiences” of sleep are not tied into webs of reference or 
potentiality as an experience of this or that. Thus we might think that the projecting 
involved in understanding is denied to the sleeper precisely because the sleeper does not 
sleep as a philosopher sleeps or as a carpenter sleeps. Sleep, as Nancy points out,65 is a 
great leveller and, intuitively, a losing of the “‘as’-structure”, that “structure of the 
explicitness of something that is understood.”66 We return to the significance of this ‘as’-
structure below. 
 
 What has been said so far shows that despite some seemingly promising 
connections between Heidegger’s accounts of disposition and understanding, as 
encountered in and around Being and Time, and sleep, nonetheless it remains hard to 
imagine a sleeping Dasein. However, what of the two other existentiales that Heidegger 
emphases: falling and discourse? The former would appear to offer the best chance of 
fitting sleep into the existential analytic, whereas the latter seems to further point away 
from such a possibility. Falling, in keeping with Heidegger’s metaphorical use of sleep 
as the other side of that which must be awakened, refers to the manner in which Dasein 
primarily hides its ownmost, authentic, character from itself and, in so hiding, loses, 
temporarily, this character. It is no coincidence that Nancy, a reader of Heidegger who 
has focused on Heidegger’s das Man, is so interested in the connections between sleep 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 206 [H163] 
65 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, p. 17. “Sleep itself knows only equality, the measure common to all, 
which allows no differences or disparities. All sleepers fall into the same, identical and uniform sleep.” 
66 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 189 [H149] 
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and falling.67 And what of discourse? Given that “Discourse is existentially 
equiprimordial with disposition and understanding” we might just as well explain sleep’s 
apparent silence in terms of discourse as we have attempted to with sleep’s lack of 
understanding and attunement within those existentiales.68 Heidegger does say that in 
“talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that 
is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person 
who is never short of words.”69 Yet does sleep’s silence ever have such a possibility? Is 
it not closer to the silence of the dumb individual? A “man [who] is dumb... has not proved 
that he can keep silence; indeed, he entirely lacks the possibility of proving anything of 
the sort.”70 And what of the “silence” of the beasts and birds?71 Can it truly be thought 
that sleep’s keeping silent, or sleep talking – that truly uncanny phenomenon, can be 
described as ‘developing an understanding’ and as stemming from the sleeper’s 
existential structure of discourse? Perhaps the most pressing question which results from 
this far too brief survey is how could sleep relate with Heidegger’s contentious notions 
of authenticity and inauthenticity? Could Dasein, even if it managed to rest its eyes, just 
for a moment, do so authentically?  
 
 In a moment we will turn to one commentators take on our question – does Dasein 
sleep? First, however, it is worth noting that sleep seems to pull in opposite directions 
with these two fundamental existentales of Dasein. With its proximity to falling, our 
falling away from ourselves, sleep seems constitutively inauthentic. Whereas the 
sleeper’s silence might be seen to connect with Heidegger’s call of conscience and its 
“uncanny mode of keeping silent”.72 
 
Only in keeping silent does the conscience call; that is to say, the call comes 
from the soundlessness of uncanniness, and the Dasein which it summons is 
called back into the stillness of itself, and called back as something that is to 
become still. Only in reticence, therefore, is this silent discourse understood 
appropriately in wanting to have a conscience. It takes the words away from the 
common-sense idle talk of the “they”.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See his Being Singular Plural (Nancy, Jean-Luc. Being Singular Plural, Translated by Robert Richardson 
and Anne E O'Byrne. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000) and, of course, The Fall of Sleep. 
68 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 203 [H161] 
69 ibid, p. 208 [H164] 
70 ibid, p. 208 [H164 – 165] 
71 David F. Krell argues that for Heidegger, given his notion of the animal as captivated or benumbed, sees 
“numb and dumb... [as constituting] something more than a mere rhyme...”. Daimon Life, p. 17 
72 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 322 [H277] 
73 ibid, p. 343 [H296] 
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Perhaps sleep’s uncanny silence, its strange discourse, approaches the silence of the call 
of conscience and as such offers the possibility of authentic sleep and of a new account 
of Dasein’s being. We must, for the moment, leave such considerations and count them 
as part of the somnolent undertow which we have already identified, a current which 
drags at Dasein despite, rather than through, Heidegger’s existential analytic. 
 
IV: Corey Anton’s Dream of a Heideggerian Account of 
Dreamless Sleep 
	  
Corey Anton, in his fascinating and wide ranging article ‘Dreamless Sleep and the 
Whole of Human Life: An Ontological Exposition’, offers his own decisive take on the 
problem of sleep and the existential analytic. For Anton, Dasein does not sleep because 
the sleeper does not exist. 
 
Can Dasein, as being-in-the-world, be its sleep? Is not sleep the very epitome of 
non-Dasein, the non-being-in-the-world that every one of us is? Taking 
Heidegger’s distinctions of ‘extants,’ ‘lives,’ and ‘exists’ as a framework, it 
would seem more appropriate to argue that humans live but do not exist (Dasein, 
verb) while they sleep.74 
 
Anton is here appealing to Heidegger’s tripartite distinction between types of being as 
found in his last Marburg lecture course in the summer of 1928 The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic.75 However, the reservation of the term existence for Dasein alone 
had already been made clear in Being and Time: “the term “existence”, as a designation 
of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.”76 Anton’s interest is drawn to the middle term 
of Heidegger’s distinction: the category of ‘life’ and its relationship with sleep. We can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Anton, Corey. ‘Dreamless Sleep’, p. 186 
75 Heidegger, Martin. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. Michael Heim. See p. 127: “A cat does 
not exist, but it lives...”, and p. 169: “Now this is correct, it is not intrinsic to the essence of Dasein as such 
that it factually exist [faktisch existiert]; it is, however, precisely its essence that in each case this being can 
also not be extant. The cosmos can be without humans inhabiting the earth, and the cosmos was long before 
humans ever existed.” It is, to say the least, intriguing that Heidegger here chooses faktisch over tatsächlich. 
Unfortunately this is concealed by its translation into English as “factually” rather than “factically”. The 
same aberration from the accepted translation practice – as established by Macquarrie and Robinson on p. 
82, footnote 1 of their translation of Being and Time – is noted at another point in The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, pp. 156 – 157 [199], by Raoni Padui in his ‘From the Facticity of Dasein to the 
Facticity of Nature: Naturalism, Animality, and Metonotology’, pp. 63 – 64.  
76 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, p. 67 [H42], emphasis added. 
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already see why our next Chapter must return to Heidegger’s most extensive engagement 
with ‘life’ and ‘nature’ as found in Part Two of FCM. 
 
 Whilst Anton casts a wide philosophical net in the process of undertaking his 
“ontological exposition” of dreamless sleep – drawing on amongst others Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, Husserl, Agamben, Straus, Jonas, Leder, James, Saint-Exupéry, and the Hindu 
Vendanta The Upanishad – his point of departure and much of the terminology of the 
argument are thoroughly Heideggerian. In fact, as we will see, Anton focuses his 
engagement with Heidegger on the specific problematic and narrative of the first three 
chapters of Division II of Being and Time. This makes an examination of Anton’s article 
a logical continuation of our previous section’s consideration of sleep’s relationship with 
the existential structure of Dasein as a whole, a structure which is both motivating and 
problematized in the opening chapters of Division II. Anton picks out, in particular, the 
famous analyses of being-toward-death, and the “call of conscience”, as well as 
Heidegger’s notion of being-a-whole. Our assessment of Anton’s argument will track 
these three concepts and his deployment of them. Anton’s central focus can be discerned 
in his aim to disrupt an “awakist bias” which “fails to grasp how dreamless sleep is a 
complement and corrective to the generally accepted idea that death serves as sufficient 
grounding for disclosing a person’s “being-a-whole.””77 This awakist bias has already 
been discussed in Part I, as have the problems associated with delimiting dreamless, as 
opposed to other forms of, sleep.78 Thus here we will focus on Anton’s efforts to provide 
a “complement and corrective” to Heidegger’s death analysis, and therefore to the 
existential analytic as a whole, and why he believes such to be necessary. 
 
 Anton points out that being-toward-death accomplishes, for Heidegger, two 
simultaneous modifications in Dasein’s being. It “individuates Dasein from the they-
self,” and “offers to existence the authentic possibility of being-a-whole.”79 For 
Heidegger this relates to Dasein’s ability to run ahead of itself and thus “resolutely reckon 
with” one’s own finitude and therein one’s possibilities in general, as a whole.80 Anton’s 
critique comes in relation to the second of these modifications – he is not convinced by 
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78 See Part I, Ch. 1, Sc. III and Ch. 2, Sc. II. 
79 ibid, p. 187 
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Heidegger’s account of being-a-whole. In opening he seeks to specify what this notion 
cannot, for Heidegger, mean. Correctly, he identifies that being-a-whole must not be seen 
to equate with the sum or complete whole of Dasein taken as an object at-hand. Dasein 
is, as we know, never reducible to an objective, present-at-hand, entity, to something 
extant in other words. Heidegger spends considerable time elucidating Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-being-a-whole as anticipatory resoluteness. However, for Anton, there 
must be another essential element to our understanding of being-a-whole: “an all-
inclusiveness achieved by an ecstatical retention and recollection of having-been in total 
undifferentiation.”81 To understand this we must see that: “...Heidegger’s exposition of 
death and Dasein’s possibilities of being-a-whole needs to be complemented with a 
consideration of the authentic possibilities of being-toward-sleep. If we died but never 
slept, then perhaps Heidegger’s appeal to death would be sufficient for an account of 
wholeness.”82 
 
 Anton is appealing to is the same intuition that we turned to in our Introduction to 
this Part: namely, that Heidegger’s account of Dasein is strikingly wakeful and thus 
appears to miss the existential significance of sleep. It is the specific manner in which 
Anton aims to correct this ‘awakist’ bias in the existential analytic that must interest us 
here. He begins by allowing that sleep, like death, can disclose. We discussed above the 
problems associated with allowing that sleep discloses in a truly Heideggerian sense. 
However, Anton does not see sleep as disclosing in any everyday sense but rather as, in 
contrast to death “which discloses the whole of my existence, Sleep discloses the whole 
of the life of which I, as existing, am a part.”83 Life, as a whole, is disclosed by sleep and 
this is compared and contrasted with death’s disclosure of the whole of existence. Already 
this begins to demonstrates Anton’s goal as being “corrective”, as well as augmentative, 
in respect to the existential analytic. 
 
 Yet, it is in the two sub-sections Recurrence of Sleep and Being-Toward-Sleep, 
through their discussions of the differences and similarities between sleep and death, that 
we truly begin to see the significance of Anton’s article for our purposes. In the former 
of these we see, after an initial surveying of the similarities and points of contact between 
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sleep and death, the, by now familiar, claim that what separates sleep from death is that 
the one is repeated whereas the other is singular. 
 
Just as people can reckon with their own death, they can understand that part of 
their being is other than “being-in-the-world.” Sleep is the re-occurring other 
side of Dasein (existence, awake or dreaming), for the dead cannot come back to 
life whereas the living wake-up daily.84 
 
Anton is clear that this singularity of death is not due to death being taken as a singular 
factual event in each of our futures. That would be to conflate Heidegger’s notions of 
death and demise. Instead, citing Jonas, he shows how we are better served by thinking 
about death in the context of Dasein’s necessary mortality. The resulting claim in relation 
to sleep is that “Dreamless sleep is similar to death in that it too is a continued 
condition.”85 It is worth noting that this chimes well with our earlier suggestions about 
sleep, in any possible Heideggerian model, not being reducible to an at-hand state of 
consciousness, given its proximity and relation to Heidegger’s account of attunements.86 
 
 It is on the back of this clarification of Heidegger’s notion of death that Anton 
stresses the dissimilarity between sleep and death and thus offers a provisional answer to 
some of the interconnected questions with which we began this Part – in particular by 
offering an account of the existential significance of sleep.87 “But in significant contrast 
to death, sleep is the re-occurring experience of having-been undifferentiated.”88 
Essentially this contrast connects a temporal ecstasis to the intuitive distinction between 
sleep as repeated and death as singular. Death is always something we are being-towards, 
whilst sleep, as ‘continued condition’, is always something we are being-from.89 Anton 
follows this by distinguishing the two “losses” involved in death and sleep. The former 
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86 However, and we will return to this and connected worries shortly, our use of the sleep’s proximity to 
attunements to suggest the possibility that sleep is not as confined to set periods of inactivity, as it is often 
taken to be, was itself based on Heidegger’s strong claims about the unique character of Dasein’s being. 
The question arises whether Anton’s claims for sleep can stand, situated as they are beyond or beneath 
existence, Dasein and the existential significance of beings. It is here that we must consider Heidegger’s 
account of captivation. See Ch. 4, Sc III, below. 
87 See p. 49, above. 
88 ibid 
89 Already this formulation illustrates the strain that Anton’s schema must undergo: are we never to sleep 
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is, we are told, a loss of both existence and life, whereas the latter is merely a loss of 
existence. As such the loss in sleep may in fact be more accurately portrayed as a gain: 
 
...in sleep we are able to lose hold of ourselves only to be incorporated into that 
whole which is more encompassing than any whole within existence. We 
furthermore have the capacity to bring that wholeness of sleep back into our 
awake lives, disclosing the whole of who we are as partly undifferentiated.90 
 
As such Anton offers a way of taking Heidegger’s very refusal of sleep for Dasein, which 
appeared as an exiling of sleep from the existential plane, as itself a granting of existential 
significance to sleep. Sleep, as beyond the existential, is, for Anton, existentially 
significant, significant for waking Dasein, and is such as being beyond, or below, the 
existential.91 
 
 Anton begins to outline the manner in which extra-existential sleep nonetheless 
carries existential significance in the subsection Being-Toward-Sleep. Here, drawing on 
Drew Leder’s work in The Absent Body, we are told, in a manner that chimes with some 
of Nancy’s pronouncements, that all “of us are indistinguishable while asleep”.92 Anton’s 
appeal to sleep’s dissolving of distinctions relates to the body and is supposed to offer us 
another important corrective to the existential analytic. 
 
To fall asleep is therefore to let the body recess back to that impersonal who 
who is universally common to life (even non-Dasein beings). Is it not liberating 
as well as comforting to understand that, as alive, awakeness is always already 
less than the whole of our being?93 
 
Putting aside Anton’s vague gesturing at an emotional benefit to such an account, we can 
see that it is our body that allows or facilitates this “recessing back to that impersonal 
who” who we are, and all are, in sleep. This appeal to the body as the means of sleep’s 
existential import not only reminds us of the often repeated associating of sleep with the 
body, in contradistinction with the mind, but also suggests potentially non-dualistic 
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interpretations of sleep’s bodily aspect.94 However, it is Anton’s use of the ‘who’ question 
which acts as another extension of the Heideggerian account of sleep. As we saw in our 
opening quotation, Heidegger’s explicit treatment of sleep is notable partly for its refusal 
to apply this Dasein specific question structure – the ‘who’ – to “‘whatever is sleeping’.” 
 
 “Existence is thus enmeshed and suspended in anonymous corporeality, and sleep 
discloses how, just as Dasein is its world existingly, the lived-body is its earthly ground 
livingly.”95 Given this new somnolent disclosure Anton has described, being-toward-
sleep becomes “the mode of existence that accepts that we are much more than our awake 
lives might lead us to believe.”96 This addition, of being-toward-sleep, is key to both the 
existential significance of sleep according to Anton and to demonstrating two of the main 
problems with the Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep he is developing.  
 
 The first of these problems can be brought out through examining the way that 
Anton’s use of the term ‘being-toward-sleep’ strains against his relating of sleep to the 
temporal ecstasis of having-been which we saw above. The true nature of this problem is 
not merely a terminological slip. In other words, Anton cannot deflect this problem by 
merely substituting the word from instead of toward into his formulation. In fact, such a 
move would merely highlight the problem further. Instead this ‘slip’ in using the toward 
motif conceals the uniformity of his reversal of the temporally ecstatic significance of 
death in his description of sleep. This, too simple, reversal fails to do justice to any 
phenomenology of sleep worth the name. To see why let us consider that Anton’s schema, 
despite his chosen formula, requires us to reduce sleep’s existential significance to a 
being-from-sleep whilst retaining death’s as being-toward-death. What is lost in such an 
account is the ambiguous being-toward-sleep-or-death which seems just as essential as 
the other two that Anton allows for. That Anton’s account should enforce such a 
separating out is surprising given that he begins these sections of his argument by 
commenting on the commonly held preference for dying in one’s sleep.97 Instead of 
taking this as an opportunity for examining the ambiguous interconnections of these two 
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concepts, in their futurity, Anton treats this as but another feature of factual, ontic and 
“everyday language” and in doing so he priorities his chosen Heideggerian conceptual 
structure at the cost of a more rigorous phenomenological interrogation of the relationship 
between sleep, death, and the future. 
 
 The second problem with Anton’s account once again appears a mere slip in his 
use of Heidegger’s terminology. We saw above that Anton characterised being-toward-
sleep as that mode of existence that accepts that we are more than merely our waking 
existence and as such that brings about the existential significance of extra-existential 
sleep. This “moves out from the recognition that the living are all partly one”.98 As such 
Anton describes being-toward-sleep, in distinction from sleep, as a cognitive accepting 
or recognising of the existential significance of sleep. However, this is to break with the 
analogy with being-toward-death as Heidegger’s account of such does not see it as a shift 
in any cognitive sense but rather as the existential significance of death, for each Dasein. 
Dasein is being-toward-death regardless of whether it flees from this possibility of its 
impossibility or resolutely faces up to its finitude. Anton appears to have run ahead of 
Heidegger in his use of the terminology of Being and Time and to do so here, at such a 
central part of that text, is to muddy the waters to an unacceptable degree. In order to clear 
these waters and to untangle Anton’s use of Heidegger we must turn to his discussion of 
the notions of the ‘call of conscience’ and, once again, ‘being-a-whole’. 
 
 It is at this point in the article, from the beginning of the section ‘Dreamless Sleep 
and the Whole of Human Life’, that Anton’s tone and terminology take a decidedly un-
Heideggerian turn. For Anton this part of his article is seen as a fleshing out of the 
significance of being-toward-sleep.99 However, these elaborations, in a sub-section 
confusingly entitled ‘Sleep as a Call of Conscience’, begin by suggesting a common 
misunderstanding about being-a-whole, in particular about the relationship between the 
notions of ‘whole’ and ‘nature’. 
 
When we imagine that humans are one kind of thing and nature is something 
else, fictional lines of difference can appear as already given gulfs. We de-
naturalize and misunderstand humanity as we de-humanize and misunderstand 
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nature. In either case, we attempt to grasp less than the whole as it actually is. … 
[And as such] we cover over a great clue regarding the whole of who we are.100 
  
Sleep, dreamless sleep, is taken by Anton as providing waking Dasein with a regular and 
much needed glimpse of its position within nature. However, this gambit leads to the 
necessary and fraught question of the relationship and shared, or otherwise, identity of 
the sleeper and the waking self. If waking is only part of some greater whole then what is 
this whole such that it can contain or conjoin such distinct facets of life? 
 
 Having set-up the intuitive impossibility of describing sleep as, even potentially, 
present for experience101 Anton begins to explore the consequences for his analogy 
between Heideggerian death and sleep. Specifically, how can sleep, as is the case with 
death, be considered our ‘own-most’ possibility? For Anton, the loss of the I and all 
experience in dreamless sleep reveals, and here the temporal lopsidedness of his 
phenomenology of sleep reappears, that “sleep is our own-most without ever being 
presently mine.”102 Since “there is no “I” who obtains the sleep”,103 we are left with an 
intensified problem as to how sleep can be considered as part of us and as such as 
existentially significant. Anton’s answer to this dilemma comes in the form of the notion 
of sleep as “the gap in experience which makes evident the meaning of consciousness”,104 
an idea which Anton lifts directly from H.W. Johnstone’s 1976 article ‘Sleep and 
Death’.105 
 
 Johnstone points out that a gap cannot be open ended, it must already have ended 
in order to be a gap at all. It is in this sense that Anton argues for sleep being, unlike death, 
a viable candidate for an existential gap. Such a “gap as gap can be noted only after the 
gap’s end”.106 Using his distinction between own-most and ownership, or “mineness”, 
Anton then argues that “my sleep is not yet mine until I wake up”.107 It is in building on 
this distinction that Anton takes a definite step away from Heidegger. Specifically, he 
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appeals to a distinction within intentionality and (self)consciousness common to both 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. This distinction is between consciousness which posits an “I” 
in addition to the mineness of experiences and those which do not. The former is 
described as variously as ‘thetic intentionality’ or ‘propositional self-consciousness’ by 
Sartre and as ‘intentionality of Act’ or simply ‘judgement’ by Merleau-Ponty. 
Conversely; the latter, is named ‘pre-thetic intentionally’ or ‘non-propositional self-
consciousness’ by Sartre, and ‘operative intentionality’ by Merleau-Ponty. For Anton 
these distinctions within consciousness allow us to show that loss of ‘I’ need not lead to 
an exit from consciousness. Instead he sees both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre as holding to 
the priority of the latter type of consciousness, pre-thetic self-consciousness, as well as 
both taking this very priority from Heidegger’s philosophy. As noted this terminology is 
alien to Heidegger’s work and would be unacceptable to him for a number reasons. 
However, it is true that this historical interpretation does describe one way that the two 
French thinkers in question may have interpreted, at least for some time, Heidegger’s 
much trumpeted phenomenological privileging of practical engagement with the world 
over theoretical observation of it.108 
 
 Yet, it is the actual distance from Heideggerian thought, heralded by this shift 
away from his method and language, which must interest us. Sleep’s difference or 
separation from the practical network of references, meanings and intentional connections 
leads to its disqualification from even pre-thetic consciousness, for Anton. 
 
In fact, because dreamless sleep stands in such contrast to both prereflective (i.e. 
operative) and reflective (i.e. thetic) intentionality, we need to explore the 
possibility of a different mode of consciousness – one which is not “self-
consciousness” and which underlies both thetic and pre-thetic intentionalities. 
Admittedly this terminology is difficult but dreamless sleep does seem to reveal 
a mode of consciousness. But even here sleep does not comprise the whole such 
consciousness. Rather, it serves as the daily reminder, the necessary clue to the 
discovery, of precisely this mode of universally shared non-thetic, non-ecstatic 
consciousness.109 
 
This broadening of the traditional notion of consciousness to include sleep bears 
significant resemblance to the Husserlian response to the problem of sleep we examined, 
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through de Warren’s work, in Chapter 2. Anton’s proximity to a Husserlian account is 
further demonstrated in his appeal to a retentive, and protentive, web stretching out from 
waking existence and crossing through and over the existential gaps of dreamless sleep.110 
“Awake existence has an ecstatical character, meaning that retentions and protentions 
penetrate and intermingle with present awareness and this accounts for my experienced 
continuity; we wake up already partly connected to who we were before we fell asleep.”111 
Once again the question of ‘how I wake-up again’ here leads to the expanding of the 
notion of consciousness so as to retain a guiding and stable thread through the apparent 
abyss of sleep. 
 
 Before returning to the problems with such one-sided phenomenological accounts 
of sleep let us follow Anton’s thread a little further – what notion of consciousness, or of 
being-a-whole, can still operate over such disparate elements? We have already seen hints 
of Anton’s route, and how it is strikingly dissimilar to both Heidegger’s and Husserl’s, in 
his earlier statements about the undifferentiated nature of sleep and humanity’s position 
in relation to nature. In the subsection ‘The Living Roots of Authentic Existence’ some 
meat, though not much, is added to the skeletal ontology of sleep Anton has been 
constructing. It is here that Merleau-Ponty is put to work in discussing both the ability to 
“shut myself up in this anonymous life which subtends my personal one” and expanding 
on this notion of anonymous life.112 This is followed by another appeal to Leder for a 
reminder of the continuation of “vegetative processes” during sleep.113 In sleep we are, 
for Anton, as close as we come to being reduced to the “merely vegetative”.114 
Remembering that sleep’s distance from existence, and Dasein, is mediated, for Anton, 
by its existential significance we can now see why this vegetative life is not something 
which we leave behind completely each time we awake. Instead we “are always partly at 
the level of these modes of organic and impersonal consciousness.”115 
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 At this point Anton draws on Jonas, Straus and Ernest Becker, to describe the 
unique characteristics of vegetal being which he wishes to compare with sleep. 
Specifically, he attempts to show that “when the living go to sleep they mimic and engage 
in what distantly resembles plant behavior.”116 These thinkers all describe the necessary 
extensions from plant life to animal life, such as motility, desires, emotions, perceptions 
and individuation.117 Of course, for Anton, it is the disruption of the last of these, 
individuation, which is of most significance in terms of his connecting of sleep with our 
‘living roots’.  
 
 Yet, for our purposes this raises a number of questions which we will only return 
to in our concluding section of this Part – though they inform the entirety of our next 
Chapter. Specifically, we might wonder whether sleep’s secondary status to waking 
follows or precedes its association with plant-like behaviour. Furthermore, it may be 
necessary to sketch in outline what Heidegger’s notion of animal ‘behaviour’ would look 
like if adapted to account for plant behaviour as well as sleeping behaviour. Our soon to 
come consideration of Heidegger’s treatment of non-Dasein living beings will also need 
to hold in view the striking fact that his oft cited discussion of the animal’s poverty in 
world says virtually nothing about the status of the plant. Furthermore, it must be 
remembered that it is at exactly this point, plants that is, that, as far the question of what 
sleeps goes, “already we are uncertain.”118 However, for Anton it is enough to show that 
though “we never literally become plants, lived-bodies always have sleep as both a 
condition and basic modality; evolutionarily speaking, we are unable to completely leave 
behind the radical anonymity of vegetative life.”119 
 
 With these somnolent roots described Anton makes a few passing comments 
about the vulnerability of the sleeper and our social self-exclusion in sleep before moving 
on to his ‘Concluding Remarks’. These remarks, like the rest of his article, stride at a 
dizzying pace down many dark paths, along which we cannot, and certainly would not 
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Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013) would be a productive resource for such an extension 
of Heidegger’s animal account in the context of the question of the plant-like character of sleep. In 
particular, his deconstructive approach to western thought’s demoting of the plant’s way of being resembles 
our own defence of sleep’s unique mode of being. 
119 Anton, Corey. ‘Dreamless Sleep’, p. 195 
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wish to, follow. However, the abiding influence of this section of his thesis is Agamben 
and his important notion of “nutritive life” which Anton had already cited in an opening 
quotation.120 It is this which amounts to the elusive whole which he has been attempting 
to describe in modifying Heidegger’s existential analytic. This is Anton’s response to a 
“critic, coming from an awakist bias” who argues that he is “making an error” as “you 
cannot claim a person is a whole, also claim that a person is part of a larger whole, and 
then further claim that the person also is the whole of that whole of which the person is a 
part.”121 Eschewing any “super-ordinary transcendental “I””, Anton’s response to such a 
critic is to turn to the “absolute whole of all wholes, that partless whole, the 
undifferentiated.”122 This decidedly Eastern sounding123 response to a hypothetical charge 
of inconsistency in fact relies heavily on his assigning of being-toward-sleep the role of 
holding together in dialogue the individuated whole “who is part of a whole” with the I 
“who necessarily already has slept,” and as such is “indistinguishable from the whole.”124 
“Authentically being-toward-sleep, we learn that the truth of humanity is that we are 
ambiguously both individuated and the undifferentiated.”125  
 
 So much turns on this notion of authentic being-toward-sleep that it is not 
surprising that in this notion dwells the weakest of Anton’s adaptations of Heidegger’s 
schema. Specifically, we must examine how Anton extends his account of being-toward-
sleep to account for the necessity of a connected, and presumably fundamental, 
attunement for sleep. Anton’s suggestion is found back at the opening of his subsection 
‘The Living Roots of Authentic Existence’: “If authentic being-toward-death dwells in 
angst, authentic being-toward-sleep opens humanity to the abiding joy of a more inclusive 
ground of being.”126 This recalls two aspects of our preceding discussion. Firstly, our 
extended consideration of the difficulties involved in allowing attunements of sleep. And 
secondly, our first criticism of Anton’s use of the phrase being-toward-sleep as 
concealing an overly simple reversal of the temporal significance of death in describing 
sleep. It might be argued that our initial discussion of somnolent attunements could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 This is clear despite the fact that Anton does not cite Agamben in these ‘Concluding Remarks’. 
121 ibid, p. 197 
122 ibid 
123 Anton does indeed turn in his penultimate paragraph to the Mandukya Upanishad, part of Hindu 
Scripture. 
124 ibid 
125 ibid 
126 ibid, p. 194 
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perhaps be dismissed as overly concerned with actually present sleep as opposed to being-
toward-sleep. However, even if this were accepted,127 it would only strengthen the worry 
about Anton’s temporal skewing of sleep’s significance. 
 
 Joy, or “blissful comfort” as Anton calls it in the following lines, is supposed to 
enact the equivalent role for being-toward-sleep that Anxiety [Angst] does for being-
toward-death. This choice makes it appear that Anton has taken the ancient Greek 
opposition of Hypnos and Thanatos in exclusion and forgotten not only that they were 
twin brothers but also all the rest of the pantheon of gods as well.128 As suggested above 
sleep, and its significance, though related in interesting and complex ways to death is far 
from being simply its opposite. Temporally speaking this is made all the clearer by the 
suggestion of a far better candidate for such an opposition. Drew Leder, in The Absent 
Body, just after a subsection drawn on repeatedly by Anton, points out the following. 
 
Each waking day is double-horizoned by sleep. Yet there is an even more global 
horizon to sleeping and waking alike, to all ecstatic recessive phenomena: life 
itself. The precondition of all my experience is that I have come into life and 
hence have undergone a gestation and birth. Yet this point of origination is 
marked by ineradicable absence.129 
 
This ineradicable absence of birth, which Leder will later hold alongside a similar absence 
of the “prenatel body”,130 mirrors the limit character of death and, whilst there are many 
ways we might further nuance such a comparison between birth and death, its mere 
presence in Leder, and in such proximity to his work on sleep which Anton relies on so 
heavily, should cause us to question some of Anton’s more outlandish claims about 
sleep’s existential and ecstatic significance. Claims such as the following “The 
anticipatory resoluteness that is made possible by reckoning with our own-most death 
should be tempered by the joyful hope that comes from understanding the meaning of our 
dreamless sleep.”131 Sleep is far from obviously the merely positive source of joy for 
which we are supposed to hope. As stated above, sleep cannot be so easily untangled from 
death given that we are not only being-from-sleep and being-toward-sleep but also being-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Which we are certainly not inclined to do. 
128 For example, Hermes is often associated with sleep in myths and this fascinating connection between 
the messenger god and sleep is one which we return to in our concluding section of this thesis. 
129 Leder, Drew. The Absent Body, p. 59 
130 ibid, p. 144 
131 Anton, Corey. ‘Dreamless Sleep’, p. 197 
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toward-sleep-or-death. Whether Anton means hope or reminiscence, as seems more 
likely, it is phenomenologically bankrupt to reduce sleep to such positivity in simple 
opposition to death’s supposed negativity. 
 
 What then are we to conclude of Anton’s efforts at providing an ‘Ontological 
Exposition’ of sleep? It is worth drawing at least three significant findings out of our 
analysis of this piece. First and foremost, the strength of the tension, or even 
incompatibility, between the existential analytic and sleep has been shown in two ways. 
Anton’s own move out of existential analysis and into a consideration of the place of 
Dasein within life must be considered alongside the tensions, failures and necessary 
search for supplementary resources which plague such an attempt to spring out of the 
analytic and out of Heideggerian terminology. Secondly, such tensions centre around a 
difficulty with sleep common to both Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenological 
accounts – the privileging of sleep’s past and the postponing, sidelining, or ignoring of 
the sleep to come. Thirdly, the path Anton attempts to follow, out of Heideggerian 
analysis and toward sleep, may productively be considered within the context of 
Heidegger’s own work which follows on from Being and Time. In particular, Anton’s talk 
of ‘nature’, ‘life’ and ‘vegetal being’ suggest a return to the account of living beings 
which are not Dasein, a return found in FCM, and its infamous notion of poverty in world. 
Whilst Anton, returns to consciousness based accounts of sleep, we may productively 
hold firm with Heidegger for a little longer in considering a possible place for the sleeper 
alongside the famous tripartite distinction between the being of the stone, that of the 
animal (and the plant presumably), and that of Dasein.
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Chapter 4 
Sleep, World Poverty and the Animal (Sleeping) Within 
 
I: The Animal’s Somnolent Trail 
 
We must follow Heidegger down an alternative path than the existential analytic 
if, that is, we still hope for a Heideggerian phenomenological approach to sleep. 
Returning to FCM, and keeping in mind what we have seen of Anton’s problematic 
attempt to move out of existential analysis, we will now consider one of Heidegger’s own 
such attempts – his method of comparative examination. If Dasein does not sleep – does 
not contain the sleeper – then what comparisons might or could Heidegger have drawn 
between wakeful Dasein and sleeping life? However, before assessing in detail the 
relevance to sleep of some of Heidegger’s most philosophically controversial claims 
about the essence of life and animality, it will be helpful to show what, positively, leads 
us to hope for fruitful insights into sleep through comparative, over existential, analysis. 
 
 The reasons in favour of turning now to the comparative examination can be split 
into two types; those relating to the structure of our argument so far, and those internal to 
the examination as Heidegger conducts it. Whereas the latter of these reasons must take 
priority, if this Chapter is to remain an exercise in awakening slumbering Heideggerian 
insights into sleep from within Heidegger’s work, it is nonetheless fitting that we begin 
with the former so as to show not only why we might turn to the comparative analysis but 
also why we do so now. In particular, it is necessary to ask why we now turn, with 
Heidegger, to the issue of ‘world’? Part Two of FCM, and with it the comparative 
examination, is focused on approaching the meaning of world. So far in this thesis the 
question ‘does the sleeper have a world?’ has only been hinted at indirectly. Now, through 
Heidegger’s comparative method, it moves to centre stage and, with it, we may hope to 
compare the relationship between Dasein and world, as being-in-the-world, with that of 
the sleeper and world. In this way our aim is to open Heidegger’s revolutionary 
conception of world as a tool for any future phenomenology of sleep. 
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 In light of this it is important that Heidegger himself, in Section 42,1 situated this 
particular method of interrogating the meaning of world in relation to two of his previous 
attempts. These other two paths were undertaken in On the Essence of Ground2 and in 
Being and Time.3 The former, amounts, according to Heidegger, to a “history of the word 
‘world’ and the historical development of the concept it contains.”4 In contrast, the latter, 
approaches “the phenomenon of world by interpreting the way in which we at first and 
for the most part move about in our everyday world.”5 Yet, in distinction to both of these 
methods, Heidegger’s comparative examination aims to elucidate the meaning of world 
by considering the relationship between world, Dasein, and those other entities with 
which we find ourselves as “part of the world: the animals and plants, the material things 
like the stone, for example.”6 It is in this introduction and contextualising of the 
comparative examination that Heidegger presents us with the three, famous, theses which 
will drive the remainder of the lecture course: “[1.] the stone (material object) is 
worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming.”7 
 
 This brings us to another structurally internal reason why in this Chapter we now 
turn to the comparative examination: the intermediate position of sleep. Specifically, in 
contrast to Anton’s dualistic analysis of death and sleep through a strained Heideggerian 
framework, we might suggest that another application of Heideggerian terminology, one 
closer to our pre-philosophical intuitions about sleep, can be undertaken through the 
comparative method. As we discussed above, in criticising Anton, sleep does not sit 
comfortably in contradistinction with death but rather seems much closer to some 
intermediate place between the world of waking life and that final exile from the world 
that seems to characterise death.8 Heidegger opens his comparative examination in the 
third chapter of Part Two of FCM with the following admission: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 And thus before the official beginning of the comparative examination in Chapter Three of Part Two, ‘The 
Beginning of the Comparative Examination, Taking the Intermediate Thesis That the Animal Is Poor in 
World as Our Point of Departure’. 
2 Heidegger, Martin. ‘On the Essence of Ground’, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, pp. 97 – 135 
3 However, it is worth remembering that “…there are other possible paths which we shall not introduce 
here.” Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 178 
4 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 176 
5 ibid, p. 177 
6 ibid 
7 ibid 
8 Of course, there is the question of the after-life, but given that Heidegger acknowledges the naïveté of his 
initial constructing of these theses we might also make appeal to such in the hope that modifications to our 
own will follow in due course. We return to this question, albeit briefly, in discussing the penultimate 
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Initially, a comparative examination of this kind seems to proceed in an 
extremely naive manner, as if the three beings we have mentioned were three 
things of the same order, as if they were all on the same plane. We shall begin 
our comparative analysis by starting from the middle, that is, by asking what it 
means to say that the animal is poor in world. Thus we shall also constantly be 
looking to two sides at once...9 
 
In this way we propose the following substituting of ‘the corpse’, ‘the sleeper’, and 
‘(wakeful) Dasein’ into Heidegger’s initial “naive” theses: ‘[1s.] the corpse is worldless; 
[2s.] the sleeper is poor in world; [3s.] Dasein is world-forming.’ Putting on hold the 
question of the naïveté of such a reformulation, the advantages of this approach are 
multiple. Firstly, it places the sleeper within the limiting constraints of its relationship to 
the wakeful being and to that being which will never awake again – it reminds us that, 
when it comes to describing sleep, we must “constantly be looking to two sides at once”. 
As such it satisfies the implicit requirement which we may take from Heidegger’s claim 
that “such phenomena as sleeping and waking cannot be addressed extrinsically as one 
particular question.”10 Furthermore such a method holds at bay the sort of problems 
associated with Anton’s account. Lastly, it seeks a starting point within sleep’s 
relationship to world as opposed to our previous efforts to fit sleep into the already 
discerned existential account of Dasein.11 
 
 Yet, perhaps the naïveté of this substituting amounts to a position which we have 
already undone in our earlier examination of Heidegger’s description of sleep in the 
context of attunements. Perhaps comparing the dead, the sleeping and the wakings’ 
relationships to world strays too close to a consciousness centred distinguishing of shifts 
in ‘state’.12 Such an approach would differ significantly from Heidegger’s comparison 
between three modes of being often conceived as three types of entity. However, in 
turning to Heidegger’s own raising of the questions of life and access to the essence of 
life, in Section 43, we can see that actually our substitution remains remarkably close to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
chapter of Nancy’s The Fall of Sleep, ‘The Knell of a Temporary Death’, in Part III, Sc VIII, see pp. 201 – 
208, below. 
9 ibid, p. 185 
10 ibid, 62. See p. 56, above. 
11 In general, we may hope to avail ourselves of the comparative analytic for the following reason: “These 
comparative (vergleichende) considerations help to highlight both proximity and difference with respect to 
the different ways of Being in each case.” McNeill, William. The Time of Life, pp. 20 – 21. 
12 It is, arguably, an effort to keep at bay such common distinctions that has led so many to reject ‘state-of-
mind’ as a translation of Befindlichkeit. 
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Heidegger’s own three theses.13 Sleep, unlike death, remains not just entangled with life 
but also within it, in this sense the affinity between the sleeper and the animal, in contrast 
to the corpse and the stone remains strong. Nonetheless, in what follows we must remain 
wary of slipping back into a covert taking of sleep and waking as distinctions within 
consciousness, as different states of Dasein. It can be argued, however, that precisely the 
substituting we have undertaken will aide in this resisting of consciousness centred 
accounts of sleep. If we are to truly move on from asking where sleep fits within Dasein 
then we must allow ourselves to ask the seemingly outlandish question of whether 
sleeping and waking are truly comfortably contained within one unified entity. Our use 
of the comparative examination begins just such a line of inquiry. 
 
 This tying of sleep with the problems and questioning of life, of course, also 
suggests a certain continuity with Anton and his raising of the problem of nature or of 
that living background which, he argued, underpins Dasein. Indeed, we will return to the 
question of nature and sleep in discussing Raoni Padui’s ‘From the Facticity of Dasein to 
the Facticity of Nature: Naturalism, Animality, and Metontology’, in our conclusion. 
However, first an essential caveat to our somnolent theses must be considered. 
 
Then again, we can only determine the animality of the animal if we are clear 
about what constitutes the living character of a living being, as distinct from the 
non-living being which does not even have the possibility of dying. A stone 
cannot be dead because it is never alive.14 
 
This extract seems to highlight an important limit point to the analogy between 
Heidegger’s three theses and our own. Surely ‘the corpse’, as having been alive, is 
different in essence from the stone. It still refers back to the question of life. The 
reanimated corpses of the zombies and vampires of horror stories are fearful to us, the 
living, in a particular way that the animated rocks (whether avalanches or the Wandering 
Rocks that Jason and his Argonauts skirted) are not. David Farrell Krell, whom we draw 
on throughout this Chapter, sees in this fleeting mention of the death of the animal a point 
of tension in Heidegger’s account of the animal – for Krell, Heidegger never offers a full 
or persuasive answer to the question ‘can the animal die’?15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, pp. 178 – 180 
14 ibid, p. 179 
15 Krell, David F. Daimon Life – Heidegger and Life-Philosophy. See, for example p. 13: “For he openly 
confesses that he is unable to say anything about the way in which death intervenes in both animal and 
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 Given that it seems correct to distinguish the corpse, or the dead, from the purely 
material entity, the stone say, this still need only show that our theses [1s – 3s], are not 
operating at the same level as Heidegger’s [1 – 3]. Perhaps, instead, they operate a step 
further into the problem of life. In this sense we may hope that our own analyses may 
shed light not just on the relationship between sleep and world and between sleep and 
life, but also between life and world. With this hope established we must see that our 
caveat and subsequent relating of our somnolent theses to the question of life further 
relates to Heidegger’s concern with the methodological difficulty of approaching life.16 
Section 45 – after some interesting discussion of the place of the middle thesis, the 
animal’s world poverty, and the relationship between zoology and biology, on the one 
hand, and metaphysics, on the other – indicates the common pitfalls that the “intermediate 
position” of life raises.17 
 
Throughout the long history of the problem of life we can observe how the 
attempt has been made either to interpret life – that is, the kind of being that 
pertains to animals and plants – from the perspective of man, or alternatively to 
explain life by means of laws adopted from the realm of material nature. Yet 
both of these erstwhile forms of explanation produce an inexplicable residue 
which in general is simply explained away. What is lacking in all this is insight 
into the necessary task of securing above all else the essential nature of life in 
and of itself and a resolute attempt to accomplish it.18 
 
This begins what we have called above the internal, textual, reasons for our present turn 
to FCM. The problem of life is plagued by the dual risks of projection from the essence 
of man, anthropomorphism, and reduction to “the realm of material nature”, materialism 
or mechanism. These risks are strikingly analogous with the risk of reducing sleep to a 
subsidiary part of our waking identity or collapsing sleep into the anomalous negativity 
of death, unconsciousness, and coma. We, like Heidegger, may only hope for access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
human life. … he also catches himself (or almost catches himself) reverting to the distinction between 
human dying and animal perishing, Sterben as opposed to Verenden, even though it has become clear to all 
that something very much like the nothing (das Nichts) shatters the ring of animal as well as human life.” 
16 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 179 
17 ibid, p. 192 
18 ibid, pp. 191 – 192 
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“the essential nature of” sleep, or life, if we, following Heidegger, remain “cockeyed”19 
and thus alert to the dangers on either side of us.20 
 
 The very structure and content of Sections 46 to 48 both demonstrates the risks 
that Heidegger has just highlighted and, essentially, also provides us with our clearest 
textual clue, or motivation, so far for pursuing a comparative analysis of sleep. Section 
46 compares the second (the animal’s world poverty) and the third (man’s world-forming) 
theses, Section 47, the second and first (the stone’s worldlessness), and Section 48 
attempts to hold together the apparently contradictory results from the two previous 
sections. By following Heidegger’s preliminary comparative examinations, as he 
sketches them in these final sections of Part Two, Chapter 3, we can both test the initial 
intuitive appeal of our sleep orientated theses [1s – 3s] and highlight the textual similarity 
with which Heidegger treats sleep, at the beginning of Part One, and animality, at the 
beginning of Part Two. 
 
 Section 46 amounts to an illustration that the poverty of the animal is meant as a 
“deprivation of world” as opposed to this poverty implying “poverty as opposed to 
richness”.21 This calls for some unpacking. The latter understanding of poverty – as lesser 
in some hierarchy of world – would seem to be the intuitive reading of the animal’s 
poverty given the, then recent, research on “the environmental world of the animal” from 
J. von Uexküll.22 This reading of poverty is based on the idea that our human world is 
“constantly extendable not only in its range... but also in respect to the manner in which 
we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability.”23 For Heidegger such an 
approach offers the corresponding “concept of world: world initially signifies the sum 
total of beings accessible to man or animals alike, variable as it is in range and depth of 
penetrability.”24 However, “even a little reflection soon renders it questionable whether 
in fact poverty is necessarily and intrinsically of lesser significance with respect to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Krell, David F. Daimon Life, p. 115 
20 Whether this hope is true or merely a willow-o-the-wisp dangled before us on our journey through the 
comparative examination is a question we will return to in our exploration of the dispute between those 
critics of Heidegger’s comparative analysis and those, such as William McNeill in his The Time of Life, 
who seek to defend its originality and coherence. 
21 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 193 
22 ibid, p. 192 
23 ibid, p. 193 
24 ibid 
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richness. The reverse might well be true.”25 This resistance to understanding the animal 
as merely lower than the human on some uniform spectrum of world-penetrability leads 
Heidegger to remind us of the “discriminatory capacity of a falcon’s eye” and the 
superiority of “the canine sense of smell with our own”.26 Yet, we are also treated to a 
surprising off-hand remark: “...man can sink lower than any animal. No animal can 
become depraved in the same way as man.”27 
 
 With the ‘poverty as lower on a spectrum’ model dismissed Heidegger asks where 
our notion of poverty, which is employed in his second thesis, stems from. For Heidegger, 
perhaps predictably given that this section should be seen as representing not only the 
positive comparison between man and beast but also the pitfall of defining the animal 
through projecting concepts applicable to man over the animal’s being, we must turn to 
the proper root of our human “concept of poverty [Armut]”.28 Essentially, “being poor 
means being deprived [Entbehren].”29 But the particular nature of this deprivation, as with 
all other features of Dasein’s being, finds its meaning in our attunements or moods “the 
way in which it is in a mood [zu Mute] – poverty in mood [Ar-mut].”30 This foundation 
of our notion of poverty tends to get interpreted “in the more extended and weaker sense 
of ‘poor’ or meagre’, in talking of the poor or meagre flow of water in a stream, for 
example. Yet even here it is not merely a case of comparing what is less at one moment 
with what is more at another.”31 Instead, Heidegger sees this understanding of poverty as 
based on a notion of insufficiency or lack and this notion, in its turn, as being rooted in a 
stronger sense of poverty. A poverty “...in the sense of being in a mood of poverty 
[Armmütigkeit] [and which] does not simply imply indifference with respect to what we 
possess. On the contrary, it represents that preeminent kind of having in which we seem 
not to have.”32 This having of a mood of poverty structures the way Heidegger means his 
second thesis and the negative result of this section: that “the poverty in question does not 
express a purely quantitative difference.”33 Along with, of course, a dismissal of the initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ibid, p. 194 
26 ibid 
27 ibid 
28 ibid, pp. 194 – 195 
29 ibid, p. 195 
30 ibid 
31 ibid 
32 ibid 
33 ibid 
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conception of world as a “sum total” of beings accessible to Dasein and other life 
combined.34 
 
 So far, so good for our claims about the sleeper’s poverty in world. Just as 
Heidegger understands the animal’s poverty in world via and through the human’s 
foundational mood of poverty so too did we open the substantive analyses of the previous 
Chapter by considering the application of attunement, the attunements of sleep, to sleep. 
The animal’s deprivation or lack is a lack of mood or attunement as sleep appears to be 
in our above analysis. Furthermore, this move away from a hierarchical and at-hand 
objective spectrum of world ‘wealth’ toward Heidegger’s foundational notion of poverty 
as deprivation holds at bay the pitfall of seeing the animal as merely quantitatively 
distinguished from our mode of being, and thus we may hope for a similar granting of a 
unique, and qualitatively distinct, mode of being to the sleeper. 
 
 However, with the opening of Section 47, our analogous somnolent theses seem 
to come under pressure. This section opens by pointing out that the apparent result of the 
previous section – “that ‘the animal is poor in world’ means something like ‘the animal 
is deprived of world’, ‘the animal has no world’” – does not sit well with “the relation 
between the second thesis and the first according to which the stone is worldless... because 
there no longer seems to be any distinction between them [the animal and the stone].”35 
 
Being worldless and being poor in world both represent a kind of not-having of 
world. Poverty in world implies a deprivation of world. Worldlessness on the 
other hand is constitutive of the stone in the sense that the stone cannot even be 
deprived of something like world. Merely not having world is insufficient here.36 
 
Whereas throughout Section 46 we could continue to understand sleep as a deprivation 
of world, a lack, when compared, though not along any single objective spectrum, with 
our waking access to world. Now a worry with this interpretation arises: it problematizes 
any straight forward distinguishing of the sleeper from the corpse. The corpse is, for us 
the living (and waking), deprived of world. It would seem that we cannot follow this 
Heideggerian step in claiming that the corpse “cannot even be deprived” of world. It 
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stretches our phenomenological intuitions, arguably to breaking point, to claim, as 
Heidegger does about the stone that it “is beside the point to regard the fact that the... 
[corpse] has no access [to world] as some kind of lack.”37  
 
 Two necessarily tentative, at this stage in our tracing of the course of Heidegger’s 
comparative examination, responses. First, perhaps this only further demonstrates the 
“intricate entanglement [Verschlingung]”38 of sleep and death and thus resists both 
Anton’s questionable distinctions and more generally what Krell calls, following Rilke 
“the error of drawing distinctions too sharply, too violently.”39 Including tripartite 
distinctions. And second, that perhaps the error is not ours but rather Heidegger’s. In 
particular, Heidegger, in Section 46, appealed to the word deprivation without fully 
clarifying the meaning of this term, and arguably he will never fully clarify it. Perhaps, 
the qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, difference in being between waking and 
sleeping is not best conceived as a deprivation or lack of world. 
 
 However, the main thrust of this section remains applicable to our modified theses 
[1s – 3s] in that it offers a new definition40 of world “as those beings which are in each 
case accessible and may be dealt with...”.41 This focus on the question of accessibility 
calls on the intuitive difference between the animal’s engagement with other entities and 
the manner in which the stone, whatever its proximity to other entities, never has entities 
as accessible to it.42 In this sense, Heidegger’s distinction is essentially, as we pointed out 
above, between the life of the animal and the materiality of the stone. The sleeper, 
whatever their proximity to the corpse in terms of our intuition that they have been 
deprived of something, retains, or so we believe, the life that has been, forever, lost to the 
corpse. The corpse will never feel the sun on its skin whereas the gently drifting sleeper 
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is precisely lost in the warmth of a sunny summer holiday, soothed into sleep by the sun’s 
rays.43 However, following this sharp distinction between the animal and the material 
thing we swing back to the other comparative direction and hear of another temptation to 
be resisted. 
 
...the lizard has its own relation to the rock, to the sun, and to a host of other 
things. One is  tempted to suggest that what we identify as the rock and the sun 
are just lizard-things for the lizard, so to speak. When we say that the lizard is 
lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word ‘rock’ in order to indicate that 
whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and 
yet is not known to the lizard as a rock. If we cross out the word we do not 
simply mean to imply that something else is in question here or is taken as 
something else. Rather we imply that whatever it is is not accessible to it as a 
being.44 
 
This crossing out, a manoeuvre that Derrida will play on, and with, in his Of Spirit, 
reminds us that the animal’s access, given the qualitative difference in its being, could 
never be access to those beings as they are for me.45 Surely the bed, often the most 
proximal entity to the sleeper, is precisely performatively crossed-out in the passage to 
sleep. Just as we “ought to cross out the word ‘rock’” in the case of the lizard surely we 
must cross out the word bed in the case of the one who lays her head upon it. We must 
keep in mind not only this requirement that the sleeper’s world be written “under erasure” 
but also that this is a step that Heidegger precisely does not take, he “ought to” by his 
own admission, but, at least in FCM, never does.46 
 
 This leads Heidegger to describe the limiting of animal access to beings. The as-
structure, encountered above, re-emerges and begins to take centre stage. However, 
Section 47 ends with the reminder:  
 
Even if the animal has access to beings in a different way from ourselves and 
within more narrowly circumscribed limits, it is still not entirely deprived of 
world. The animal has world. Thus absolute deprivation of world does not  
belong to the animal after all.47  
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And it is with this apparently contradictory finding that Heidegger begins the final section 
of his preparatory Chapter 3 before launching into the main content of the comparative 
examination proper. 
 
 If by the beginning of Section 48 Heidegger’s “perplexity” about world and about 
life “has increased” then so too has our perplexity about the relationship between world 
and the sleeper.48 Yet, it is the manner that this perplexity is described which enacts our 
final, textual, motivation for engaging in a comparative examination of Dasein, the 
sleeper, and the corpse. Heidegger owns his own cross-eyed position in acknowledging 
that when viewed from the perspective of comparison with the stone the animal seems to 
have access to things and thus also to world, whereas when compared with the apparently 
infinite wealth of the Dasein’s world-relation the animal’s deprivation is all too clear. 
 
The animal thus reveals itself as a being which both has and does not have 
world. This is contradictory and thus logically impossible. But metaphysics and 
everything essential has a logic quite different from that of sound common 
understanding.49 
 
It is precisely this having and not having of world which bares a striking resemblance to 
our epigram from Heidegger’s fleeting engagement with sleep: “‘Whatever is sleeping’ 
is in a peculiar way absent and yet there.”50 Just as he opened Part One of the course with 
the apparent contradiction of sleep, now, at the opening of Part Two, we are presented 
with the “logically impossible” claim that the animal both has and does not have world.51 
This second contradiction may, in its apparent resolution later in the course, offer us clues 
as to possible resolutions to the first, and thus an outline to any possible Heideggerian 
phenomenology of sleep. But more generally this similarity in placement and in semantic 
structure ‘intertwines’ and ‘entangles’ the problem of ‘whatever is sleeping’ and that of 
life, or more concretely that of the animal’s relationship to world.  
 
 Having “identified the knot which we must first strive to undo”, the animal’s 
apparently contradictory relation to world, Heidegger can set out to “pursue it intricate 
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entanglements”.52 And we too can and must follow him along the twisting Wege of the 
comparative analysis, so long that is as we recognise that our way will, like his and 
necessarily, “no longer be able to proceed with the same naivety as we did before.”53 The 
intuitive appeal and essential limits of both Heidegger’s theses and our own analogous 
application of his method have started to emerge. Furthermore, Heidegger’s double 
negative results from this first stage of the comparative examination must, just as much, 
apply to any feasible Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep – the sleeper cannot be 
“simply present at hand” nor may its world be understood as “simply a degree or species 
of the world of” Dasein.54 
 
 Holding these preliminary cautions in mind it will now be fruitful to test our 
analogous three theses, 1s – 3s, against the progression of Heidegger’s analysis in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of Part II of FCM. It will be useful to split this analysis into four stages 
all of which offer significant resources for considering sleep’s relationship with world, 
life (both waking and sleeping), Dasein, and the dead (and, essentially, death itself). These 
four stages, which map broadly onto the systematic progression of these chapters, are: (a) 
Heidegger’s initial deepening of the problem of philosophical access to animality through 
an investigation into the possibility of “transposing” oneself into various types of entities; 
(b) the animal’s behaviour as “captivation [Benommenheit]”; (c) the animal as surrounded 
by its “disinhibiting ring [Enthemmungsring]”; and (d), the self-confessed limits and 
conclusions of Heidegger’s analysis.55 With these stages examined we close with a 
consideration of the various criticisms and defences of Heidegger’s treatment of the 
animal. This in turn will allow us to draw out potential consequences for potential future 
Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep.  
  
II: Transposition 
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 Section 49, with its focus on the “methodological question concerning the ability 
to transpose oneself into other beings”, enacts a surprising, though temporary, stepping 
out of the “intermediate position”, which we have just emphasised as central to 
Heidegger’s analysis of the animal. It is this exceptional moment in the analysis that leads 
Rafael Winkler, in his fascinating article ‘Heidegger and the Question of Man’s Poverty 
in World’, to claim that this section, and the one following it, contain the “most dramatic 
moment in the entire course”.56 Dramatic or not these sections allow Heidegger to address 
the question of our access to the animal as opposed to the animal’s access to world itself. 
Or so it would, at first, appear. And yet, Heidegger is swift to point out that the apparently 
methodological question, “Can we transpose ourselves into an animal at all?”, “is [in 
fact] a substantive one.”57 Whereas, for Heidegger, every methodological question must 
be a substantive question about that inquired into, “here this is the case in a quite 
exceptional sense.”58 Thus we are reminded that his substantive problem, the problem of 
world, is “precisely that of accessibility itself”.59 This folding together of methodological 
and substantive questioning, of course, applies just as well to the question of the sleeper’s 
access and accessibility when considering their relationship to world. However, on a 
larger scale this collapsing of method and substantive findings should bring to mind the 
recurrent question of phenomenological access to sleep which has been a feature of our 
project from its inception. What access one deems possible to sleep is not a neutral 
question when it comes to the character or essence of sleep itself. 
 
 What then are the substantive results that Heidegger expects from his inquiring 
into the possibilities of transposition? Heidegger proposes to ask after the possibility of 
transposition in relation to the animal, the stone or material object, and into another 
human being. He hopes, in so doing, to “learn about those very beings that are to be 
grasped.”60 More concretely, “the following discussion is to eliminate that initial naïve 
approach to the question [of transposition] which assumes that we are dealing with three 
beings all present at hand in exactly the same way.”61 Crucially, this aim of Heidegger’s 
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focus on transposition, through the continued use of our analogous theses [1s – 3s], draws 
sleep further away from the traditional conception of it as one state or period in human 
being amongst many others, instead the possibility of emphasising the different modes of 
being between corpse, sleeper and waking Dasein begins to open up. This effect on our 
conception of sleep is shown by Heidegger’s comment that “In general the question at 
issue concerns the possibility of man’s transposing himself into another being that he 
himself is not.”62 The sleeper, we usually assume, is part of us. Heidegger’s emphasis on 
transposition, and the problems there of, allows us to further chip away at this 
presupposition as we have already begun to do above. 
 
 All well and good, but how, we must ask, does this enigmatic concept of 
transposition operate for Heidegger? Before attempting answers to each of his three 
‘possibility of transposing’ questions we are treated to a general discussion of what this 
term does not mean. First and foremost, it does not “mean the factical substitution of 
oneself for another being so as to take its place.”63 This would be to doubly miss the target 
of true transposition as it would both replace, and thus alter, that which we are attempting 
to access and it would “consist in our simply forgetting ourselves”, and thus losing our 
point of comparison.64 Essentially, this prohibition includes entirely internal, or mental, 
attempts at such conceptualisations of transposition. Heidegger has no more time for “a 
mere thought-experiment” as he does for actual transference into the position of that entity 
under investigation.65 As commentators have noted this relates to his dismissal of the term 
‘empathy’ as a reading of transposition.66 Empathy, a previously popular reading of 
transposition, “implies that we are ‘outside’ in the first place.”67 Indeed, Heidegger 
acknowledges that self-transposition itself offers plenty of opportunities for 
misunderstandings along similar lines. These negative comments about transposition both 
strengthen the problem of ‘transposition into the sleeper’ whilst cutting short imagined 
empathetic approaches to understanding the ‘internal’ life of sleep. 
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 What then, positively, is Heidegger’s understanding of transposition. His initial, 
rather opaque, offering is that it amounts to a “going-along-with [which] means directly 
learning how it is with this being [the target of the transposition], discovering what it is 
like to be this being with which we are going along in this way.”68 However, through 
Heidegger’s specific investigations into the possibility of transposing ourselves into 
different entities we gain some further clarity on this going-along-with. We must 
remember that Heidegger’s aim is to disrupt our standard assumption that these various 
targets for transposition all operate at the same uniform at-hand level of being. Thus it is 
not surprising that his approach to these questions, ‘Can we transpose ourselves into, (a) 
an animal, (b) a stone, or (c) another human being?’, is designed to show that despite their 
grammatical similarity they, in fact, function in strikingly distinct ways. Heidegger’s 
answers to these three questions are, in their most basic form: (a), at least potentially; (b) 
no; and, (c) the question itself is nonsensical. 
 
 Though by far the most time is spent analysing the nature of question (c), on the 
possibility of transposing into another human being, Heidegger begins with (a), the 
animal. This very question, we are told, already presupposes “something like a going-
along-with” the animal.69 
 
We do not question that the animal as such carries around with it, as it were, a 
sphere [Sphäre] offering the possibility of transposition. The only question 
concerns our factical success in transposing ourselves into this particular sphere 
[Sphäre].70 
 
We will return to notion of the animal’s sphere which secures the possibility of 
transposition and which will be a reoccurring point of interest for us in what follows. But 
for now we must move on to question (b) and the possibility of transposition into the 
stone. Heidegger is clear that “we cannot transpose ourselves into a stone.”71 In fact, the 
very question is “quite meaningless”72 for the stone does not offer any “sphere” into 
which “we could transpose ourselves”.73 We cannot access the world, as sphere of 
accessibility to other beings, of the stone for it lacks, absolutely, just that. Here, once 
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again, we might find ourselves tempted to move the sleeper, with their stark inactivity, 
their a-kinesia, closer to the inanimate stone than to the animal. Yet comparison with the 
corpse – alongside the fact that the phrase ‘dead to the world’ is only applicable to certain 
sleepers on certain occasions, and even then is not equivalent to, simply, ‘dead’ – is 
enough to return the sleeper to its analogous ‘intermediate position’. 
 
 Crucially the assessment of question (c) returns us to the famous analysis of 
Being-with found in Being and Time. Whereas we might at first take ourselves to be 
“confronting the same question as in the case of the animal”, Heidegger is insistent that 
this is not the case.74 We saw that question (a), for Heidegger, reveals the presupposition 
of the possibility of transposability into the animal, in the case of the transposing of 
oneself into another human “we cannot even make such an assumption”.75 Just as in 
Division I, Chapter 4, of Being and Time we are shown that the solipsist has 
misunderstood Dasein’s essential being, here too Heidegger argues for the priority of 
being-with, as a structure of our being, as opposed to the priority of isolated selves 
reaching out to each other across imagined, and unbridgeable, divides. 
 
For the being-there of Da-sein means being with others, precisely in the manner 
of Dasein, i.e., existing with others. The question concerning whether we human 
beings can transpose ourselves into other human beings does not ask anything, 
because it is not a possible question in the first place. It is a meaningless, indeed 
a nonsensical question because it is fundamentally redundant.76 
 
Heidegger is not, of course, painting human sociality in a golden light as if we were 
returned to the harmony of Adam and Eve. He recognises that, in fact, we often fail to go 
along with, and thus to get along with, other human Daseins. However, this is only 
possible on the basis that man “always already finds that he is with others.”77 The 
particular, factical, ways in which we are being-with and thus going along with has the 
result that, “for several reasons, and to some extent essential ones, this  going along with 
one another is a going apart from one another and a going against one another, or rather, 
at first and for the most part a going alongside one another.”78  
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 Heidegger’s account of question (c) shows that, for all his general doubts about 
the risks involved in using the phrase ‘self-transposition’, it would seem possible to 
meaningfully ask whether we ‘can transpose ourselves into an animal?’, (a), and that this 
must be greatly contrasted with questions (b) and (c) which are, though for different 
reasons, both nonsensical. However, Heidegger is clear that access to the animal’s essence 
alongside any hope we might have of providing a more concrete answer to question (a) 
relies, fundamentally, on our coming to terms with his reasons for dismissing question (c) 
– Dasein’s being-with – rather than with the impossibility of transposing oneself into a 
stone, question (b).79 Thus, after describing how this thesis – Dasein’s structural 
involvement with other humans – fits into the history of recent philosophy of the subject 
and relates to the guiding motifs of finitude or infinity,80 Heidegger begins Section 50 by 
once again asking after the possibility of transposing oneself into the animal, question (a). 
 
 Indeed, Heidegger acknowledges that “Initially we do not seem to have gained 
anything from our discussion [of transposition] at all.”81 Yet the possibility of our being 
transposed surely gains some legitimacy, at the very least, from the fact that “Being 
transposed into others belongs to the essence of human Dasein.”82 Fundamentally, this 
question cannot be settled by theorising about our abilities or about the essence of the 
animal but rather considering how “we already comport ourselves … toward animals”.83 
For Heidegger, it is this analysis of our everyday comportment that demonstrates the 
presupposition revealed in the previous section: namely, that we can go along with 
animals, and “in a certain manner … plants too”.84 This leads Heidegger to a brief, though 
intriguing, engagement with our being-with the domesticated animal, and the pet in 
particular. In keeping animals for our purposes or merely as pets “we enable them to move 
within our world.”85 We are being-with them and “they ‘live’ with us. But we do not live 
with them if living means: being in an animal kind of way.”86 Furthermore, this being-
with is “not an existing-with, because a dog does not exist but merely lives.”87 The pet:  
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….feeds with us – and yet, we do not really ‘feed’. It eats with us – and yet, it 
does not really ‘eat’. Nevertheless, it is with us! A going along with …, a 
transposedness, and yet not.88 
 
Whilst it may not appear so at first, the sleeper fits into our waking lives in a similar way. 
Of course, the sleeper does not go for a walk with us as the loyal hound may, and yet we 
do “enable them [sleepers] to move within our world.”89 This intuitively odd claim gains 
some clarity if we remember that this example, though only explicitly mentioning 
animals, is supposed to apply to plants too – perhaps an equivalent type of relationship 
would be between the gardener and their plants.90 The ‘movement’ of plants, within our 
world, which means a lot more than just their growth, is already presupposed and allowed 
for in our everyday comportment, and it is as such that sleep too is presented.91 
 
 Heidegger ends this fascinating phenomenology of the relation between Dasein 
and domestic animals with the key caveat to our transposedness into the animal: “and yet 
not.” This “not” relates to the way in which our being-with the animal is never a relating 
of two worlds but rather an opening of our world to the animal.  
 
Transposedness into the animal can belong to the essence of man without this 
necessarily meaning that we transpose ourselves into an animal’s world or that 
the animal in general has a world. And now our question becomes more incisive: 
In this transposedness into the animal, where is it that we are transposed to?92 
 
But this refusal to grant the animal world is, for Heidegger, in fact, a recognition that the 
animal “invites human transposedness into it, even while refusing man the possibility of 
any going along with the animal”.93 This fundamental refusal is supposed to be essential 
to the animal and to gain traction as a description of that essence precisely because refusal 
only exists when “granting is possible. Earlier we expressed this situation in a purely 
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raised in relation to sleep. It must be asked what the difference is, if any, between the shepherd minding his 
flock and the minding of those that sleep by the waking, the standing vigil that was, and still is culturally, 
so significant in terms of how we, the waking, relate to them, the sleepers. That this connection does nothing 
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formalistic way when we claimed that in a certain sense the animal has and yet does not 
have a world.”94 What is this animalistic refusal and does the sleeper refuse transposition 
in a similar way? However, with this hermeneutic return to the structure of deprivation as 
found at the end of Heidegger’s previous chapter – having in not-having – we see the 
completion of his demonstration that the, apparently, methodological question of 
transposition in fact only finds an answer in “the essence of the animal.”95 Thus, the 
question about the refusal of the animal, and our equivalent question about the refusal of 
the sleeper, become questions of essence – what then refuses in the sleeper’s very 
essence? 
 
 Yet such questions themselves, as we see with Heidegger’s unpacking of the 
concept of refusal, quickly mutate into the following key, Heideggerian, questions: 
‘where are we transposed to, if the animal has no world to fulfil this purpose?’ Or put 
another way, ‘what is it that the animal has which allows it to both be poor in world and 
refuse transposition from us?’ Both of these questions, when applied to sleep, offer us 
great opportunities for considering fundamentally troubling features of sleep. ‘Where is 
the sleeper?’ Or, ‘what is the place of sleep?’ And, more controversially, ‘what does the 
sleeper have such that it may have lost, or be poor in, world?’ Heidegger’s, preliminary, 
answer to his own unanswered questions will suggest both his own later discussion of the 
animal’s ‘disinhibiting ring’ and perhaps the most pressing difficulty with the animal’s, 
and with sleep’s, ‘intermediate position’. The animal “intrinsically displays a sphere of 
transposability”.96 And yet, the ambiguity of such a sphere is only exacerbated by 
Heidegger’s insistence that “more precisely, the animal itself is this sphere, one which 
nonetheless refuses any going along with.”97  
 
 Heidegger claims to have moved beyond the “purely formalistic” analysis of the 
animal’s essence in these two introductory sections of his analysis. And yet, we might 
ask what conceptual room there is for this, as yet, anomalous sphere of transposability 
which is not a world? How is this squeezed, intermediate, essence of the animal to be 
understood? Furthermore, Heidegger has achieved this restating of the poverty of the 
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animal through a consideration of our everyday comportment to the animal. Now he sets 
himself the goal of reversing the direction of this analysis by considering the essence of 
animality in terms of the animal’s own ‘comportment’. It is this which leads Heidegger 
to make his famous, and exceptional, engagement with contemporary biological and 
zoological research. For our purposes, however, it is the results of this appeal to 
observational and experimental content, as opposed to the appeal itself, which bear most 
fruit in relation to sleep; namely, Heidegger’s striking description of the animal’s 
behaviour as captivation [Benommenheit]. 
 
III: Captivation [Benommenheit] 
 
 By the time we get to the account of animal behaviour, as found in sections 58 
and 59, Heidegger has already spent significant time and effort considering and 
deconstructing the notion of the animal as an organism. That is to say as an entity 
composed of, or unified out of, various organs.98 This traditional understanding of the 
organism is replaced by his own alternative unity of the animal, a unity of capacities rather 
than of organs. Though much rests on this account of the organism it is striking that 
Heidegger makes clear in Section 58 that “we could also have taken the characterization 
of behaviour as our point of departure and shown its dependence upon capability”.99 As 
we continue tracing Heidegger’s analysis of the animal we follow this, alternative, 
suggested route and periodically return to the notion of capability or capacity which 
underpins the ability of the animal to live at all.100 Yet, for our purposes it is important to 
see that by Section 58 Heidegger has already disrupted both mechanistic understandings 
of the unity of the animal, and those which rely on an inner entelechy. The specific 
interplay of capacities builds up to the overarching behaviour of each animal, in this way 
the differences in behaviour between the mole and the earthworm are easily explicable. 
What is yet to be discerned is what characterises all of these as behaviour at all? What 
makes these ways of animal being more than merely “processes in nature,” or “events of 
nature”?101 
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 Of course, many might see animal behaviour – whether they would grant the 
human an exemption or not – as limited in precisely this way: to natural processes. Yet, 
as we have seen, the intermediate position of the animal demands that it is neither reduced 
to a material thing nor anthropomorphised via human-centric concepts. Thus too, in the 
case of animal behaviour, it must be distinguished from “the warming of a stone”, in the 
sun, and from our, human, “comportment”.102 Fundamentally, and this will be of 
particular relevance to our comparative examination of the sleeper, the animal’s 
behaviour is distinguished from the causal processes considered by science in that 
behaviour is relational. The “mole… behaves with respect to the worm by pursuing it.”103 
It is in an effort to do justice to this relationality at the heart of animal being that Heidegger 
also acknowledges the proximity between animal behaviour and human comportment. 
Indeed, we often speak of people as behaving well or badly. However, for Heidegger this 
possibility of attributing behaviour, of one sort or another, to persons itself relies on “the 
specific manner of being which belongs to man” as being a “comporting oneself 
toward....”.104 
 
 Heidegger’s strict holding apart of behaviour and comportment has, of course, 
been the target of significant criticism over the years,105 however, it is worth noting that 
he himself acknowledges that his “terminology is arbitrary”.106 What matters is not the 
terminological distinctions but the essential underpinnings thereof. Thus Heidegger must 
look more closely at the behaviour of the animal, and an initial clue for how such a closer 
examination will retain the sharp distinction between behaviour and comportment is 
illustrated in the following quotation: 
 
The behaviour of the animal is not a doing and acting, as in human 
comportment, but a driven performing [Treiben]. In saying this we mean to 
suggest that an instinctual drivenness, as it were, characterizes all such animal 
performance.107 
 
This distinction between action and driven performance already shows that here, as with 
the question of transposition, Heidegger’s analysis of the animal both offers resources for 
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describing the sleeper – we think that sleep is something performed, it has a verbal quality 
– whilst at the same time challenging the naïveté of our thesis’s one-for-one replacement 
of the animal with the sleeper – it is far from obvious how the notion of “instinctual 
drivenness” could be said to characterise all of sleep, nor whether the sleeper, in 
themselves, actually performs sleep, or for that matter anything at all. Such challenges to 
the naïveté of our experiment in Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep can only, in fact, 
amount to resources for our larger scale project of a more open phenomenological 
outlining of sleep. 
 
 Yet, the move to characterise animal behaviour as Benommenheit, captivation or 
benumbment, is where the real resources of Heidegger’s account of the animal emerge 
for describing sleep. He is struck by the way that the driven performing of animal 
behaviour is characterised by an “intrinsic retention and intrinsic absorption, although 
no reflection is involved.”108 The individual instances of behaviour, Heidegger’s favourite 
examples are seizing and hunting and the like, are marked by the fact that “the animal 
does not drive itself away from itself.”109 This glance at the stone is enough to remind us 
that the relationality of animal natural processes itself demands a centre from which to 
relate, a self-like focal point from which behaviour can issue, and, just as much, to which 
it must return.  
 
Behaviour as a manner of being in general is only possible on the basis of the 
animal’s absorption in itself [Eingenommenheit in sich]. We shall describe the 
specific way in which the animal remains with itself – which has nothing to do 
with the selfhood of the human being comporting him- or herself as a person – 
this way in which the animal is absorbed in itself, and which makes possible 
behaviour of any and every kind, as captivation [Benommenheit].110 
 
It is this absorption [Eingenommenheit] and captivation or benumbment [Benommenheit], 
of animal behaviour which, in a wary glance the other direction at the domain of human 
being, grants that the animal “behaves within an environment but never within a 
world.”111 This warning glance quickly builds into full blooded cautions on the 
anthropomorphic risks of his own terminology, reminding us that “we must... draw the 
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specific content... [of animal behaviour] from out of animality itself.”112 These warnings 
will be of particular importance in our consideration of the “behaviour” of the sleeper as 
benumbed or captivated. 
 
We usually employ the word ‘captivation’ to describe a particular state of mind 
in human beings, one which can persist for a greater or lesser period of time. We 
use it then to refer to that intermediate state somewhere between consciousness 
and unconsciousness.113 
 
Unsurprisingly this “psychiatric concept” will not do for Heidegger.114 More importantly, 
for our purposes, neither will a permanatising of the “state known to us”, or “simply 
transferring” it into the animal.115 
 
 Whatever intuitive appeal the phrase ‘the “behaviour” of the sleeper as benumbed 
or captivated’ holds – consider, for example, descriptions of the sleeper as ‘numb to the 
world’ – it surely loses just as quickly in ascribing to the sleeper “behaviour” at all. We 
may appeal to two very different responses to this worry. Firstly, Heidegger’s very 
warnings about the danger of simply transferring concepts from human to animal being 
should alert us to similar problems with any simple transfer from animal to sleeper. The 
sleeper, for all their intriguing proximity to the animal, is not supposed to simply take 
over the being of animality. Secondly, Heidegger’s conception of behaviour, and thus of 
benumbed behaviour, is not so different from the processes of sleep: “It is not as if the 
beating of the animal’s heart were a process different from the animal’s seizing and 
seeing... the being as a whole in its unity, must be comprehended as behaviour.”116  
 
 However, this final defence surely raises anew a worry we have already 
encountered: the question of the sleeper “as a whole in its unity”. This issue reminds us 
that our present endeavour to employ the comparative analytic must, necessarily, jar 
against the intuition that sleep is best understood as part of that entity which sleeps.117 
And yet, it is precisely here that the essential characterisation of the animal’s behaviour 
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as captivation offers us new resources and reasons for reading with Heidegger the 
sleeper’s essence as similarly so benumbed. Just as earlier we saw Heidegger dismiss 
attempts to describe whatever is sleeping via appeals to consciousness or 
unconsciousness,118 here too our common vision of captivation as “that intermediate state 
somewhere between consciousness and unconsciousness” will not serve in considering 
the animal.119 If our introduction to this Part detailed Heidegger’s case against reducing 
sleep to unconsciousness, here we may now build on this argument to show that sleep, 
for a Heideggerian phenomenology, cannot be conceived as some intermediate state 
between consciousness and unconsciousness. Or, in fact, as any ‘state’ at all. “We do not 
regard captivation as a state that merely accompanies behaviour, but as the inner 
possibility of behaviour as such.”120 And thus, we must, following Heidegger, consider 
the manner in which this inner possibility of behaviour, captivation, shows itself. Our 
consideration of Section 59 will aim to show to what degree Heidegger’s elaboration of 
the essence of behaviour as benumbed could plausibly include the sleeper. What room is 
there for sleep in Heidegger’s intermediate category of “behaviour”?121 
 
 First a couple of cautions about this notion of captivation are necessary. 
Heidegger’s clear warnings about transferring our everyday, state-based, conception of 
captivation from humanity to animality must be held alongside his explicit 
acknowledgement that “in elucidating the essence of this captivation we orient ourselves 
in a certain way with reference to the human state in question”.122 We might see this as 
Heidegger recognising that the term used and its origin is not insignificant. Secondly, 
Section 58 ends with the reminder that Heidegger does not take himself to be “offering a 
complete and thoroughly developed determination of the essence of animality”, as “we 
are pursuing it here only from one quite specific perspective and thus in a one-sided 
fashion.”123 This question of perspectives and of incomplete versus complete 
determinations of essence has fuelled the debate surrounding this text’s treatment of the 
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animal. It is, furthermore, precisely these features, which Heidegger is at such pains to 
remind us of, which make this analysis such fertile ground for our considerations of sleep.  
 
 Section 59 aims to clarify the structure of animal behaviour “in a concrete way” 
and, essentially, this will involve the distinguishing of animal “relationality” from that of 
human “relationality”.124 Heidegger has already noted that the animal, in distinction to 
the stone, relates to other entities in our world. It is now necessary to acknowledge this 
within the concrete account of animal captivation that he is attempting to offer. And this 
“being related to….” of the animal is, for him, always a “being driven forward – and that 
also means a being driven away.”125 This amounts to Heidegger granting the animal its 
own form of intentionality: “Seeing is the seeing of what is seen, hearing is the hearing 
of what is heard.”126 It is this granting of intentionality to animal behaviour which forces 
him to examine how such intentionality differs from that involved in human 
comportment. For our purposes, we might ask whether the sleeper is similarly endowed 
with relationality, or intentionality, and if so “what kind of relationality” that would be?127 
 
 Famously, Heidegger will seek the tools to make this distinction in contemporary 
biology and zoology. Before considering the results of this examination, and how they 
tell on our three theses [1s – 3s], however, we must look at Heidegger’s guiding 
“methodological point of departure”.128 We are best served, so Heidegger thinks, by 
beginning from “those forms of behaviour which are more remote, with respect to their 
consistent and intrinsic character, than those forms of comportment displayed by the 
higher animals that seem to correspond so closely to our own comportment.”129 Krell 
would later note with interest and derision this shift of focus away from our hirsute 
cousins and the other “higher animals”.130 Yet, for our purposes it is worth comparing 
this guiding thesis with that with which he opens the engagement with attunements earlier 
in the lecture course. We were told that “precisely those attunements to which we pay no 
heed at all, the attunements we least observe, those attunements which attune us in such 
a way that we feel as though there is no attunement there at all, as though we were not 
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attuned in any way at all – these attunements are the most powerful.”131 In one sense this 
chimes well with Heidegger turning his attention away from the household pets and 
chattel, considered in Section 50’s discussion of transposition, and towards those animals 
or organisms which are most often forgotten about.132 On the other hand, it is the 
proximity of the attunements that Heidegger is going to consider which allows them to 
mask their truly disclosive power in their everyday normality and, as such, the proximity 
of domestic animals, rather than the alien life of the single cell organism, might be 
analogous with such attunements. Perhaps the only acceptable approach is to consider 
those animal behaviours most proximal and most alien to us? The sleeper as interspersed 
within and around us and yet as so alien, here stirs gently. 
 
 Heidegger’s “concrete examples” of animal behaviour, as found in sub-section a) 
of Section 59, all surround the industrious honey bee and its quests for food and home, 
and thus also its traversal from one to the other. The details of the experiments considered 
are not of much importance to us here.133 Instead it is the results he draws from these 
which we must consider. In particular, how the bee relates to other entities in contrast to 
our relations with such, and the question of its orientation and drives. Beginning with the 
former of these, Heidegger considers a series of experiments which he takes to shed light 
on the manner in which a bee relates to a specific type of entity it encounters – its food. 
Bees will stop eating when either the food source has been exhausted or when too full to 
consume any more. This might suggest that they comport themselves much like us. Of 
course, Heidegger will not take this route. Instead he asks whether “the bee recognized 
the honey as present” or rather relates to it in some other way? By means of a rather cruel 
and odd experiment involving the removal of a bee’s abdomen during its feeding process 
Heidegger suggests this alternative manner in which the bee relates to its food: 
 
Rather, the bee is simply taken [hingenommen] by its food. This being taken is 
only possible where there is an instinctual ‘toward…’ Yet such a driven being 
taken also excludes the possibility of any recognition of presence. It is precisely 
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being taken by its food that prevents the animal from taking up a position over 
and against this food.134 
 
 The bee, and animals more generally, do not have entities as beings which are 
present to them but rather are “simply taken” by them. Let us pause to consider both of 
these words, ‘simply’ and ‘taken’, and how they might relate to the sleeper’s benumbed 
behaviour. The simplicity of the animal’s relationship with other entities can be seen in 
light of what it precludes: “any recognition of presence.” The animal does not have access 
to beings as beings and as such is exiled from the ontological sphere. This exile from the 
realm in which we are always already engaged135 would seem to be, for Heidegger, a 
move from complexity toward simplicity. Whereas this has raised eyebrows in the case 
of animal behaviour – why should we assume that animal behaviour is any simpler than 
our own – it is fairly uncontroversial when applied to sleep – insomniac or not the time 
of sleep seems far more uniform and simpler than the multifaceted and complex waking 
lives we each undertake. Of course, we might contend that there is no reason to conflate 
the unknown with the simple or uniform. Conversely, we often talk of sleep ‘taking’ one 
or of someone as being absorbed or swallowed by sleep, or of giving oneself over to 
sleep.136 However, here we must be on our guard against too quickly moving from the 
animal being taken by other entities and the sleeper as taken in general. We must hold 
fast to the more difficult question as we examine the remainder of this section: ‘is the 
sleeper taken (whether simply or otherwise) by the entities it relates to, and, if so, how is 
it so taken?’  
 
 This question may struggle to even get off the ground given that, as we discussed 
above, the sleeper is far from obviously related to other entities at all, let alone taken by 
them. However, returning to the bee as taken by its food, we can already see the direction 
of Heidegger’s analysis. The animal is prevented “from taking up a position over and 
against” other entities.137 This position, or stance, is, as we discussed above, related to 
Heidegger’s notion of the ‘as-structure’.138 It is this structure which animals lack – “...in 
sucking at the blossom the bee does not comport itself toward the blossom as something 
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present or not present.”139 Given this Heidegger is required to find another way to explain 
why the bee stops feeding in the cases mentioned above. His answer is that “activity here 
is terminated through an inhibition (drive and disinhibition).”140 As Heidegger argued in 
his treatment of the organic unity of living organisms these drives are interconnected and 
the animal is never free of them.141 For the animal “activity does not simply cease, rather 
the drivenness of the capability is redirected into another drive.”142 Structurally this bears 
a striking resemblance to Heidegger’s commitment to Dasein as never being without 
some attunement – “Dasein always has some mood.”143 
 
 Before turning to Heidegger’s own more detailed elaboration of animal 
benumbment as taken, in sub-section b) of Section 59, and how that relates to the question 
of the sleeper’s relationship with other entities, let us consider his brief foray into the 
question of the animal’s space. Struck by the impressive ability of the honey bee to return 
home Heidegger believes that this ability to traverse substantial distances requires 
explaining within his new framework lest it be seen as providing evidence for a beastly 
affinity between us and those creatures that creep and crawl, or, in this instance, buzz. 
Once again the as-structure’s centrality to this question is brought out: “In the strict sense, 
there is orientation only where space is disclosed as such, and thus where the possibility 
of distinguishing different regions and identifiable locations within these regions is also 
given.”144 However, before considering some experiments regarding the bee’s ability to 
return to its hive Heidegger issues the following warning: “The problem of animal space, 
of whether the animal has a space as such space at all, cannot be taken up in isolation.”145 
Just as “the task of clarifying such phenomena as sleeping and waking cannot be 
addressed extrinsically as one particular question” so here too Heidegger warns about 
isolating the problem of the space of the animal.146 In fact, sub-section b), which “asks 
after the basis of a universal determination of the essence of animality”, is framed by this 
very problem.147 
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 With his experimental resources mustered, and commended,148 Heidegger 
acknowledges that one might still talk of bees navigating their environments, through 
having ‘noticed’ the position of the sun. And yet, it is precisely this ‘noticing’ which, with 
the loss of the as-structure, the animal is refused. 
 
It [the bee] does not strike out in a given direction prescribed for it by the place 
in which it has found itself. Rather it is absorbed by a direction, is driven to 
produce this direction out of itself – without regard to the destination.149 
 
The animal does not ‘find itself in a place’, it is too absorbed in a direction, whichever 
that might be, and is driven too constantly to pause, look around, and thus find itself 
located. This connection between placement and Dasein and the excluding of the animal 
leaves Heidegger with the problematic questions: ‘if the animal does not find itself placed 
then how does the animal navigate?’, and ‘through what does the animal navigate?’ These 
questions clearly strengthen the disanaology between animality and the sleeper in that 
many would not describe the sleeper as “navigating” at all. 
 
 Here we are reminded of the fact that what Heidegger is searching for will not, 
and should not, explain the individual details of different animal captivated behaviour – 
“a captivation which is quite different in the case of each animal species” – but rather the 
essence of animal behaviour overall.150 Remaining with the example of the bee Heidegger 
returns us to the manner in which it is simply taken by that with which it relates. “The bee 
is simply given over to the sun and to the period of its flight without being able to grasp 
either of these as such, without being able to reflect upon them as something thus 
grasped.”151 This sentence conjoins the animal’s being taken in its reflecting with its 
inability to “grasp” and then “reflect upon” that which it is involved. This inability is also 
understood as a prohibition of animal apprehending. The following extract reveals the 
complex network of terms Heidegger is playing with in these sections: 
 
There is no apprehending [Vernehmen], but only a behaving [Benehmen] here, a 
driven activity which we must grasp in this way because the possibility of 
apprehending something as something is withheld [genommen] from the animal. 
And it is withheld from it not merely here and now, but withheld in the sense 
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that such a possibility is ‘not given at all’. This possibility is taken away 
[benommen] from the animal, and that is why the animal is not simply unrelated 
to anything else but rather is taken [hingenommen], taken and captivated 
[benommen] by things.152 
 
This series of terms – Vernehmen, Benehmen, Genommen, Benommen, and hingenommen 
– together provide Heidegger with his account of Benommenheit. They all share their root 
in the “nehmen, to take, and its past participle genommen”, as noted by the translators of 
the lecture course.153 However, as is made clear by the term Genommen, “withheld”, these 
concepts are not merely added together to form the essence of the unity of the animal. 
Instead, here we see that the withholding of apprehending and thus of the as-structure – 
or in other words their subtraction – from the animal leaves the animal “not simply 
unrelated to anything else but rather... taken and captivated [benommen] by things.” 
Fundamentally, this reproduces, or fits within, the structure of poverty which Heidegger 
had been at pains to describe earlier and which we described above: having, being taken 
by things, in not-having – having apprehending withheld. 
 
 As our way into considering how this description of animal captivation relates to 
the sleeper’s potentially equivalent status, let us examine a warning that Heidegger offers 
us about a possible misinterpretation of his account. 
 
But this captivation should not be interpreted simply as a kind of rigid fixation 
on the part of the animal as if it were somehow spellbound. Rather this 
captivation makes possible and prescribes an appropriate leeway for its 
behaviour, i.e., a purely instinctual redirecting of the animal’s driven activity in 
accordance with certain instincts in each case.154 
 
This quotation provides us with the resources for both setting out a worry with sleep’s 
captivation, and for alleviating this worry along with some other equivalent concerns. It 
might be thought that the sleeper also lacks apprehension of things and is thus benumbed 
like the animal. Yet whatever intuitive weight this holds we cannot deny that Heidegger 
firstly describes sleep, via Aristotle, as the binding of one’s perception and essence,155 
and then, here, warns us not to see captivation as a “rigid fixation” or a being 
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“spellbound”. The worry is that what Heidegger is precisely trying to resist is the kind of 
sleep-like state based accounts of animal behaviour as they at once remain too temporary 
and at the same time fail to allow the “appropriate leeway for [animal] behaviour”. Yet, 
we have already argued that one of the main benefits of this comparative analytic of the 
sleeper is that it may begin to pry sleep free from just these conceptions of it. Additionally, 
the “being bound” of sleep which Heidegger takes from Aristotle is indeed a binding of 
essence as the German makes clear, Gebundenheit, whereas the condition of being 
spellbound [Verhextheit], as its root, Verhexen [bewitched], demonstrates has no such 
connotation of binding.156 Thus when we talk of the sleeper as benumbed we do not mean 
that they are bewitched but rather that they are bound and sealed off from all those “beings 
which it itself is not.”157  
 
 The significance and functioning of this binding of the sleeper can be brought out 
by comparing what Heidegger says, just following his warning words on witchcraft, about 
the animal’s relationship with beings, in light of its lack of the as-structure. “Beings are 
not manifest to the behaviour of the animal in its captivation, they are not disclosed to it 
and for that very reason are not closed off from it either. Captivation stands outside this 
possibility.”158 The animal, and we are arguing the sleeper too, in its intermediate position 
is neither correctly seen as accessing nor as being closed off from other beings. This 
becomes clearer when we see that “Beings could only be closed off if there were some 
possibility of disclosure at all”.159 Here we must be reminded of our previous discussion 
of the disclosive power of attunements and, in particular, what Heidegger says about what 
he calls ‘bare mood’: “The ‘bare mood’ discloses the “there” more primordially, but 
correspondingly it closes it off more stubbornly than any not-perceiving.”160 Previously, 
we analysed the possibility of the attunement, or attunements, of sleep amounting to 
something similar to this ‘more stubborn’ closing off. Yet we came to the preliminary 
conclusion that Dasein does not sleep and that attunements, along with existence, drop 
away as we lie down and lay down our burdens. The animal, which lives but does not 
exist, also knows nothing of these burdens and as such “does not stand within a 
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manifestness of beings.”161 The sleeper and the animal, plausibly share this exiling from 
the realm of disclosure, from the realm of ontology.  
 
Clearly, this cannot be the last word on the animal’s, or indeed the sleeper’s, 
relationality. Instead the “driven directedness of the animal finds itself suspended [hängt], 
as it were, between itself and its environment, even though neither the one nor the other 
is experienced as being.”162 This suspension, this hanging in limbo, between itself and its 
environment begins to demonstrate the truly problematic character of the intermediate 
position of the animal, and the sleeper, which Heidegger has insisted on for so long. 
Intuitively the sleeper is not related to beings, it does not apprehend them, and yet it, 
almost always, finds its way back to the world and to waking. The sleeper is not, like the 
corpse, without relationality. The true difficulty is to describe what, if we can still use this 
word ‘what’, the animal and the sleeper are related to. How is it “that captivation and 
behaviour display an openness for … For what precisely?”163 
 
IV: Openness, Elimination and the Animal’s Disinhibiting Ring 
[Enthemmungsring] 
 
 Section 60 “turns away from the animal, as it were” in considering the “what” 
with which the animal relates.164 However, seen in another light, this is only one further 
turn of the hermeneutic screw tightening onto the essence of animality: an account, that 
is, of the openness of behaviour. The section itself is split into two sub-sections which 
attempt to clarify, respectively, that which is eliminated from animal relationality or 
openness and that which constitutes it, that which disinhibits animal behaviour. The 
former of these, sub-section a), can be seen as a deepening of the enigma [Rätsel] of the 
animal’s wealth, of relationality, and poverty, of beings, whilst the latter, sub-section b), 
describes the animal’s openness to that which disinhibits it. For our purposes, this section 
has the pivotal role of intensifying the enigmatic character of the sleeper whilst also 
sweeping away some more of our pre-philosophical notions about this intermediate and 
ambiguous mode of being. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 248 
162 ibid 
163 ibid 
164 ibid 
	   125	  
 
 Sub-section a) and its consideration of the “eliminative character of behaviour” 
begins by reminding us that Heidegger is searching for that which unifies behaviour, for 
that which is essential to the animal mode of being. As such we must be particularly wary 
of focusing on individual instances of isolated behaviour – to do so would be to miss the 
whole: “each instinctual drive is intrinsically determined by its being driven with respect 
to the other drives.”165 It is this network of drives which forms “the totality of instinctual 
behaviour within which the animal is driven”.166 And this network in turn both allows for 
openness whilst, as behaviour, always prohibiting the apprehension, or having, of beings 
as such. “The animal is encircled [umringt] by this ring [Ring] constituted by the 
reciprocal drivenness of its drives.”167 The animal thus encircled by a Ring from which it 
“cannot escape” might appear as a purely negative characterisation and so Heidegger 
wonders: “What does this inability [to apprehend beings] positively imply for the 
phenomenon of captivation and its characteristic openness?”168 
 
 The positive interpretation of this eliminative character of animal behaviour opens 
with the following striking claim: “This fundamental trait of behaviour... can show itself 
as destruction – as devouring – or as avoidance of....”.169 Heidegger calls on “concrete 
phenomena” to support the supposed universality of this eliminative quality of behaviour. 
The example he turns to is the much cited cases of “female insects [who after mating] 
devour the male of the species.”170 This most alien instance of animal behaviour – the 
taboo of cannibalism here distances and alienates the animal from us and our world –  is 
supposed to demonstrate that “The animal is never there for the other simply as a living 
creature, but is only there for it either as sexual partner or as prey – in either case only in 
some form of ‘away’ [weg]. Behaviour as such is always intrinsically a form of 
elimination [Beseitigen].”171 This formulation stands, given what we know about the 
animal’s deprivation of the as-structure, however, it is easy to see how it might lead to a 
fatal misconception. It is but a short step from recognition of this fundamental trait of 
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behaviour to taking the eliminative nature of the animal as necessitating “purely negative” 
comportment.172 “But in fact there is no question of any comportment whatsoever, not 
even a negative one.”173 Of course, this just as clearly mitigates against the possibility of 
an overly positive interpretation of animal behaviour as comportment. Whether animals 
viciously devour their mates-cum-prey or tenderly nurture their young we go wrong for 
Heidegger if we move from these behaviours to negative or positive comportments. 
 
 The question persists: ‘what are animals related to in behaving one way, which 
appears positively eliminative, or another, which appears positively constructive?’ 
Heidegger turns to animals “and insects in particular [that] relate to light”, with the aim 
of discerning the “instinctual context” of light-seeking and light-avoiding behaviour.174 
Through a series of encounters with butterflies, crabs and moths, or rather with their 
relationships to light, we are reminded that the animal is always taken by that to which it 
relates and thus is not left “free for the light as such.”175 Heidegger insists that the 
extremely strong relations these animals have with light – as he puts it, the “animal locks 
its behaviour and what is proper and peculiar to it [Eigen-tum] into the light...” – are never 
equivalent to our own varying relations with light.176 The moth “plunges into the light 
precisely because it does not attend to the light or grasp it as such in its light-seeking 
behaviour.”177 
 
 As such Heidegger acknowledges that the description of animal behaviour as 
eliminative is “inevitably misleading”.178 It draws us towards an unwarranted positive 
interpretation of this fundamental trait of behaviour. And yet, what other interpretation, 
what negative interpretation, could there be? Heidegger’s answer comes in the form of 
the animal’s rejection of beings. 
 
It [this alternative interpretation] arises because the animal’s behaviour 
expresses a kind of rejection on the part of the animal with respect to what it 
relates to in its behaviour. In this rejecting things from itself we see the animal’s 
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self-absorption. The latter does not imply that the organism is encapsulated 
within itself, cut off from any and every relation to the environment.179 
 
Fundamentally, however, such an answer can only lead to a deepening of the enigma 
[Rätsel] of animal behaviour: 
 
This eliminative character of all behaviour, the way in which it leaves things to 
one side, is an enigma [Rätselhaftigkeit] which repeatedly forces us to address 
the question: What then is behaviour related to and what is the nature of this 
relation? Or we can now also ask: Where is the ring with which the animal is 
encircled as such, and how does it encircle the animal? What is this encircling 
[Umringen] like, if a relation to other things is not merely sustained, but 
constantly brought about [errungen] by this encircling?180 
 
This eliminative character of behaviour, this rejecting of things, this leaving of things to 
one side, is the animal’s self-absorption, or to put it another way its imprisonment within 
it’s encircling ring. The enigma comes with the caveat to the first of our just cited extracts 
– that this self-absorption is never an encapsulation or cutting off of relations – and this 
mystery results in the questions listed in our second extract. 
 
 Before considering these questions, and moving, with them, onto sub-section b) 
of Section 60, it is necessary to return to the sleeper and to ask whether the behaviour of 
the sleeper is fundamentally eliminative, and if so, how so? Whatever intuitive appeal 
Heidegger’s positive characterisation of animal behaviour as eliminative may hold – and 
it is important to note that he himself provides us with specific constructive counter-
examples – the sleeper, surely, appears far more positively eliminative. Whereas animals 
avoid some things, the worm – if it is lucky – avoids the mole, whilst devouring and 
destroying others, the sleeper, in contrast, avoids almost, or in fact, everything. It takes 
avoidance to its limit. Furthermore, Heidegger’s account of light-avoiding animals might 
suggest to us the sleeper’s, or half-sleeper’s, turning away from the beam of sunlight 
which has somehow found its way into the bedroom. The appeal of such an account is 
clear to see – the sleeper, if it behaves at all, behaves only, or so this interpretation would 
have it, in avoiding all that with which it might relate. And is this not the very structure 
of poverty which Heidegger has been insisting on from the beginning of his comparative 
examination? Namely, having in not-having. 
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 However, as we have seen this positive interpretation of elimination is precluded 
in the case of the animal and so too, if our analogy is to hold, in that of the sleeper. There 
are two reasons why the sleeper’s behaviour cannot be positively characterised as in the 
previous paragraph. Firstly, it must be asked why we are so quick to describe the sleeper’s 
behaviour as ‘avoidance’, or indeed with any negative name lifted from waking life? In 
the example we have just given of the sleeper, or half-sleeper, turning away from, 
‘avoiding’, the light we could just as easily have described them as seeking the darkness. 
Or to take another familiar phenomenon: a half-sleeper may often seek the cool side of a 
pillow. Perhaps the thought is that ‘darkness’, or ‘coolness’, or ‘comfort’, or ‘sleep’ itself, 
are too loose conceptually to be conceived of as intentional objects for the sleeper.181 And 
yet this very thought brings us neatly to our second reason for turning away from such an 
intuitively positive account of the behaviour of the sleeper – if the sleeper lacks such 
objects that it may seek then surely it just as much lacks those it is supposed to avoid. It 
is tempting to “understand eliminative behaviour as a seeking of emptiness, [but] then we 
should already have to understand the animal’s behaviour fundamentally as a self-
comportment toward beings as such.”182 The positive interpretation holds the double 
standard of granting beings to the sleeper to be avoided whilst denying them the same as 
to be sought. 
 
 Heidegger’s determined opposition to anthropomorphism is cached out in his 
hardline stance on the animal’s exile from the as-structure. For our purposes, this exile 
provides a lens through which we can describe the sleeper’s apparently negative 
behaviour as structurally eliminative without falling victim to a hollow anthropomorphic 
projection. The question, of course, remains what exactly the sleeper, like the animal, is 
open to, given this elimination of beings which underpins its very relationality. Alongside 
this arises the suspicion, one which Krell and others put clear voice to, that Heidegger, 
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despite all his efforts, has not truly thrown off the preconceived negative account of the 
animal, and thus, we might add, nor that of the sleeper. 
 
 With the enigma of the animal’s relationality re-affirmed, sub-section b) begins 
with the secondary questions which Heidegger described and which we just cited: “Where 
is the ring with which the animal is encircled as such, and how does it encircle the animal? 
What is this encircling [Umringen] like”?183 As such this sub-section attempts to clarify 
“something resembling a surrounding environment” for the animal.184 With this move 
from the essence of animality, ostensively out, to the place of animality we see the focus 
on world, and the animal’s poverty therein, returning to centre stage. Initiating this 
investigation comes the assertion of the animal’s openness to otherness “the animal opens 
itself to what is other in approaching it.”185 As the eliminative character of this openness 
has made clear what the animal opens itself to cannot be manifest as beings. Instead, “a 
being such as the animal... can only come upon the sort of entity that ‘affects’ or initiates 
the capability in some way. Nothing else can ever penetrate the ring around the 
animal.”186 With these essentialist remarks, and he insists that he is here still operating on 
the fundamental rather than the concrete level, Heidegger has described the manner of 
animal openness “as disinhibition [Enthemmung].”187 
 
 Such “‘affects’” stimulate the animal in disinhibiting its behaviour, in activating 
its drives. However, one might think, Heidegger acknowledges, that instinctual drives are 
“precisely characterized by their uninhibitedness” and as such we should talk of the 
animal’s others as inhibiting rather than dis-inhibiting.188 Yet once again this view, for 
Heidegger, rests on an overly quick comparison with human comportment and its 
supposed “control [as opposed to the uninhibited animal] and so on.”189 Instead the 
animal’s drives, in their unity as behaviour, indicate, in themselves, “an inner tension and 
charge, a containment and inhibitedness that essentially must be disinhibited before it can 
pass over into driven activity”.190  
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 So far these descriptions of the animal’s behaviour seem to allow for plausible 
extension over the sleeper. The sleeper, whatever their relationship to other beings, seems 
open to being affected, stimulated, and dis-inhibited. Furthermore, the same temptation 
which prompted us to call the sleeper’s behaviour negative or eliminative, in the positive 
sense, also suggests that the sleeper is inhibited, fundamentally reticent. Perhaps most 
obviously all of these ways that the sleeper relates may cause the sleeper to transform into 
the waking-self. And here, fundamentally, lies the problem with this analogy. We have 
already seen that animal behaviour must – as with capability and drives in general – be 
self-absorbed and self-sustaining, or as Heidegger puts it “subservient”.191 And yet, surely 
this archetypal disinhibition of the sleeper results precisely in the dissolving of the 
sleeper. The sleeper’s ‘behaviour’, which could no longer be called such, of waking-up 
amounts to the very opposite of the requirement that the animal continually be capable: 
“Something which is no longer capable, irrespective of whether a capacity is used or not, 
is no longer alive.”192 One might almost say that the sleeper in such cases is too 
disinhibited to behave itself. This problem with the analogy intuitively responds to the 
image of the sleeper as dying every morning and being born anew every night, if, that is 
we are lucky! 
 
 Leaving, for just a moment, this problem of behaviour and awakening let us 
consider the possibility that the sleeper behaves through the disinihibition of its drives 
whilst asleep. How else are we to explain the fact that sometimes we awake with our 
heads where our feet were the previous night or in some other odd position.193 Or one 
might think of dreams which, upon awaking, we believe ourselves, or others, to have 
discovered their external source.194 What disinhibits such, internal to sleep, behaviour? It 
seems that this is equivalent to the question which has already been reiterated so often by 
Heidegger in his search for the openness of the animal – open to what? “Since that which 
disinhibits behaviour essentially withdraws and eludes it, so too the relation of behaviour 
to that which occasions it is a not attending to it.”195 Thus the what of animal relating 
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withdraws [entziehtsich] as it disinhibits. This withdrawal of things from the animal, even 
whilst they retain some hold on them, reminds us of the way in which sounds withdraw, 
or become more distant, as one slips into sleep.196 
 
 The animal is dis-inhibited, remains open, but never has that which disinhibits it. 
 
Thus the intrinsic self-encirclement [Sich-Einringen] of the animal is not a kind 
of encapsulation. On the contrary, the encirclement is precisely drawn about the 
animal in such a way that it opens up a sphere within which whatever disinhibits 
can do so in this or that manner.197 
 
This at first appears to be but another articulation of the paradox described above – that 
the animal is open even though it can never have that which it must be open to, beings. 
However, in fact something more astonishing is being proposed in this account of the 
animal’s disinhibiting ring. Here we see the extension of the animal’s essence, of 
animality, beyond the commonly held boundaries of skin, fur, and carapace. 
 
...[T]he life of the animal is precisely the struggle [Ringen] to maintain this 
encircling ring or sphere within which a quite specifically articulated manifold 
of disinhibitions can arise. Every animal surrounds itself with this disinhibiting 
ring, and not merely subsequently once the animal has already been living for a 
certain period of time, because this encircling belongs to the innermost 
organization of the animal and its fundamental morphological structures.198 
 
And thus the true significance of the self of the animal’s self-absorption comes into view. 
Absorption does indeed indicate a form of limitation but not within “the so-called 
‘interior’ of the animal, but in the ring of the interrelated drivenness of instinctual drives 
as they open themselves up.”199 Perhaps unsurprisingly Heidegger has no time for 
describing a hermetically sealed animal identity, after all the question of world is what 
motivated his comparative examination. 
 
 Thus it is that we are brought back to the thesis of the animal’s poverty in world, 
but now we can see that it is “a poverty which roughly put, is nonetheless a kind of 
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wealth.”200 With this wealth merely hinted at and with animal essence opened up we must 
return to the problem of the sleeper’s dis-inhibition, and more broadly the analogy we 
have been considering between Heidegger’s account of animality and a potential 
phenomenology of sleep. The mistake with both the worry about the dissolving of the 
sleeper in awakening and with our initial response to it through a consideration of dis-
inhibiting behaviour within sleep is that they both presuppose that the essence of the 
sleeper must be internal to it. Yet, as we have just seen, the animal for Heidegger is 
structurally, essentially, open. This, when held alongside Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with 
limiting sleep to a temporary state, suggests that we have succumbed to precisely the 
reading of sleep that our exegesis has moved us away from: sleep as a part of 
consciousness, a state within it, a sub-section. Another means of seeing this point is to 
consider that the sleeper is not, phenomenologically, confined to those periods of time we 
ordinarily describe as sleep. A consideration of going-to-sleep – which in its projective 
aspect is so often forgotten or inadequately discusses as we have seen – is enough to 
suggest that the behaviour of the sleeper needs to be understood not only as dissipating 
but also as instantiating, or constituting. However, it is crucial to see that this is not merely 
to acknowledge the coming to be of the interiority we call sleep, a recognition of the 
‘being born anew’ described above. Instead we are better served by considering the 
sleeper through the lens of life rather, that is, than the boundaries or edges thereof. This 
shows the living sleeper as fundamentally open, or in other words “our scarcely 
conceivable, abysmal bodily kinship with the” sleeper.201 
 
 However, this kinship, as with the animal, is dangerously easy to misunderstand. 
And this danger is doubled. We risk either forgetting the wealth of the animal and the 
sleeper in favour of their poverty, or forgetting their poverty in favour of their wealth.202 
The animal must not be confused with the stone, nor with Dasein. However, as Dasein 
we, for Heidegger, constantly “end up talking as if that which the animal relates to and 
the manner in which it does so were some being”.203 We constantly forget the poverty 
and, in so doing, are necessarily blinded to the peculiarity of the wealth. Yet, as we saw 
in our exploration of transposition, claims about the essence of animality are necessarily 
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entangled with methodological considerations. Here such considerations return to the 
fore: 
 
...the essence of life can become accessible only if we consider it in a 
deconstructive [abbauenden] fashion. But this does not mean that life represents 
something inferior or some kind of lower level in comparison with human 
Dasein. On the contrary, life is a domain which possesses a wealth of openness 
with which the human world may have nothing to compare.204 
 
The question of the limits of our access to the animal and to the wealth of animal openness 
is here raised. This necessitates a deconstructing, or dismantling, approach to the animal 
whilst also holding at bay the hierarchical claims associated with a detached observer 
model, implicit in the natural scientist’s approach to the animal. This key denial of any 
hierarchy of man over animal will be central to the arguments of Heidegger’s defenders 
considered below. 
 
 Section 60, Sub-section b) continues with a reminder of what we have learned of 
‘that which the animal is open to’. Namely, that it “must always... withdraw itself.”205 
This withdrawing signals that that which disinhibits the animal is “nothing enduring that 
could stand over against the animal as a possible object”.206 It is worth noting how this 
characterisation of the stimuli which the animal encounters recalls not only the exile of 
the animal from the realm of beings but also the sleeper’s inability to take-up a stance, 
inability to stand over against. Of course, with this characterisation of the animal’s 
openness as open to stimuli which disinhibit animal behaviour comes the risk of a slide 
back into naturalistic accounts of cause and effect. Heidegger is quick to block such a 
relapse as the animal is already related prior to the stimulus and to think of the stimulus 
as a cause of a particular effect in the animal is to ignore this prior engagement. The prior 
engagement is the animal’s intrinsic encirclement: “it is only where there is disinhibition 
and intrinsic encirclement that stimulation is possible.”207 The animal has always already 
found itself in its own encircling ring.208 Fundamentally, this means that different animals 
will have different intrinsic rings which in turn dictate which stimuli can disinhibit which 
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animals. “However strong or intense a stimulus is, objectively speaking, a particular 
animal may be utterly unresponsive to particular stimuli.”209 
 
 Heidegger ends this Section, before bringing his Chapter and the analysis of the 
animal to a series of conclusions, with what appears to be a definition of life itself. “More 
precisely, we must say that life is nothing but the animal’s encircling itself and struggling 
[Ringen] with its encircling ring, a ring by way of which the animal is absorbed without 
its ever being with itself [bei sich selbst] in the proper sense.”210 We have considered the 
sleeper within this framework and seen that, whilst initial difficulties appear, in fact the 
sleeper struggles within a particular type of encircling ring and as such is not best seen as 
a turning inwards at the expense of the outer. Instead this very framework of inner and 
outer is problematized in the case of the animal and, also, for the sleeper. Our very 
undertaking of this analysis of the animal amounted to a critique of the presupposition 
that the sleeper is within and subordinate to the subject as a whole. Here we see that such 
demarcating of the sleeper, as with the animal, is fundamentally problematized by a more 
fine-grained consideration of the modes of being of sleeper, waking Dasein, and the 
corpse. 
 
V: Conclusions, Self-Objections and Incomplete Analyses 
 
 Only now can we hope “to conclude by delimiting a correct concept of the 
organism”.211 Thus it is that Heidegger announces the beginning of the end, not of the 
comparative analysis but of the animal section thereof.212 This concluding section of 
Chapter 4 of Part II of FCM, Section 61, is itself split into three sub-sections. These can 
be broadly outlined as follows: sub-section a) summarises the account of the organism so 
far established, notably highlighting the animal’s essential self-encirclement in its 
environment; sub-section b) briefly describes the origins of this account of the essence of 
the organism in theoretical biology; whereas, sub-section c) reveals a fundamental limit 
or incompleteness to the account presented so far. Heidegger’s consideration of the 
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animal, however, will require another chapter, though admittedly a short one, before 
reaching its conclusion, which anyway, as we will see, cannot truly be called such. 
Chapter Five, in Section 62, returns us to the thesis with which the interrogation of the 
animal began – ‘The animal is poor in world’ – and offers a solution to the paradox of the 
animal’s relation to world that followed from this. Only then, in Section 63, does 
Heidegger acknowledge the charge of anthropocentrism, which many commentators have 
found so damning of his account of the animal, before, that is, dismissing this worry and 
leaving the animal, and its relation to world “a problem,” though “one which [he] cannot 
broach now”.213 
 
 Beginning then with Heidegger’s most explicit summary of the organism, 
behaviour and captivation, in Section 61, sub-section a), we must, as ever, be on our guard 
against the old misconceptions of metaphysics. Namely, that the organism can be seen 
neither as a bundle of instruments, nor a collection of instinctual drives.214 Instead “we 
can say that the organism is the capability for behaviour in the unity of captivation.”215 
Fundamentally this unity, as we have just discussed, does not map onto the physical unity 
of the organism’s body with its, incorrectly described, sharp boundaries of hide, shell, or 
coat of fur. Seen from the perspective of traditional metaphysics, the boundary of this 
captivated unity of the organism is already what we might, just as misleadingly, call 
‘external’ to our body, already ‘out there’. 
 
For the animal is not first an organism and as such an organism then something 
more that comes to bind itself to its environment. Rather its being bound 
[Verbundenheit] to the environment, the self-encircling which is open to 
disinhibition, belongs to the inner essence of behaviour, i.e., belongs to that for 
which the capability is there as capability. This self-encircling is the 
fundamental capability of the animal into which all the other capacities are as it 
were integrated and from out of which they grow.216 
 
Truly the animal’s ring of disinhibition forces us to speak not so much of the boundary 
of the organism, of the essential limits of animality and as such of the essence of animality 
itself, but rather of a “being bound [Verbundenheit] to the environment”, which we must 
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remember is structurally a being open to disinhibition. This binding in being open is, as 
the unity of captivation, not merely “as intimate” as that old intimacy of “the unity of the 
body” but rather the very ground and condition of the possibility of this as such.217 
 
 Heidegger follows this with a succinct and important summary of “the 
characteristic structural moments of captivation in six points”.218 However, before we 
consider these “structural moments” we must pause and reflect on this binding 
[verbindlich] of the animal to its environment. In particular we must ask how this being 
bound [Verbundenheit] relates to Heidegger’s earlier appeal to the Aristotlean description 
of sleep, discussed above, as a “δεσµός [desmos, bond, fetter, collar], a being bound 
[Gebundenheit], a peculiar way in which αἴσθησις [aisthēsis, perception] is bound.”219 
We best approach the insights of this new comparison, between the bondage of the sleeper 
and that of the animal, by exploring the difference between Gebundenheit and 
Verbundenheit. This difference, which is concealed by their uniform translation into the 
English ‘being bound’, is of the utmost importance to the exercise, the somnological-
zoological analogy, which we have been undertaking in following Heidegger’s way 
[Weg] of animal analysis. 
 
 Though these two words, Verbundenheit and Gebundenheit, share a common root 
in the verb binden [to bind] they also have important differences in meaning and in 
everyday use. Beginning with Gebundenheit, the simpler of the two words, we can break 
it down into Gebunden [bound or tied], the past-participle of binden, and heit. Thus 
‘boundness’ or ‘being bound’ amounts to a close enough translation of Gebundenheit. 
However, as a word, it is often used to describe or suggest fixity and thus solidity or 
surety. One is put in mind not only of the locking away of the demons, or Krell’s daimons, 
of the night – children tucked up tight in bed, more fastened there than nestled – but also 
of the solid, and secure, foundation upon which a good day’s work must be based: a good 
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night’s sleep.220 Furthermore, the priority evident here is one where sleep is looked back 
upon as bound. The Ge- of Gebundenheit designates the past. The sleeper was bound but 
never is bound and this word holds none of the strangeness of our blissfully throwing 
ourselves into bondage each and every night, with regularity – if we are lucky. Lastly, 
Heidegger’s translation of δεσµός, as Gebundenheit, carries with it the privileging of 
having-been-asleep which we have already identified in the Husserlian phenomenology 
of sleep, above. 
 
 What then of the animal’s bondage, of Verbundenheit? Verbunden may mean to 
bandage, to dress (a wound, for example), to connect, to associate, or to form a bond more 
generally. And it is from this that the primary use-meanings of Verbundenheit come: 
solidarity, closeness, attachment. This is, of course, not an exhaustive list, but it does 
succeed in demonstrating the associative quality of Verbundenheit, the being bound to-
ness, which seems lacking in Gebundenheit. The question arises of how differently these 
claims about the animal’s bondage to its environment would appear to the English reader 
if we take Heidegger to be describing the animal’s ‘solidarity, or closeness, with its 
environment’? Clearly such a reading would at least dampen our, understandable, worries 
about Heidegger’s, seemingly, overly negative description of the animal. However, we 
would go wrong to see in this Verbundenheit merely the idyllic unity of the noble, 
however savage, beast with its environment. Whatever resources Heidegger may offer 
the environmentalist, here and elsewhere, he holds little sympathy for such romanticism.  
 
 Instead the ambiguity and tension in this term, Verbundenheit, are essential to 
understanding Heidegger’s description of the animal. The Ver- of Verbundenheit must be 
considered. As a prefix this Ver- has frustrated many attempting to learn German given 
its plethora of seemingly contradictory and diverse uses. However, we can, broadly, see 
it as adding three types of potential meaning to a word. It can suggest change or 
transformation in the sense of moving from one state-of-affairs to another. It is this sense 
of the prefix which we appealed to in our brief engagement with Understanding 
[Verstehen], in Chapter 3, above. However, Ver- may also suggest error or, more 
accurately, misguidedness, as in the following example: ‘Ich habe mich verlesen’, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 The sense in which the normative value of sleep is reliant on this binding of the sleeper to the will of the 
waking self appears here and can be contrasted with Nancy’s account of the value of sleep, of the demand 
of sleep, as seen in Chapter 5, below. 
	   138	  
may be translated as ‘I misread.’ Here we can think of Ver- as matching mis- in English 
expressions such as misread, mishandled, misconceived, and so on. And lastly, Ver- can 
give the impression that that which the constituted term is applied to is away from the 
perspective of the person making the statement in which the Ver- term is included. Think 
of Vertrieben [dispel] or Verdrängen [displace, dispel, or oust]. Of course, these three 
meanings or roles of Ver- are not easily separable, as our examples demonstrate, and 
furthermore, they all share a common theme which we might call ‘going beyond 
boundaries’. Such ‘going beyond boundaries’ can suggest the change or transformation 
of something, or it could indicate a failure to stay within accepted bounds, transgression, 
or, lastly, it can, from the perspective of those within such boundaries, indicate the being-
away of that which the Ver- term is assigned to. 
 
 In returning to the animal analysis we can see that Heidegger was, as ever, careful 
in his use of terminology. The animal’s being bound to, or its solidarity with, its 
environment carries with it an internal ambiguity. Verbundenheit involves a tension 
between the binding of the root word binden and the going beyond bounds of the Ver-. 
The essence of the organism is found in its captivation as a being bound to its 
environment, and thus to the open. For us, as Dasein, the animal is bound and restrained, 
it is world poor, and yet this being bound of the animal involves a transformation or 
mutability, a transgression – the animal is beyond our man-made morality (we are to avoid 
animosity, after all), and a being-away. It is the last of these that reminds us of the 
problems of transposition which we have already discussed: the animal is, no matter how 
ontically present to us, ontologically distant and as such problematic. We will return to 
all three of these features of the animal’s bound essence very shortly, none of them are 
uncontroversial. First, however, we must ask why the sleeper is denied this internal 
ambiguity? The question can be posed anew thus: ‘Why is the sleeper merely a having 
been bound [Gebundenheit] and not a being bound [Verbundenheit]?’  
 
 It could be argued that when Heidegger favourably cites Aristotle’s account of 
sleep he is not signing-up to it but merely pointing out the unexplored directions for an 
analysis of sleep which such an account offers. From this we might further conclude that 
whereas the sleeper is bound [Gebundenheit] – and we must remember that sleep “is not 
only a way in which perception is bound but also our essence, in that it cannot take in 
other beings which it itself is not” – before a somnolent comparative examination has 
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been undertaken, through such we come to see that it is, rather, a closeness, or solidarity, 
[Verbundenheit] with the place of sleep.221 Clearly sleep’s being bound in closeness to a 
place cannot be simply overlaid onto the being bound of the animal to its disinhibiting 
ring – animal’s sleep too, or so we assume. Once again questions proliferate whilst 
answers dwindle. Furthermore, it is just as likely that this very difference between the 
animal’s mode of being and that of the sleeper is best understood through these different 
words for the bondage involved in these two very different cases. Or, otherwise put: 
perhaps Heidegger was ascribing to the Aristotlean view and did see sleep as less 
problematic or ambiguous than the animal. These alternative interpretations, which need 
not be conceived merely as a scholarly quibble about Heidegger’s own view but rather a 
question about the possibility of delimiting the sleeper as such, guide the remainder of 
this section. 
 
 These introductory reminders with which Heidegger opens Section 61 are, 
however significant they seem to us, merely the lead-in for his skilful six-point summary 
of the structure of captivation. Here we will merely sketch Heidegger’s summary, in our 
own words except for point five, though using his own “abbreviated form, [of] the six 
points” to guide our headings:222 
 
1.   Withholding. The animal has the manifestness of beings structurally withheld 
from it. As such it may only behave, and never comport, itself. Perception is, 
fundamentally, beyond it. 
2.   Being taken. And yet the animal is in relation to other beings. This relation, as it 
is not one of perceiving, is one of being taken by. 
3.   Absorption. The totality of the animal’s drives pushes it from one relationship of 
being taken to another. Its captivation is also an absorption in its unified totality 
of drives. This is the closest the animal comes to “self-hood”. 
4.   Openness for something else. As such the animal is open to that which disinhibits 
its drives, it is open to that which is other than it. 
5.   The structure of encirclement thus given. “This disinhibiting ring is not like a rigid 
armour plate fitted around the animal, but is something with which the animal 
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encircles itself as long as it lives.”223 This involves an inherent struggling with 
this ring which in fact constitutes the very struggle of life itself. 
6.   The indication that captivation is the condition of the possibility of any kind of 
behaviour. Captivation as prior to all biological and zoological analysis and 
revealed as the, transcendental, condition for the possibility of such analyses. 
 
This list of structural moments offers us a helpful means of considering our own 
comparative analysis of the sleeper. However, we must hold off from such a blow by 
blow examination, for, as Heidegger makes explicit, this structure is not “the definitive 
clarification of the essence of animality”.224 
 
 Step six may appear to suggest that Heidegger is here dismissing the very 
theoretical biology which he had previously drawn on. However, the end of sub-section 
a) and the whole of sub-section b) easily dispel such an impression. Conversely, 
Heidegger is keen to free the scientist from both “the apron strings of philosophy” and a 
dependence on “newly discovered facts.”225 At this point in his philosophical 
development, and perhaps only at this point – as we will see when considering Padui and 
Winkler shortly, Heidegger still held out hope for a radical scientific overcoming of 
mechanism and the dominance of technology, techné, what he would later formulate and 
diagnose as Gestell. In the field of the life sciences this would involve an overcoming of 
“Darwinism and the increasingly powerful, purely analytical method in morphology and 
physiology.”226 Given this, Sub-section b) should be understood as an unearthing of the 
biological steps which paved the way for any possible understanding of the essential 
structure of captivation as Heidegger has described it. These two steps, though they would 
later be further developed by others, were undertaken by Hans Driesch and Jakob Johann 
von Uexküll. “The first step concerns the recognition of the holistic character of the 
organism.”227 Whereas the “second step is the insight into the essential significance of 
research concerned with how the animal is bound [Verbundenheit] to its environment.”228 
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 These two steps can be seen as corresponding with two withdrawals in 
Heidegger’s own account of the animal; namely, the move away from instrumentalist or 
mechanistic accounts of the organism, and, secondly, the rejection of the bodily unity of 
the animal in favour of it openness within its disinhibiting ring. Whilst he is clear that 
neither account of the organism is free from the influence and context of the “dominant 
mechanistic theory and investigation of life”, these steps nonetheless retain their radical 
promise for Heidegger.229 Though he only explicitly names the “great danger [Gefahr]” 
which accompanies the insights of Driesch we can, with little effort, unearth the parallel 
threat that lurks within Uexküll’s contributions.230 Driesch’s neovitalism, with its appeal 
to entelechy – and despite its insights into the unity of the animal, is in fact, for Heidegger, 
still bound to the old metaphysical account of animality. 
 
As far as biological problems are concerned, vitalism is just as dangerous as 
mechanism. While the latter does not allow the question of purposive behaviour 
to arise, vitalism tries to solve the problem too hastily.231 
 
In fact, both mechanism and vitalism, whether neo- or otherwise, share the same mistaken 
metaphysical presupposition about the animal. They both, as McNeill explains, 
“presuppose in advance and from the outset that entities in themselves have the character 
of eidos (“form”) and of logos, that the Being of entities (here, of living beings) has in the 
first instance and in general the character of a “self” (of self-subsistence and identity) that 
is reducible to and accessible as logos.”232 Yet, as we have seen, Heidegger’s very 
question demands that we call into question such presuppositions and consider the very 
mode of being of the animal from out of the animal itself.233 
 
 Given this it is not surprising that Uexküll’s problematizing of the metaphysical 
understanding of the unity of the animal appears as all the more groundbreaking in this 
sub-section of the course. However, here too, with Uexküll’s talk “of an ‘environing 
world’ [Umwelt], and indeed of the ‘inner world’ of the animal” there is clearly the 
potential for misreading Uexküll and thus misunderstanding the animal.234 Whereas, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 ibid 
230 ibid, p. 262 
231 ibid 
232 McNeill, William. The Time of Life, Heidegger and Ēthos, p. 29 
233 We will return to this question of the animal’s eidos, or lack thereof, in our next, and concluding, section. 
234 Heidegger, Martin. FCM, p. 263 
	   142	  
Driesch one risks assigning the same fundamental structure of being to the animal as that 
of the stone, or indeed any other entity of scientific interest, here Uexküll appears to grant 
the animal that which Heidegger has been attempting to approach: world. Whatever 
Heidegger claims Uexküll truly means by his talk of Umwelt – “the disinhibiting ring”, 
of course – it is clear that here, as at the start of the animal analysis, the beast balances, 
with remarkable capability but without a hint of understanding, on a knife’s edge. The 
“animal is separated from man by an abyss [Abgrund]”, and, also, from the stone by 
another.235 
 
 Yet this precarious balancing act which both Heidegger and his animals are 
undertaking is, in sub-section c), made all the more difficult – the knife’s edge becomes 
a slack rope and strong and unpredictable winds abound – with the addition of motion. 
Heidegger’s account of the animal “is still incomplete.”236 “All life is not simply organism 
but is just as essentially process, thus formally speaking motion.”237 The organism, if by 
that we mean the structural unity of the animal’s being, is fundamentally distinct from 
anything which might be described, or better delimited, in a static snapshot. 
 
Captivation is not a static condition, not a structure in the sense of a rigid 
framework inserted within the animal, but rather an intrinsically determinate 
motility which continually unfolds or atrophies as the case may be. Captivation 
is at the same time motility, and this belongs to the essence of the organism.238 
 
This bite in the tail, or at least near the tail, of Heidegger’s analysis of the animal as 
captivated behaviour should not surprise us. The account of the animal has, of necessity 
been interwoven and fundamentally linked with a more general account of life, and life, 
as we all know, has a tempo or flow of its own. “Even in our everyday experience we are 
familiar with the birth, growth, maturing, aging, and death of animals.”239 This process 
and animation which, only now, comes to the fore brings with it the tension we found 
above in sub-section a)’s binding of the animal to the open. The Ver- of the animal’s 
Verbundenheit to its environment contained within it the struggle, the straining, against, 
within, and beyond the bounds of traditional metaphysical conceptions of essence. 
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 How then might this turn to motility and to the process or flow of the animal relate 
to the sleeper and to our comparative analysis thereof? Whilst there are many possible 
interpretations we will here indicate two substantive ones, which happen to contradict. 
Firstly, it might be thought that the resulting incompleteness of Heidegger’s account of 
the animal illustrates the point of severance of the somnological-zoological analogy. 
Whereas the animal fundamentally contains, is animated by, motility, the sleeper, as we 
see in Aristotle’s account, precisely lacks this – “sleep is an ἀκινησία [akinesia, not-move, 
quiescence, or rest].”240 The sleeper, with their exile from Dasein, world and projection, 
on this account also loses that which complicates and makes incomplete the account of 
the animal so far offered – movement, transformation and process. This interpretation 
certainly rests on common intuitions about sleep – when wishing to traverse, or to move 
at all, we do not usually go for a nap – and yet, as we will see, there are good reasons to 
favour an alternative unpacking of the relevance of this internal incompleteness of the 
animal analysis for any Heideggerian phenomenology of sleep. 
 
 Instead, let us take the account we have so far been developing of the sleeper as, 
still in analogy with the animal, fundamentally incomplete. This takes the ἀ- of ἀκινησία 
as not, in the case of sleep, indicating a total lack of motility but rather as describing a 
problematic and alien type thereof. We might formulate this as the requirement that we 
truly investigate the relationship between the sleeper and movement, process and flow.241 
There are many ways we might begin to describe this somnolent motility: the gentle rise 
and fall of the chest in sleep; the twitching, tossing and turning, to whatever degree, of all 
sleepers; or the sleepwalker’s parallel life of journeys, activities and accidents. However, 
all of these remain within the familiar – to waking everyday Dasein that is – realm of 
spatial motility. Heidegger, conversely, as his description of the everyday experience of 
the motility of animals demonstrates, has in mind movement through time. Heidegger’s 
point, in application to the organism, can be taken as mirroring Husserl’s movement from 
static to genetic phenomenology: it is not enough to describe the static unity of the 
organism when the organism is not incidentally, or secondarily, just as much a unity 
across time – “the organism as we now understand it does not simply happen to get caught 
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up as it were in this motility. Rather, this motility determines the being of the animal as 
such.”242 The sleeper too then must not be conceived as a static unity. And yet here too 
arises one of the most striking features of the sleeper’s temporal motility: it is intermittent 
or interrupted.243 Can we even speak of a unity of the sleeper across the daily, noisy and 
alert, plains of waking life? Holding aside this intriguing question it remains nonetheless 
plausible that we, regardless of how we answer the question of the sleeper’s trans-wakeful 
unity, go wrong when we treat sleep as a state, condition, or entity which might be 
extracted from its “motility of a peculiar kind”.244 
 
 “Birth, maturing, aging, and death all too obviously remind us of the being of 
man, which we recognize as being historical.”245 However, as this phrase, this “all too 
obviously”, reminds us we must be wary of distinguishing the animal so sharply from the 
stone – from that which does not have motility inherent to its mode of being – that we 
fall, unsuspectingly, into the error of anthropomorphising the animal. Heidegger, 
snapping of his gaze back in the other direction of comparative analysis, draws out the 
questions of history and death. Very quickly we are moved from the question of a 
“particular individual” animal’s history to that of “the animal kind, the species”.246 
Heidegger’s hope is that this type of questioning offers renewed resources for bringing 
into question such “celebrated and notorious” concepts as “‘development’”.247 Yet, 
unsurprisingly we are also reminded that it is questionable whether we should “speak of 
history at all where the being of the animal is concerned?”248 
 
 With Heidegger’s brief but fascinating engagement with the end of life, here at 
the end of his chapter on the mode of being of life, we discover another reason to favour 
our second, and chosen, interpretation of the importance of Heidegger’s parting 
revelations on animal motility for our account of the sleeper. Namely, that the question 
of life’s motility “is not an arbitrary one and cannot possibly be dealt with by subsequently 
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trying to insert it into the analysis as it were”.249 Surely this prohibition against 
subsequently tacking on motility to the essence of life as captivation is just as prohibitive 
of our subtracting of motility from the captivation of the sleeper. Furthermore, our own 
Chapter’s premise has been that sleep is fundamentally, and intriguingly, as closely linked 
to life as it is to death. Thus it is that Heidegger’s intertwining of death and life in these 
final pages of Chapter 4 is particularly interesting for us. 
 
 “The touchstone for the appropriateness and originary character of every question 
concerning the essence of life lies in whether or not this question has adequately grasped 
the problem of death and whether or not it is able to take it up into its own question 
concerning the essence of life in the correct way, and vice versa.”250 Heidegger is cautious 
to note that this is not the same thing as treating one or the other as the sufficient 
explanatory condition for understanding the other. However, the necessity of 
understanding death in relation to the animal’s motility, and thus its life, is clear – “the 
problem of the motility of life has to be unfolded in relation to death, although not death 
alone.”251 The sleeper, thus, as analogous with the animal, cannot be understood, in its 
motility, without considering its death. Once again we are brought back to the question 
of the sleeper’s longevity. Does the sleeper die with each dawn? Or does the sleeper live 
on whilst we dream that they have long since departed? 
 
 However, it is here that Heidegger’s appeal to comparative examination is brought 
back to centre stage. For “it is questionable whether death and death are the same in the 
case of man and animal, even if we can identify a physico-chemical and physiological 
equivalence between the two.”252 Even, or perhaps most so, in death “the animal is [still] 
separated from man by an abyss.”253 Captivation, as the structure of living organisms 
already sets “quite determinate possibilities of death”, or limits for the animal.254 In fact, 
Heidegger is explicit: “the animal cannot die in the sense in which dying is ascribed to 
human beings but can only come to an end.”255 This ‘coming to an end’ suggests a 
possible course for comparing these comments on the animal’s death with that of the 
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sleeper’s end. Perhaps the return to waking is a similar end? Never a death but always 
something final. Enough for motility but not enough for contact with the nothing and 
existential angst. However, given our insights about sleep, and the sleeper, being, through 
the analogy with the animal analysis, strikingly removed from the periodic and state-
based conception we are required to question these over hasty moves from animal demise 
to sleep’s cessation. In a similar vein, one might claim that this excluding of the captivated 
from death reveals that ‘the good death’ as we often conceive it, dying in one’s sleep that 
is, is in fact, for Heidegger, no death at all.256 
 
 Section 61 closes with a reminder that this account of the animal’s essence was 
itself initiated by Heidegger’s controversial thesis: ‘The animal is poor in world.’ The 
question arises of how the relationship or priority between this thesis and this 
characterisation, as captivated, should be conceived. It is in exploring this question of 
priority that Section 62 returns us to the paradox of the animal’s, apparent, poverty and 
wealth in world. 
 
With the animal we find a having of world and a not-having of world. Either this 
result is intrinsically contradictory and impossible, or we are employing the 
word ‘world’ – as the accessibility of beings – in a different sense each time 
when we formulate the problem in terms of the animal having world and not 
having world. In that case the concept of world has not yet adequately been 
elucidated.257 
 
This puzzle or paradox of the animal was originally encountered in Section 48 of FCM 
and closes the introductory remarks on the comparative examination in Chapter 3 whilst 
presenting the problematic which drives Chapter 4, and thus the animal analysis as a 
whole. Now, at the end of that analysis, we can see that there was, indeed, an equivocation 
in the use of ‘world’ the initial paradox. The point upon which this confusion rests is 
found in the phrase “as the accessibility of beings” of ‘world’ in our previous quotation. 
Now with the animal’s captivation explored we can see that the animal does have “access 
to… and indeed to something that actually is. But this is something that only we are 
capable of experiencing and having manifest as beings.”258 The ‘as-structure’ is lacking 
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for the animal and as such we begin to see with clarity what the animal lacks, the true 
significance of thesis [2.]. However, the initial puzzle presented in Section 48, which we 
discussed on pp. 103 – 104 above, speaks of a having and a not having of world. Here, at 
least, Heidegger is emphatic: “...the animal essentially cannot have world at all, although 
that which it relates to can always be experienced as a being in our experience.”259 
Fundamentally one cannot ascribe a world to an entity that does not have beings manifest 
to it. 
 
 This not-having of world, this decisive exiling of the beast from our world and 
“our experience”, must also allow for the maintenance of the poverty structure we 
analysed in our tracing of Heidegger’s opening comparative moves in Chapter 3, Part II, 
FCM. Thus we must recall that “this not-having of world does not force the animal 
alongside the stone”.260 Heidegger’s notion of poverty requires that the not-having of the 
animal is only possible on the basis of a certain having. What possession could amount 
to the condition of the possibility of the animal’s poverty in world? 
 
Being open in captivation is the essential possession of the animal. On the basis 
of this possession it can be deprived, it can be poor, it can be determined in its 
being by poverty. This having is certainly not a having of world, but rather being 
held captive to the disinhibiting ring – it is a having of that which disinhibits.261 
 
Thus it is that, whilst the puzzle of the animal’s relationship to world appears settled, the 
intermediate and constituently poor character of animal being is retained. The animal’s 
“not-having of world is not merely a case of having less of world in comparison with 
man, but rather a case of not having at all – but this now in the sense of a not-having, i.e., 
on the basis of a having.”262 
 
 For our purposes we must remind ourselves that this very puzzle, which now 
appears solved, amounted, in its structure, to our final piece of textual evidence for the 
potential for approaching Heidegger’s phenomenology of sleep through his comparative 
examination in our opening engagements with the comparative examination. There we 
pointed to the similarly paradoxical structure of whatever is sleeping’s relationship with 
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being-there, both being-there and not-being-there, and the animal’s relationship to world, 
having and not-having.263 Now we must ask two questions: firstly, whether Heidegger’s 
solution to the puzzle of the animal’s world offers an equivalent solution to our mirrored 
comparative examination of the sleeper’s relationship with world; and secondly, whether 
this decisive moment sheds any light on the sleeper’s relationship with being-there, with 
Dasein. Both questions should, it will be shown, be answered in the affirmative, all that 
remains is to show the manner of this affirmation. 
 
 Beginning with our own comparative analysis of the corpse, the sleeper, and 
Dasein – ‘what is the sleeper’s relationship with world?’ If, through the twists and turns 
of Heidegger’s comparative path [vergleichenden Weg], our analogy has held between 
the sleeper and our abyssal cousins then, as we have seen, the captivation of the sleeper 
denies it, like the animal, world. However, the difficulty comes, as we have also already 
discussed, in considering how this denial leaves the sleeper distinct from the corpse. In 
other words, what is the not-having of world of the sleeper, its poverty, based on. What 
is the primordial possession of the sleeper which allows its deprivation of world and of 
beings? Surely it is precisely life itself that the sleeper possesses. The regular beat of 
blood around the body, the rise and fall of the chest, and, fundamentally, it’s being bound 
[Verbundenheit] to its environment, to its locale. Life is always in place and this, the place 
of sleep, amounts to the very possession upon which the sleeper’s poverty in world stands. 
 
 And, of course, this appears to tellingly chime with the conclusion of our 
existential analysis of the sleeper – that Dasein does not sleep. The sleeper is not-being-
there, is not Dasein. Yet this apparently definitive statement, when taken by itself, fails 
to realise the proximity between Dasein and the sleeper. Fails to recognise the abyssal 
kinship. We must remember that sleeping could be “rightly conceive of” as “being-away” 
and yet being-away for Dasein “is not something which happens arbitrarily from time to 
time, but is an essential characteristic of man’s very being”.264 Here the ambiguity of the 
relationship between waking and sleeping and being-there and being-away, the 
ontological priority, appears settled. However, even without the destabilising of this 
priority which we are about to encounter, it is essential to see that two intriguing questions 
are already pressed upon us. Firstly, how is the sleeper’s being-away related to that of 
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Dasein? To quote Krell “How do matters stand (as Heidegger likes to ask) with an abyss 
of essential separation, a chasm, which at the same time marks an abysmal affinity, a 
chiasm?”265 And, secondly, upon what, upon which possession, is the sleeper’s being-
away founded? This latter question cannot be answered, as in the case of Dasein, through 
a being-there. Unless it is Dasein itself that guarantors the very possibility of sleep. Yet 
surely another option presents itself. Once again the place, the ‘there’ of the sleeper’s 
mode of being, striped of its relationship with being and ontology is that which 
distinguishes the sleeper from waking Dasein. This ‘where’ of sleep is the sleeper. 
 
 Yet this settling of puzzles raises, as we have just seen, the question of Dasein’s 
connection with the animal and with the sleeper – the animal lacks beings but “that which 
it relates to can always be experienced as a being in our experience.”266 It is this 
relationship, this perspectival move, which, at the beginning of Section 63, returns us to 
the methodological and more, discussions of the very possibility of describing the 
animal’s essence, to, in other words, transposition. However, this debate now takes the 
form of an “objection to our [Heidegger’s] thesis”.267 The objection is neatly summarised 
thus: “It is only from the human perspective that the animal is poor with respect to world, 
yet animal being in itself is not a deprivation of world.”268 This takes the form of a limiting 
of our ability to ascribe content to animality. We can be “certain”, for Heidegger, of the 
intermediate position of the animal and that this involves a “not-having” of world.269 But 
is this not-having rightly conceived as “an essential poverty with regard to world?”270 
Heidegger provides us with two reasons we might think that “the thesis concerning the 
animal’s poverty in world goes too far.”271 The first is that surely deprivation, over not-
having, requires that one knows something of that of which one is deprived – “But this is 
precisely what we have denied in the case of the animal”.272 What is more this epistemic 
problem appears all the more pressing given that humans also, “first and for the most 
part”, do not “properly know of world as such.”273 Secondly, the negativity of poverty – 
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“a kind of pain and suffering” – would presumably be discernible in the essence of all 
living beings.274 And yet: 
 
Biology knows absolutely nothing of such a phenomenon. Perhaps it is the 
privilege of poets to imagine this sort of thing. “This has nothing to do with 
science.”275 
 
This shift from science to poetry marks the limits of his initial thesis, thesis [2.]. It is “not 
an interpretation which remains true to the proper essence of animality, but merely a 
comparative illustration.”276 The thesis is “misleading precisely with respect to the 
essence of animality itself”.277 
 
 And yet, the apparent downgrading of the guiding thesis of the animal analysis is 
not to be. Instead, we are reminded that all this, all the analyses of animal being and the 
comparative examination of which they are part, are orientated from out of the 
fundamental attunement of boredom and towards the “‘as a whole’ which profound 
boredom itself manifests”.278 As such we are told that in spite of our movement “closer 
to an elucidation of the concept of world”, we have, so far, “merely acquainted ourselves 
with the negative side of the matter.”279 This “negative side” is the animal in its 
captivation, as the not-having of world. But why negative given the great efforts 
undertaken to retain the intermediate position of animality? The thought is once again 
perspectival: from Dasein’s world-forming perspective the animal is allied with the stone 
in its not-having world. The natural result is that we must clarify this very perspective in 
relation to world. In fact, “the supposedly purely negative characterization – our 
examination of the not-having of world – will only begin to exercise its full effect once 
we prepare to bring out the essence of world with respect to the world-formation of 
man.”280 This functions as a response to the first aspect of the objection as just described 
– not ourselves having clarified world how are we to know with certainty that poverty 
does not accurately describe the animal’s relation to world? Indeed, for Heidegger, “we 
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have no right now, or at least as yet no right to alter our thesis that the animal is poor in 
world or to level it down to … a mere not-having”.281 
 
 What though of the charge of the negativity inherent in this ascription of poverty 
to the animal, the second aspect of the objection? In this penultimate paragraph of the 
animal analysis Heidegger returns us to two essential, and essentially disrupting 
[erschütternd], features of animal being. The animal “finds itself essentially exposed to 
something other than itself,” something that “brings an essential disruption [wesenhalt 
Erschütterung] into the essence of the animal.”282 How this shocking, trembling in the 
face of the open is supposed to combat the “pessimism” or negativity of poverty will be 
considered momentarily.283 Yet, for us this shattering [erschütternd] at the heart of the 
animal should put us in mind of the way in which sleep caused, in Heidegger’s brief 
treatment of it, the very principle of non-contradiction “to shatter [erschüttern] in its very 
foundations.”284 Metaphysics, its principles and our accounts of essences, our definitions, 
are shaken or disrupted here. The last word on the animal, quite properly, goes to death, 
for “we cannot clarify it [the essence of the animal] until and unless we also take into 
account the fundamental phenomenon of the life process [motility] and thus death as 
well.”285 This shaking, open, mode of being hurtling, as it is, through its environment and 
its time and always towards its death, if we may call it such, must, much like Heidegger’s 
thesis “remain as a problem”.286 As must that hint of a somnolent mode of being which 
we have been following and awakening through this Chapter. 
 
VI: Conclusions and Controversies 
   
 So much for the somnolent Holzweg within Heidegger’s animal analysis, his 
animal trail, Tier Weg. Yet, as we have seen, these paths are no easy countryside strolls. 
They pass, instead, through the dark embraces of ancient places teeming with life, not so 
much the Black Forest as the primordial forest, and a forest of night. This gloomy forest, 
like that in the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm, holds dangers both for Heidegger, and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 ibid 
282 ibid, p. 273 
283 ibid 
284 ibid, p. 61 
285 ibid, p. 273 
286 ibid 
	   152	  
indeed, for those who would retrace his steps. The question must be asked whether 
Heidegger has followed in the animal’s tracks successfully. David Farrell Krell offers us 
a useful way of approaching an answer when he, borrowing a phrase from Faulkner, 
describes FCM as Heidegger’s “most splendid failure”.287 We must, with Krell, ask why 
‘splendid’ and why a ‘failure’? “Splendid because Heidegger here tries with remarkable 
persistence and energy to compare the world-relations of stone, animal, and human being, 
without collapsing into either crass physicalism or naive vitalism and 
anthropomorphism.”288 Like Odysseus on that most awe inspiring of journeys Heidegger 
must avoid the almost human grasping of the Scylla of anthropomorphism whilst 
remaining free from the persistent pull of the Charybdis of anthropocentrism.289 These 
twin perils frame his analysis and both guarantee its brilliance whilst determining its 
limits. Furthermore they echo the risks that accompany our own project: we must neither 
level sleep down, á la physicalism and anthropocentrism’s reductive perspective, nor 
project waking characteristics into or over the sleeper, as its phenomenologically 
problematic status invites us to do. 
 
 In the ancient myth the two perils of beast and natural event, sometimes 
rationalised as shoals of rocks or a reef, and a whirlpool, are positioned such that a sailor, 
Odysseus in the Odyssey, has no choice but to choose one or the other trial to face. There 
is no middle, or intermediate, course to chart. As such Odysseus, following the advice of 
Circe, elects to face the many heads of Scylla and lose only a few men rather than risk 
the loss of his entire boat and crew to the maw of the whirlpool Charybdis. The genius of 
Heidegger’s text lies in its attempt to do what even cunning Odysseus could not – hold 
fast to an intermediate course. However, as we will now examine, through our chosen 
example of Krell’s Daimon Life, there has been a proliferation of commentators who 
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argue that instead Heidegger merely chooses one horn of the dilemma, and that his choice 
shows both less wisdom and less self-awareness than that of Odysseus’.290 
 
 For Krell there can be no doubt that Heidegger, despite his best efforts, sails 
thoroughly within the remit of anthropocentrism and is sucked ineluctably back to a 
position akin to metaphysics – “it is blatantly anthropocentric”.291 This “failure”, which 
Krell will call “a colossal” and “daimonic failure”, is tied to the “self-objection” with 
which Heidegger closes the animal analysis.292 It is a failure to relinquish the dominant 
and imperious position of the human observer and thus approach the animal justly and 
without prior, metaphysical, assumptions. From such a perspective, whether 
acknowledged or not, Heidegger cannot but take the animal’s essence as bound 
[gebundene].  
 
 Before offering responses to this charge, via the detailed and sympathetic reading 
of FCM found in the work of William McNeill, let us isolate the three main strands of 
Krell’s critique of Heidegger’s animal analysis as found in the following extract: 
 
For he [Heidegger] openly confesses that he is unable to say anything about the 
way in  which death intervenes in both animal and human life. Not only does he 
find himself resorting to a blatantly metaphysical and even ontotheological 
appeal to the “as-structure,” which here means the apophantic rather than the 
hermeneutic “as” and the discourse of Vorhandenheit more than anything else, 
but he also catches himself (or almost catches himself) reverting to the 
distinction between human dying and animal perishing, Sterben as opposed to 
Verenden, even though it has become clear to all that something very much like 
the nothing (das Nichts) shatters the ring of animal as well as human life.293 
 
The three lines of critique here can be summarised thus: 1) Heidegger sets up an 
unjustifiably sharp distinction between animal and human life; 2) this distinction is based 
on an appeal to the “as-structure” which seems to undo, as opposed to build on, the 
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groundbreaking work of Being and Time; and 3), fundamentally Heidegger seems unable 
to account for the animal’s relationship to death, and thus to “something very much like 
the nothing (das Nichts)”. 
 
 The first of these points of criticism, 1), can be seen as containing the other two, 
2) and 3), in setting-up a hierarchy which amounts to a fervent anthropocentrism. The 
implausibility of this holding us aloof from the animal and denying of the animal such 
Dasein-specific qualities as comportment, for example, is demonstrated, Krell argues, by, 
amongst other things, a couple of slips in Heidegger’s own application of this 
terminological demarcating. “For a brief moment Heidegger allows himself to slip back 
into the living language of (human) comportment: the bee “comports itself” toward the 
sun (verhält sich zur Sonne). Later he will be guilty of the same lapsus calami, when the 
female praying mantis devours her mate.”294 However, as we have already cited twice, it 
is Krell’s belief that Heidegger is guilty of, what Rilke calls, ‘drawing distinctions too 
sharply.’295 What is the problem with sharp distinctions we might, quite reasonably, ask? 
One is tempted to reply that Krell’s problem with such things is just as tied to his 
philosophical pedigree as he argues is Heidegger’s sharp distinguishing of the man from 
the animal – deconstruction often seeks to problematize dualisms. This tempting but 
unfair charge would be to miss Krell’s specific focus on the topic of life. Krell’s point is 
rather that when specifically dealing with the squirming and slippery question of life sharp 
distinctions slice through all too blindly. 
 
 In this specific case we must ask what it is that could justify this sharp separation, 
this cleaving of us from our abyssal kin? It is, as we have seen, in 2) above, the “as-
structure” but essentially Krell argues that not “the foundational hermeneutical-as but the 
derivative aphophantic-as comes to dominate – and undo – fundamental ontology; 
furthermore, as Heidegger himself here suspects, his earlier labors to establish a 
“fundamental attunement” for metaphysics will have been in vain.”296 This aphophantic-
as is derivative for it relies on the hermeneutical-as of Dasein as developed in Being and 
Time, an “as-” that is prior to and importantly distinct from the aphophantic-as of 
everyday and technical language. For Krell this amounts to a slip back into the old 
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metaphysical prejudices of many a humanist philosopher: “human beings are once again 
those logical, logistical living beings who have the word and who take the floor to declare 
that animals inhabit an impoverished world”.297 It is the focus on ‘declaration’, on our 
naming this as that, which seems to Krell a step backwards to the familiar picture of 
ontotheology – as familiar as Genesis 2:20 and man’s naming of the beasts and plants of 
the earth. In contrast “animal life is an essence that is enigmatically and hermetically 
sealed within its own undifferentiated self-revealing and self-concealing.”298 
 
 Finally, 3), Krell is particularly incensed by the incompleteness which, by 
Heidegger’s own admission, plagues his analysis. As we saw in Section 61, sub-section 
c) the account of the animal as captivated is missing an essential aspect – an account of 
the animal’s motility, what Krell calls the “animatedness (Bewegtheit) of life.”299 This in 
its turn requires us to face “the difficult problem of death” and inquire as to the death of 
the animal, into the finitude of animality.300 In the case of Dasein, famously, death, our 
being-toward-death, can individuate us and wrench us back to ourselves, back to our 
ownmost being. Just before this lecture course Heidegger had presented this feature of 
the being of Dasein as a relation to the nothing (das Nichts).301 Yet, as our long extract 
from Krell above makes clear, Heidegger will deny the animal exactly this relationship 
to the nothing: “Nein! he cries, but why the need to shout?”302 Just as we repeatedly 
encountered the limits of our intermediate analysis of the sleeper through the necessity of 
considering its relationship with death, so Heidegger encounters a similar limit, as far as 
Krell is concerned, in the “touchstone” of death.303 However, Krell is not disappointed 
that Heidegger struggles with such a difficult question but rather with his recourse to the 
old “distinction between human dying and animal perishing, Sterben as opposed to 
Verenden”,304 as if, or so Krell sees it, the entire animal analysis was for naught and 
Heidegger efforts can but “reduplicate beliefs and prejudices that have prevailed 
throughout the history of metaphysics?”305 The concern is that, in spite of his protestations 
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to the contrary, Heidegger has returned to the old hierarchy of beings: with the bee lower 
than the baboon and the entire plant and animal kingdom ruled over by man. Or to put it 
another way: that “deprivation”, “captivation”, “elimination”, and, perhaps most of all, 
“bound” are not as stripped of their normative connotations as Heidegger would like. 
 
 One cannot help but notice that these complaints that Krell raises against 
Heidegger map almost perfectly onto the very findings of our own somnolent 
excavations. Sleep is sharply separated from Dasein – it is exiled from existence and 
reduced to life. When we push at why this line of demarcation arises we found that the 
sleeper lacks projection and stance, it lacks the as-structure or beings as beings. And 
lastly, the sleeper’s relationship with death, our ownmost and their daily dissolution, 
remains shrouded in uncertainty and seems to push the comparative examination to its 
breaking point. What if such findings, as seems clear in the final case, were in fact the 
very signs of the failure of our method? The failure of Heidegger, and us with him, to 
successfully navigate the reefs of anthropomorphism and the maelstrom of 
anthropocentrism? 
 
 William McNeill, in the first chapter of The Time of Life, sees such criticisms as 
failing to grasp the radicality of Heidegger treatment of the animal. If Krell takes seriously 
and develops the “self-objection” with which Heidegger ends his animal analysis,306 then 
McNeill elaborates on, and defends, Heidegger’s response to that objection. The core of 
this response, as we saw above, is that we must not be overly hasty in dismissing the 
thesis of the animal’s poverty in world as deprivation until we have gained a handle on 
at least one more of the theses of the comparative examination: “man is world-forming.” 
With this in mind McNeill not only interprets the animal analysis differently to Krell, and 
others, but also reminds us not to take these chapters out of their context of the 
comparative examination, and of Heidegger’s thinking more generally. “Only if one 
isolates the analyses of animal Being from their proper context, as tends to happen in 
contemporary debate, does the thesis that the animal is “poor in world” appear to merely 
reinscribe a fundamentally traditional, metaphysical “theory” distinguishing the animal 
from the human.”307 
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 In contradistinction with Krell, who finds Heidegger’s protestations against 
vitalism and entelechy to be a mere cover for his reintroduction of metaphysical 
distinctions, McNeill sees in Heidegger’s text a fundamental opposition to 
anthropomorphism, and thus to the tradition’s anthropocentrism as well. His defences of 
the animal analysis can be broadly divided into three kinds: i) countering the broad charge 
that Heidegger slips back into metaphysics in this lecture course; ii) demonstrating how 
it is possible to take seriously Heidegger’s claim to be doing justice to the animal’s being 
from out of its being, or in other words, how the terms with which Heidegger describes 
the animal need only appear negative or derogatory; and lastly, iii) unpacking, as 
instructed, the third and final thesis of the comparative examination – man’s world-
formation. As with Krell the latter two of these arguments can be seen as elements internal 
to the main thrust of former. 
 
 As we saw in our examination of Section 61, sub-section b) above Heidegger’s 
description of the animal is not supposed to provide a new account of the essence of 
animality but rather to question the very applicability of assignment of essences in this 
case.308 The following extract illustrates McNeill’s core argument and its relationship 
with its component parts – ii) and iii): 
 
Given that the “organism” is a fundamentally open way of Being, it is evidently 
problematic even to claim that one could conclusively define, that is, delimit in a 
definitional logos that would circumscribe its Being, what “the animal” in its 
essence “is.” Even Heidegger’s characterization of the way of Being of the 
animal as Benommenheit [1] neither claims to be a conclusive theory of 
animality that would be valid for all time, [2] nor does it present a blanket theory 
of animal Being that could simply be “applied” indifferently to all animals. [3] 
Nor, finally, does it present a definition that would simply allow us to oppose 
animals on the one side to human beings on the other.309 
 
The final three claims, [1] – [3], amount to straight-forward rejections of commonly put 
criticisms of Heidegger’s account of the animal. For example, [1] and [3] can both be 
found throughout Krell’s work, whereas [2] is one of Derrida’s most direct critiques of 
Heidegger found in Of Spirit.310 It is of primary significance, however, to identify what 
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motivates this rejection of “what” questions, questions of “essence”, in the case of the 
animal? 
 
 Here a return to the mythical duality of Scylla and Charybdis is instructive. 
Whereas we have been treating anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, and indeed 
vitalism and physicalism, as two horns of a dilemma facing whosoever would undertake 
a philosophical account of the animal, we have perhaps lost sight of what underpins this 
predicament itself. What McNeill takes Heidegger’s account to be doing, rather than 
plotting a course between these two perils or falling prey to one or the other, is overturning 
the presuppositions of the dilemma. As such our very distinction between 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism begins to lose its traction. It matters not whether 
we determine the animal’s essence as less than ours on some universal scale or whether 
we establish the animal’s essence as equivalent to ours via reference to our own. In both 
cases we have resorted to a metaphysical schema which Heidegger is explicitly 
withdrawing from: “...Heidegger’s analyses problematize from the outset any attempt to 
understand the Being of the organism or of the animal on the basis of a presupposed 
eidos.”311 This presupposition is already to take for granted “the medieval interpretation 
of the Being of beings as substance, an interpretation prepared in part by Greek 
philosophy”.312 
 
 It is the schema of hidden eidos, accessible via logos, which Heidegger disrupts 
in his comparative examination, according to McNeill. To see the details of this anti-
metaphysical turn we must consider ii) and iii), respectively, Heidegger’s non-derogatory 
ascription of world poverty, and his calling into question of the essence of man. In both 
cases world or world-relation must remain at the centre – “The entire analysis of animal 
Being, we must recall (and Heidegger is emphatic about this), is subservient to this 
leading task [inquiring after the meaning of world].313  
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Studies, Volume 8, 1992, pp. 63 – 81, and Michael Lewis in his ‘The relation between transcendental 
philosophy and empirical science in Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics’, footnote 15, p. 
5, forthcoming. 
313 McNeill, William. The Time of Life, Heidegger and Ēthos, p. 50 
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 Beginning with iii): man’s relation to world is one of world-formation. 
 
Is it the human being that in each case forms the world, as Heidegger’s third 
thesis, “man is world-forming,” might seem to claim? If so, are we not after all 
trapped in a kind of anthropocentric perspectivism in which human beings, 
whether as individuals or collective subjects, somehow form and thus “have” 
their human world, from which they could know nothing of the “world” or 
“worlds” of animals?314 
 
However, a reading of the final chapters of FCM illustrates, for McNeill, that Heidegger 
is not setting-up man as the author of world, in some traditionally metaphysical and 
idealist sense, but rather describing man as the site of “an event that occurs and continues 
to occur”, that “occurs in and through human beings, who partake in the happening of this 
event, although they do not originate it as “subjects.””315 This is already enough to 
destabilise man’s imperious position as the entity that crafts, at will, worlds. It is not 
man’s decision to form worlds and as such we are being-in-the-world whether we like it 
or not. And this being-in involves, constitutively, attunement or disposition. It is this 
attunement which, as we have seen, is always already with us which conditions the very 
possibility of all our endeavours, including, essentially, any attempt to understand animal 
being, or indeed, that of the sleeper. 
 
The primacy of attunement in the disclosure of our Being entails that living 
nature, in holding us captive, is never entirely reducible to an object of 
theoretical contemplation. Rather, it is that to which we are always already 
bound in advance, that which binds us prior to all our activities and actions.”316 
 
We do not stand, imperious, over and above the animals naming left, right, and centre but 
rather are always already, through our “bodily attunement (prior to any self-disclosure or 
presence as such)”, involved in life and in “the happening of language.”317 The 
aphophantic as-structure is itself rooted in this event of world-formation. However, this 
also has the effect of precluding an absolute detachment from life, from the animal. 
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 And yet, it is the ‘binding’ of this extract which brings us to McNeill’s insistence 
that the animal’s being is not being denigrated in Heidegger’s account but rather is 
receiving the justice it deserves – is being allowed the freedom it requires. We are put in 
mind of the Ver- of the animal’s Verbundenheit to its environment, just as we were put in 
mind of the Gebundene when reading Krell. McNeill, reminding us to look even a little 
beyond the narrow scope of the animal analysis, points to the “intrinsic elevation 
[Erhabenheit] of nature over itself, a sublimity that is lived in life itself.”318 This must not 
be mistaken for a granting of extra status to the animal on some grand scale of being, the 
Hegelian spectrum Krell sees Heidegger as dangerously close to, but rather an 
acknowledging that for Dasein, an entity that is just as much living as it is questioning 
the meaning of being, nature will never be reducible to presence-at-hand. This is to 
acknowledge both that we are always already attuned as living and as transposed “into 
the encircling contextual ring of living beings”, and that the animal is thus, from our 
perspective as so attuned and transposed – but what other perspective could there be?, 
essentially open in its being.319 “As a consequence of this very openness of the activity 
of living, the animal is always more than it already is: it exceeds every “already” in an 
incalculable manner that can never be theoretically discerned.”320 
 
 This appears a final blow to the biologist whom Heidegger had praised so highly, 
it appears to leave behind all possibility for ascertaining an essence of animality. But there 
can be no doubt that for all its dispelling of anthropomorphism, indeed, hidden 
metaphysical anthropomorphisms, it retains the special status of human being – though 
truly it is of the Da-sein of human being. We will return to this, the reasons for and the 
questions about it, momentarily through our consideration of Rafael Winkler and Raoui 
Padui’s two alternative takes on the exceptional status of this lecture course and of the 
limits of Heidegger’s animal analysis. First, however, we must consider where our sleeper 
is left after all of this to-ing and fro-ing between Scylla and Charybdis, between 
metaphysics and science, and between Heidegger, his detractors and his defenders. 
 
 Let us pick out a couple of promising consequences from McNeill’s 
reconstruction of Heidegger’s text which both reinforce and develop aspects of the animal 
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analysis which we have already seen as fertile ground for any potential Heideggerian 
phenomenology of sleep. First we must remember that Heidegger asks after the ‘what’ of 
sleep and that it is this move which led us to consider the relationship between sleep and 
Dasein in the first place.321 However, now, if our somnological-zoological analogy holds, 
we must see that ‘what’ questions are as inappropriate in regards to the sleeper as they 
are to any entity that shares in life with us. The ‘who’ of sleep is clearly just as out of the 
question given Heidegger resistance to anthropomorphism and his respect for the alterity 
of this other life encountered within the world but always refusing the world. Yet this 
only adds to our puzzlement about what and how we may speak of the sleeper? One is 
tempted to follow Heidegger’s suggested, but never actualised, ‘crossing out’ of the terms 
with which we discuss the sleeper – a language put to sleep.322 Secondly, this openness 
of the sleeper and the inaccessibility of it is not some accidental feature of our theoretical 
method in approaching them. Instead our basic attunement, which is with us always, 
always involves a pointing back to that living within us. Sleep lives within even at our 
most wakeful moment and it is neither present to us, nor could be, yet we go wrong if we 
think that makes it nothing to us at all. 
 
 When it comes to animals and sleepers Heidegger’s analysis appears more and 
more a discourse of limits and of the limiting of our access. This is felt particularly 
strongly in Rafael Winkler’s ‘Heidegger and the Question of Man’s Poverty in World’, 
which will be the first of two brief examples of readings of FCM that seek to move 
beyond, as opposed to criticise or reconstruct and defend, Heidegger’s thought. Both 
Winkler and Padui, our second example, offer us insight into the unique status of this 
specific moment on Heidegger’s philosophical Weg and the consequences for any future 
phenomenology of sleep. 
 
 As Winkler’s title suggests his article focuses on the limitations, or poverty, 
allotted to human being, or Dasein, in the comparative examination’s investigations of 
world. This already intuitively fits with his stated aim “to undo once [sic] for all the oft-
repeated charge of Heidegger’s anthropocentric interpretation of the animal”.323 Yet, this 
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102, above. 
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initial goal is tempered by Winkler’s later assertion “Derrida’s remark in Of Spirit, that it 
is always a matter for Heidegger of ‘marking an absolute limit between the living creature 
and the human Dasein’, is indisputable, except for this very precise, very peculiar spot in 
Heidegger’s text.”324 In this sense Winkler withdraws from the blanket defences, offered 
by McNeill, in focusing on a specific singularity within this very unique text in 
Heidegger’s œuvre. This “peculiar spot in Heidegger’s text” is, as we suggested early in 
Chapter 2 above, Sections 49 and 50 and the discussion of transposition therein. Winkler 
finds in these sections a moment when “what Heidegger is saying... doesn’t entirely agree 
with what he’s doing or showing us.”325 This all turns on the question of the animal’s 
refusal of transposition “which appears in man’s relation to the animal”.326 Whereas many 
have read this, with good reason, as pointing towards the poverty of the animal – McNeill 
for example327 – Winkler insists that instead Heidegger has here glimpsed “the question 
of man’s access to life.”328 
 
 “Surely man’s poverty in world, life’s refusal to give itself to man, is more 
mysterious, more enigmatic, more elusive than the animal’s so-called privatio of the 
logos.”329 Winkler is here building on the thought that life, or rather our relation to it and 
its subsequent and necessary refusal of us, marks and illustrates our own poverty in world 
rather than that of the animal. He wonders “whether, instead of being quasi-indiscernible, 
man’s relation-to-life doesn’t bespeak an opaqueness of greater intensity than man’s 
relation-to-death.”330 Here life, it’s radical refusal to us – which we have affirmed 
repeatedly through this analysis but most explicitly in McNeill’s consideration of the 
openness of animality just considered – announces our finitude more sharply even than 
the impending impossibility of possibilities, than, that is, death. This shows the 
Keinesweg promised above – the refusal of a no way.331 
 
 Yet, “[t]he fact is that Heidegger will say nothing of the sort.”332 Heidegger, as 
McNeill correctly noted, will see this as internal to the animal itself – “will displace 
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(versetzen) this poverty entirely onto the animal and disfigure it into a privatio.”333 For 
Winkler, and for us, this “hypothesis”, and he acknowledges that it is “no more than a 
hypothesis”, offers us a momentary opening to questions and problems which lay dormant 
within Heidegger’s animal analysis.334 Without needing to undo any of our hard won 
accounts of the animal and thus, perhaps, of the sleeper we have here learned something 
further about wakeful Dasein itself. We have begun to approach the intersection between 
life and existence. This connection is, of necessity, tied to the relationship between the 
sciences and fundamental ontology and both Winkler and Padui will see in this text a rare 
moment in Heidegger’s thinking of this relationship. 
 
 In ‘From the Facticity of Dasein to the Facticity of Nature: Naturalism, Animality, 
and Metontology’, as its title suggests, Padui situates FCM, philosophically, in 
Heidegger’s metonological period and thus sees it as one of the lecture courses in which 
the positions and, crucially, the distinctions formulated in Being and Time undergo 
modification or are, even, overturned.335 The “question of animality”, or the question of 
Dasein’s relationship to non-Dasein life – and thus to nature, problematizes the central 
Heideggerian distinctions of facticity versus factuality and, fundamentally, the 
ontological distinction of the ontological and the ontic.336 For Padui, the disrupting of 
these distinctions offers the glimpse of a Weg not taken in Heidegger’s fraught 
relationship with the natural sciences and with naturalism more generally. Whilst 
Heidegger will “shrink back from the abyss of... naturalism” Padui maintains that the 
animal analysis, and the metontological turn signalled in The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic, present problems for this later retreat.337 Problems which Heidegger does not 
adequately deal with. In this sense Padui finds in these texts resources for a twisting free 
from Heidegger’s dominant position on naturalism, and animality.  
 
 This internal critique offers resources for considering the position of the sleeper 
in relation to animal and Dasein which, like McNeill and Winkler’s accounts, 
problematize the simple story of a nightly exile from Dasein status. However, Padui 
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remains far closer to Derrida and Krell’s line of critical commentary in bringing out the 
inherent instability of the intermediate position of the animal in Heidegger’s analysis. 
Fundamentally, for Padui, “the distinction between the facticity of Dasein and the 
factuality of nature is blurred by the addition of a previously excluded middle.”338 Just as 
we found Krell raising the problem of the animal’s finitude above here too, in Padui’s 
article, the question is whether the animal – and the sleeper – can truly be cleaved from 
Dasein, denied death, and constitutively poor in world. However, Padui does not halt at 
such questions or stand back and wait for Heidegger’s sharp distinctions to fall apart. 
Instead we are taken a step further into the question of what remains after the collapse of 
the ontological difference. Most significantly “the question of animality brings with it the 
threat of something like gradualism – the idea that one can be more or less Dasein-ish, 
that one can be “in” a world to different degrees.”339 And from here it is but one further 
step to the claim that “Not only are “animals” poor in world, but many human animals 
can be poor in world, such as children or the mentally disabled, or perhaps even the 
severely drunk or sleeping.”340  
 
 Padui’s analysis presents us with an alternative way of reading our somnological-
zoological analogy. As an internal critique of Heidegger’s Dasein-analytic. The thought 
– a thought much like that presented in the Haar quotation cited in our ‘Introduction’ to 
this Part – is that we, and Heidegger, should not sit easy with what is inadvertently 
excluded from existence. For Padui, this amounts to an invitation to reconsider the 
question of naturalism in Heideggerian thought. The opening of a way through 
Heidegger’s overly “broad” understanding of naturalism and thus offering a potential 
rapprochement between Heideggerian philosophy and modern scientific research.341 We 
need not follow Padui to acknowledge what all our chosen commentators would surely 
also agree with: “problems and aporiai proliferate in this text [FCM]”.342  
 
 We have tarried with this aporetic lecture course, not in the hope of answering – 
to return to Winkler’s analysis – the question of whether the refusal of the sleeper 
demonstrates a fundamental poverty in world at the heart of the sleeper or waking Dasein. 
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Rather we must precisely refuse this alternative. The most significant result of our 
somnological-zoological analogy so far has been to detach the sleeper from the everyday 
conception of it as a fleeting state within consciousness and to see instead a fundamentally 
open mode of being which “exceeds every “already” in an incalculable manner that can 
never be theoretically discerned.”343 As such the sleeper, which is never Dasein, is 
nonetheless never entirely separable from Dasein. Of course, “[t]he fact is that Heidegger 
will say nothing of the sort”, but perhaps here we see the somnolent undertow at its most 
powerful.344 What appeared to be a separating of Dasein from the sleeper, “by an abyss 
[Abgrund]”, now appears to have only instantiated the sleeper in its radical connection 
with its somnolent place, in its essential openness.345 Perhaps, here, we find a new reading 
of man’s essential “being away” a being away which is not “being torn away in that 
wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing”.346 Could it be that Heidegger 
himself could not hear “midnight’s voice”? Might it be that the everyday blinded even 
him to that which sleeps, but never dies, whilst Dasein hammers, writes and even 
questions? Let us, with Heidegger, end with Zarathrustra’s “intoxication song” and the 
wonder of the depth of world which includes, refuses, and awakens that which sleeps: 
 
 O Man! Attend! 
 What does midnight’s voice contend? 
 “I slept my sleep, 
 “And now awake at dreaming’s end: 
 “The world is deep, 
 “Deeper than day can comprehend. 
 “Deep is its woe, 
 “Joy – deeper than heart’s agony: 
 “Woe says: Fade! Go! 
 “But all joy wants eternity, 
 “Wants deep, profound eternity!”347
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Part III – Falling from Phenomenology to Sleep and 
Back Again 
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Chapter 5 
Levinas, Nancy, and the Dream of a Somnolent 
Phenomenology 
 
I: Introduction 
 
Let us recap on our somnolent journey so far. We have been tracing the possible 
paths open to phenomenology, to phenomenological philosophers and philosophies, in 
responding to Nancy’s challenge. The challenge, as we saw in Part I, raises worries not 
only about philosophy’s ability to account for, to de-limit, sleep but in particular for the 
phenomenologist “approaching the bed”.1 De Warren scoured the margins of Husserlian 
phenomenology and produced a direct response to Nancy. However, in our sketching of 
this preliminary phenomenology of sleep we saw that such a response would certainly not 
satisfy Nancy and that it required that we grant the priority of an ever-wakeful absolute 
consciousness which in turn regulates and distributes sleep and waking. Out of the limits 
of such an account came our search for a surprisingly missing existential analytic of the 
sleeper in Heidegger’s Being and Time, in Part II. This in turn led us to consider, through 
the comparative analytic of FCM, a hypothetical account of the sleeper – to undertake a 
clearing and setting off from a Holzwege that Heidegger indicated but never, himself, 
followed. It is at the end of that path, an end which is necessarily arbitrary and itself 
limited, that we now find ourselves. 
 
In this Part, and this concluding Chapter, we move, via a more direct 
phenomenological encounter with sleep, to our closing consideration of Nancy’s text The 
Fall of Sleep and its relationship with those phenomenologies of sleep we have examined. 
In contrast with the ambivalent absence of sleep in Heidegger’s middle period work, the 
presence of sleep in the progressions of Levinas’s early texts Existence and Existents2 and 
Time and the Other3, is striking. Indeed it is no coincidence that Levinas chose these texts, 
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texts which decisively mark his own “profound need to leave the climate of” 
Heideggerian philosophy, in which to discuss the philosophical significance of sleep.4 
Instead it will be argued that Levinas’s account of sleep must be read as structured by his 
efforts to provide a truly post-Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy. By exploring 
the narrative placement of the account of sleep within Existence and Existents it is 
possible to highlight both the positive position of sleep in Levinas’s philosophy, and, 
essentially, its limits. Limits which will come to the fore in our reading of Nancy’s 
approach to sleep. 
 
What, broadly, might we hope for from a Levinasian account of the sleeper in 
contrast with the Heideggerian one we have been outlining in the previous Part? Firstly, 
we must be clear as to what we should not hope for. We must not expect to find, in 
Levinas’s philosophy, a thinking which does justice to the animal, or to the alterity of 
non-human life and as such a means of describing, and opening the possibilities of the 
sleeper. This is for two clear reasons. Firstly, Levinas’s radical rethinking of ethics – as 
an ethics of the Other – stops short at the animal other. As Derrida puts it: 
 
It therefore appears all the more urgent to raise the question of the fact that the 
Jewish thinker who, no doubt with justification, passes in this century for the 
most concerned with ethics and sanctity, Emmanuel Levinas, did not make the 
animal anything like a focus of interrogation within his work. This silence seems 
to me here, at least from the point of view that counts for us, more significant 
than all the differences that might separate Levinas from Descartes and from 
Kant on the question of the subject, of ethics, and of the person.5 
 
Secondly, where we found a point of contact between Heidegger’s account of life and a 
possible Heideggerian approach to the sleeper, with Levinas it is precisely the distance 
from life, from the everyday, and from the world of these lives which grants sleep its 
place, or position, in his work. The Levinasian account, which Levinas himself only 
indicated and never completely articulated, of sleep suggests that sleep resists, in so far 
as it is sleep, light and the reduction to the Same. Levinas, put very simply, offers us an 
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account of sleep where the alterity of sleep is not reducible to the totality of life – where 
life really means the dominance of the presence of consciousness as self-consciousness 
in waking life 
  
It is here that we see what we might hope to gain from a specifically Levinasian 
encounter with sleep: in demanding that we do justice to the separation of the Other, or 
to its exteriority we are offered a similar position in relation to sleep – namely, that justice 
be done sleep as separate. This structure of allowing the separation of the Other is made 
manifest in Levinas’s descriptions of the face of the Other: “[t]he face has turned to me—
and this is its very nudity. It is by itself and not by reference to a system.”6 Separate sleep, 
and herein lies the essential phenomenological value to a Levinasian account of sleep, 
will be described not in terms of its place within consciousness but precisely in regard to 
its exceeding of it, to, in other words, its radical exteriority. However, here too are found 
the limits of such an account – actual and potential limits, limits in what Levinas, in fact, 
did write on sleep and limits on any possible Levinasian phenomenology of sleep. 
 
Yet, and here we find our means of approaching the presence of sleep in Levinas’s 
early post-war writings, it is necessary to further nuance our understanding of Levinas’s 
response to Heidegger’s philosophy. As we have seen, in Part II, Heidegger’s account of 
sleep describes the manner in which sleep enacts a loss of possibilities. Of course, the 
point for Heidegger is not that this loss is merely the loss of some possibilities, such as 
the possibilities involved in undertaking philosophical inquiry, alongside the gaining of 
others, such as the possibility of dreaming, but rather the more radical loss of the very 
possibility of questioning towards the meaning of being. Thus sleep enacts not a loss of 
a possibility of Dasein but rather of Dasein-status itself. The paradoxical nature of 
Levinas’s alternative is precisely that Levinas does not so much disagree with this 
description of sleep and its place in relation to our connection to being but rather changes 
the normative status of this suspending of our relationship with being, this, temporary, 
exit.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity, translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969. p. 75 
7 In taking this as my guiding thread I am following Jacques Rolland in his ‘Introduction’ to On Escape 
(Levinas, Emmanuel. On Escape, translated by Bettina Bergo, edited by Jacques Rolland. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), and Robert Bernasconi’s article 'No Exit: Levinas' Aporetic Account of 
Transcendence'. Research in Phenomenology 35.1 (2005): 101-117. 
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II: From Sleep to the Existent – Levinas, Sleep, and the Promise 
of Escape 
 
Before moving onto Levinas’s detailed and fascinating treatment of sleep it is 
necessary to consider the context of this treatment within Levinas’s withdrawal from 
Heidegger’s philosophy which begins, unsurprisingly, in 1933 and, arguably, continues 
for the rest of his philosophical carrier. In his 1935 article ‘On Escape’8 we see what 
seems, at first, a classic phenomenological analysis, where a phenomenon is selected, 
clarified and analysed. In this case Levinas’s chosen phenomenon is the need, or desire, 
to escape.9 A desire which Levinas claims to be borrowing from “the language of 
contemporary literary criticism”.10 However, very quickly, in fact before we are even 
introduced to the term ‘escape’ as the topic of Levinas’s phenomenological exploration, 
we see that there is much more at stake for this text than merely analysing one 
phenomenon amongst the plethora of phenomena. 
 
This is in part due to the way in which Levinas undertakes phenomenology. As 
Richard A. Cohen puts it: “[t]o understand the meaning of a term, any term, Levinas seeks 
out its most extreme sense.”11 This practice leads Levinas to see the desire for escape as 
always derivative of the fundamental structure of our relationship with being. In ‘On 
Escape’ Levinas sets himself two targets. Firstly, he aims to trace back all specific, we 
might say ontic, instances of the desire to escape to our universal, ontological, desire to 
escape being. Secondly, the demonstration that such a desire is founded and points 
towards a real prospect open to us and not merely a chimerical fantasy. It would be fair 
to say that ‘On Escape’ focuses on the former to the detriment of the latter. 
 
However, already, in showing the desire to escape as, fundamentally, a response 
to an enchainment to being and a discomfort in our being, Levinas has begun his move 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Levinas, Emmanuel. On Escape 
9 Levinas’s early work does not distinguish between need and desire in the famous, and important, manner 
that he will do so in Totality and Infinity. As such, this distinction need not concern us here except to say 
that this specific phenomenon will be developed into the later notion of desire as opposed to need. 
10 ibid, p. 52 
11 Cohen, Richard A. 'Levinas: Thinking Least About Death—Contra Heidegger'. International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 60.1-3 (2006): 21 – 39. p. 33 
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away from Heidegger and towards his own unique critique of the philosophical tradition. 
‘On Escape’ presents us with, amongst other things, an attempt to think need, against the 
tradition, as not merely a privation, within being, of that needed, and, more significantly, 
a structure for assessing routes, or paths, out of being.12 In particular, Levinas considers 
the phenomenon of pleasure as a form of the promise of escape which in fact breaks that 
very promise and leaves us back where we started – enchained in being. In this way he 
establishes what we might see as three stages of our relationship with being; enchainment 
to being – accompanied by “nausea” and a “desperate” need to escape,13 promises of 
escape, and escape itself. Of course, already we should be on our guard against seeing 
these three modes of relating to being as stages of a progression, or dialectic. To do so 
would be to describe escape as a state which is to be achieved and such a state would 
already, in such a description, be susceptible to domestication, or the bringing of escape 
into being, and would, as such, announce the very failure of escape. Nonetheless, this 
structure, along with our anti-Hegelian caveat, does allow us to position sleep in relation 
to the crucial distinction between the promise of escape and escape itself. This will be of 
particular importance in explaining Levinas’s move away from sleep in favour of the 
relationship with the Other in the latter parts of Existence and Existents, in Time and the 
Other, and in his later texts. 
 
 It is as a continuation of this search for an escape from being that we must see 
Levinas’s 1947 work De l’existence a l’existant.14 In this sense, as the French title makes 
clear, this key text – the text which first introduced Derrida to Levinas’s work – must be 
seen as employing a narrative structure which reverses Heidegger’s in Being and Time. 
We should be alive not only to this broader context in which Levinas’s early work resides 
but also the specific movement of this text from existence (being) to the existent (entity). 
Levinas is searching for the meaning of singularities as distinguished from the meaning 
of parts within the whole.15 This allows us to, rather playfully, reformulate Heidegger’s 
guiding question into a Levinasian equivalent. Rather than asking ‘why is there something 
rather than nothing?’ Levinas instead asks, in Existence and Existents, ‘how is there a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Levinas, Emmanuel. On Escape, p. 73 
13 ibid, p. 66 
14 As we are about to see the narrative structure of the French title is lost in the standard English translation 
Existence and Existents. 
15 Already, here, we can see the beginnings of a connection between Levinas’s work and Nancy’s. We 
consider this proximity below. 
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thing rather than just something?’ Which we might rewrite, in Heideggerian terms, as 
‘why is there the Ontological Difference between being and beings?’ 
 
 In both Existence and Existents and Time and the Other, sleep makes its 
appearance near the middle and at a pivotal point of the arguments, following Levinas’s 
descriptions of the il y a, or there is.16 More accurately, it directly follows Levinas’s 
accounts of existential insomnia. In the earlier of these texts Levinas entitles the chapter 
in which the there is is described, ‘Existence Without a World’. The there is, the space of 
the night – “space itself disengaged from its function as receptable [sic] for objects”, 
announces the presence of existence, or being, without existents, beings, entities and, 
essentially, without their world.17 Already we should be alive to the contrast this brings 
out with Being and Time. For Heidegger, famously, Dasein is always already being-in-
the-world. Levinas’s use of sleep, the place of sleep in this text, directly follows his 
disruption of this structure of Heidegger’s. 
 
 These concepts of space, world, and place will be returned to very shortly, and are 
the key to our understanding Levinas’s engagement with sleep more generally. But, first, 
it is important to see that the there is, in all its forms and manifestations, amounts to the 
disappearance of the subject. This disappearance, famously, does not amount to an 
ecstatic exit from being and presence but rather the removal of what scant protection the 
existent had from the overwhelming rumbling of the there is. “In horror a subject is 
stripped of his subjectivity, of his power to have private existence. The subject is 
depersonalized.”18 This horror is not mine or yours but rather explodes the bounds of 
subjectivity and, as such, constitutes what Levinas calls, tellingly, a tragic “fatality”. This 
fatality enacts the inevitability of being’s return, which he had, in ‘On Escape’ highlighted 
through nausea: “The binding, or irremissible, quality of nausea constitutes its very 
ground. Despair over this ineluctable presence constitutes the presence itself.”19 That the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The complex relationship between sleep and the there is can already be glimpsed in the Levinas’s 
description of ‘the night’ as amounting to a trace of the there is which can indeed “occur right in the 
daytime.” p. 54 of Levinas’s Existence to the Existents. 
17 ibid, p. 55 
18 ibid, p. 56 
19 Levinas, Emmanuel. On Escape, p. 68. One might, productively, attempt to compare and contrast this 
“binding” to being and the tragic tone of Levinas’s description of it with Heidegger’s normative sounding 
description of the animal as being bound [Gebundenheit]. 
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fatality of the there is is tragic and calls for tragic depiction will be significant to the 
constitutive power of sleep.  
 
This return of presence in negation, this impossibility of escaping from an 
anonymous and uncorruptible existence constitutes the final depths of 
Shakespearean tragedy. The fatality of the tragedy of antiquity becomes the 
fatality of irremissible being.20 
 
Through tragedy Levinas refuses the possibility of death, anxiety in the face of death, and 
the ecstatic more generally, as offering an escape from the there is. Instead he ends his 
chapter with a nod in the direction of Husserl: “we must ask whether consciousness, with 
its aptitude for sleep, for suspension, for epoché, is not the locus of this nothingness-
interval.”21 
 
 The next chapter of Existence and Existents, ‘The Hypostasis’, begins with 
Levinas’s, now famous, account of insomnia. Yet it is worth emphasising that insomnia 
is framed, structurally and conceptually, by sleep. And in addition, as Time and the Other 
succinctly puts it, consciousness is precisely defined in opposition to vigilance: 
“Consciousness is the power to sleep.”22 This initially counter-intuitive claim becomes 
clearer when we see that consciousness “is [for Levinas] a hesitation in being.”23 This 
hesitation, which we will return to below, distinguishes consciousness from vigilance. 
Vigilance, as insomnia – rather than ‘in insomnia’ as insomnia announces the there is and 
thus the destruction of all inside-outside carving-up, can involve no hesitation or break. 
Sleep thus, for Levinas, interrupts the vigilance of the there is.24 This definition of 
consciousness as “a hesitation in being” recalls the opening sections of Existence and 
Existents which deal with the existential reticence of the ‘The Relationship with 
Existence’.25 These early movements of the text are diametrically opposed to the 
relationship that Dasein holds with being for Heidegger. Yet the duality of the Levinasian 
relationship to being, as hesitation, only finds its origin and very possibility through sleep. 
Of course, this should not surprise us given that the very relationship with existence has 
already been described with words such as weariness, fatigue and indolence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Levinas, Emmanuel. Existence and Existent, p. 57 
21 ibid, p. 60 
22 Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the Other, p. 51 
23 Levinas, Emmanuel. Existence and Existents, p. 64 
24 ibid 
25 ibid, pp. 7 – 25 
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 This structure, of a relationship of keeping at bay, is founded upon Levinas’s 
description of the relationship between consciousness and sleep. 
 
It is paradoxical to define consciousness by unconsciousness. They do not merge 
into one. Yet the event of consciousness does not refer to the unconscious just as 
its contrary. Consciousness, in its opposition to the unconscious, is not 
constituted by the opposition, but by this proximity, this communication with its 
contrary...26 
 
Without this “communication”, without this “proximity” – a word which is tellingly 
prescient of both Levinas’s later philosophy of the Other and Nancy’s work, 
consciousness would not be.27 There would only be eternal vigilance. For Levinas this 
proximity underpins the very possibility of intentionality, light, without being absorbed 
into intentionality. 
 
...the way consciousness refers to the unconscious is not an intention in turn. It 
consists in a fainting away at the very focal point of its luminousness. This 
characterizes the way light is produced, as scintillation.28  
 
The focal point, or ‘source’, of the light is not itself illuminated, or contained by the light. 
However, it is the word scintillation that should draw our attention. Scintillation 
prefigures what Levinas will call the “evanescence” of the “I” as the instant, or the 
present.29 Evanescence is intimately tied to what Levinas calls the “very paradox of 
consciousness.”30 This on-off, blinking, evanescence underpinning consciousness, as we 
will see below, might be compared to the twofold rhythm of sleeping-waking which 
Nancy emphasises. 
 
 We can see now that sleep is not just a power of consciousness but itself has the 
power of constituting consciousness. This productive and positive account of sleep, when 
distinguished from the vigilance of insomnia, shows sleep as the very granting of 
consciousness. The very gift of escape from the horror of the night. Yet it is essential to 
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27 One might, indeed we will, take these words as clues towards a Levinasian phenomenology of sleep that 
never was and that we can only indicate below.  
28 ibid, p. 65 
29 Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the Other, p. 53ff 
30 ibid, p. 51 
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note that this very gift is founded upon sleep’s phenomenological status as the 
disappearance, however temporary, of intentional consciousness and thus too of the 
weight of being. Such an account of sleep stands in clear contrast to Heidegger’s implicit 
conception of sleep – an account where sleep amounts to an impoverishing of world and 
Dasein-status and, thus, the end, however temporarily, of the quest for the meaning of 
being.  
 
 Yet, Levinas’s early productive account of sleep also interestingly reverses a 
Husserlian problem with sleep which we encountered in our analysis of de Warren in Part 
I. There we saw that Husserl’s reason for postulating the sleeplessness of the 
transcendental ego rested on the need for an initiator of the transformation between 
sleeping and waking. This was in turn motivated by the desire for symmetry between the 
phenomenological accounts of going to sleep – which seems to be something subjectivity 
is, at least partly, involved in – and waking-up – which seems, by definition, initiated 
from beyond the remit of waking subjectivity. With this in mind, the significance of 
Levinas’s productive account comes into view. Instead of asking how consciousness can 
allow the interlude of sleep – the lapse from presence – Levinas describes sleep as 
permitting the very gap or distance from presence, as being, and thus allowing 
consciousness. This can be succinctly summarized by contrasting Husserl’s problem, 
‘how we wake-up’, with Levinas’s: ‘how we escape insomnia and, finally, drop off.’ “The 
impossibility of rending the invading, inevitable, and anonymous rustling of existence 
manifests itself particularly in certain times when sleep evades our appeal.”31 This 
reversal furthers Levinas’s normative radicalising of being and, with it, sleep as well. 
However, we must remember that Levinas would, in time, return to the question of what 
keeps watch in the night of consciousness. 
 
 Before moving on to this Levinasian return to vigilance and move away from sleep 
it is essential that we explore the relationship between sleep, place and the ‘here’ or 
‘localisation’ as found in these early texts. 
 
There is not only a consciousness of localization, but a localization of 
consciousness, which is not in turn reabsorbed into consciousness, into knowing. 
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There is here something that stands out against knowing, that is a condition for 
knowing.32  
 
This localisation, as the precondition for consciousness, knowing and intentionality must 
itself be beyond intentionality – it “stands out against knowing”. This ‘here’ is established 
precisely by sleep as a carving out of the there is. How does this carving out take place? 
Precisely by doing just that: by taking a place. Levinas is explicit in naming the body’s 
primordial role in this existential drama of beginning. “In lying down, in curling up in a 
corner to sleep, we abandon ourselves to a place; qua base it becomes our refuge. Then 
all our work of being consists in resting.”33 The contrast between Heidegger’s denial of 
understanding to the sleeper and Levinas’s finding, in the sleeper’s “lying down” 
precisely the power, and productivity, of the hesitation of sleep should now be apparent.34 
 
 This refuge, this place of sleep, is to be radically contrasted with the ‘Da’, ‘there’, 
of Da-sein. Specifically because, as Levinas puts it, “the latter already implies the 
world.”35 Whereas for Heidegger Dasein, ‘there-being’, is always already in the world, 
for Levinas the interrupting of vigilance is required for the existent as separated, as 
existent, to exist at all. Thus this concept of place does not so much replace the 
Heideggerian notion of being-in-the-world but rather situates it, as unfolding out of the 
emergence of subjectivity as position. The very possibility of positing objects for Levinas, 
which will, of course, take place within the world, is secondary to the here of 
subjectivity’s emergence, the body, and sleep.36 
 
Place, then, before being a geometric space, and before being the concrete 
setting of the Heideggerian world, is a base. … It [the body] is not situated in a 
space given beforehand; it is the irruption in anonymous being of localization 
itself.37 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Levinas, Emmanuel. Existence and Existents, pp. 65 – 6 
33 ibid, p. 67, my emphasis. This emphasis on the importance of the body, on the materiality of sleep, 
consciousness and the relationship to being, allows for interesting comparisons with some of Merleau-
Ponty’s later work. Bettina Bergo’s ‘Radical Passivity in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty (Lectures of 1954)’ 
offers one means of initiating such a comparison. Such thoughts also, of course, bring us closer to our 
discussion of Nancy and the collapse of our suspension of the question of the body and sleep. 
34 See pp. 75 – 76, above. 
35 ibid, p. 68 
36 “It [the body] is not posited; it is a position.” – ibid, p. 69 
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Levinas is at pains to distinguish between his description of the body’s constitutive power, 
in our ability to sleep, and previous accounts of space. It is our contention that this effort 
is required precisely to allow “space” for an account of radical exteriority outside of the 
totalising tendency of traditional notions of space. It is with this goal in mind – a 
broadening of our conception of space or place – that Levinas attacks the foundational 
status of Kant’s conception of space as transcendentally ideal and Heidegger’s conception 
of being-in-the-world and equipmentality. 
 
 This initial positioning of sleep founds all other accounts of space and all 
possibilities in space and this is done by constituting the existent as hesitation in the face 
of being. This hesitation is, and as mentioned above this could be taken as an oblique 
reference to Husserl, a ‘suspending of being’. Sleep can thus be taken as an escape, 
however temporary, from the irremissibility of being. This pivotal moment of the 
emergence of the subject shows again the positivity of sleep in the early Levinas’s 
philosophy – without it being, as the there is, would truly be unified as the Same. 
 
 Let us briefly summarise what this Levinasian account would provide us with in 
terms of a phenomenology of sleep. As we mentioned above Levinas would have 
accepted Heidegger’s description of sleep as a cessation of the adventure of being, or 
more accurately as a loss of the world which facilitates and conditions the ownmost 
possibility of Dasein – questioning towards the meaning of being. However, this feature 
of sleep, this loss of sleep, in Levinas’s account amounts to precisely sleep’s gift – the 
suspension of the weight of being. The dark hollows of sleep shield us from the light of 
the world and from being’s irremissibility. For our purposes this allows us to describe, 
phenomenologically, the manner in which sleep, as an interruption of intentional 
consciousness – if not all consciousness, establishes, or re-establishes, consciousness in 
waking. The very promise of sleep underlies, in Levinas’s account, the separation of 
subjectivity, as subjective, from the totalising force of being. Sleep, in Levinas’s account, 
finally takes on not only a positive or productive status in terms of the whole of lived 
experience and in his narrative departure from Heideggerian thinking, but also, and this 
is of essential importance, enacts this normative promotion through insisting on the 
separation of sleep from waking life and its powers. This second point, the separation of 
sleep, is surely what we identified above, Separate Sleep, as the promise offered in this 
engagement with Levinasian phenomenology. 
	   178	  
 
III: “…but there will be a reawakening.”38 
 
Thus sleep offers an escape from the there is and fits into the ongoing drama of 
Levinas’s search for an escape from being begun in 1935 in ‘On Escape’.39 We have 
shown how, in the case of sleep – as elsewhere, this search cannot be separated from 
Levinas’s attempt to leave the climate of Heideggerian ontology. Yet, the question which 
we must now move to is this: ‘Does the escape of sleep – this positivity within the 
negativity of sleep as suspension of insomnia – offer a true escape from being or is it 
rather merely the false promise of escape, an escape within being – from one regional 
(ontology) to another?’. 
 
We do not need to look far to begin an answer to this question. In fact, a simple 
consideration of how sleep’s production of the existent as separated from the there is fits 
into the subsequent argument of Existence and Existents will suffice. As we saw above 
this interruption furnishes the existent as a substantive as opposed to the verbal flux of 
being. This moment of solidity Levinas calls the ‘present’. It is worth noting that sleep 
operates, as the positioning of the existent, as “the here of position,” and thus “precedes 
every act of understanding, every horizon and all time.”40 As such, this ‘present’, which 
Levinas is describing, is not the present as one point within the flux of time but rather ‘the 
instant’ which precedes and pre-conditions time. Very quickly we are brought from “the 
mastery and the very virility of the substantive”, which both marks and allows the 
subject’s separation from the flux of being, to a new problem – ‘how do we move from 
one instant to another?’41 In other words: ‘how is it that this instant, as the moment of 
beginning, can avoid becoming trapped within itself?’ 
 
 In fact, this is precisely the position that Levinas wishes to describe. One way to 
understand the structure of Levinas’s argument at this point is to see that what he has 
described as hypostasis, the instant or present, is precisely trapped in a boot-strapping 
situation. Levinas has, purposefully, described subjectivity in its moment of triumph and 
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39 Levinas, Emmanuel. On Escape, passim 
40 Levinas, Emmaneul. Existence and Existents, p. 68 
41 ibid, p. 103 
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constitution as being faced with a new weight and a new enchainment. “Time, far from 
constituting the tragic, shall perhaps be able to deliver us from it.”42 As the title of Time 
and the Other suggests it will only be with the encounter with the Other that time will 
release us from the hypo-stasis of the present. By this point we are not lost within the 
neutral anomalousness of the there is but rather “having being as an attribute” become 
weighed down with this – the very archetype of identity. We are riveted to ourselves. This 
returns Levinas to his earlier descriptions of the instant’s relationship with existence. As 
discussed, we should not be surprised to find that this relationship is described through, 
what we may call, neighbouring phenomena to sleep; namely, weariness, indolence and 
fatigue. Yet, a puzzle remains: how is this relationship between the instant, as constituted 
by the very possibility of sleep, and its existence defined through weariness? 
 
 Here, indeed, we strike at the limits of the power of the isolated subject as instant 
and with it the limits of the positivity of Levinasian sleep. 
 
The present is subjected to being, bonded to it. The ego returns ineluctably to 
itself; it can forget itself in sleep, but there will be a reawakening. In the tension 
and fatigue of beginning one feels the cold sweat of the irremissibility of 
existence. The being that is taken up is a burden.43 
 
In sleep we are forgotten, our being and its weight is forgotten, “but there will be a 
reawakening.” The instant, in its scintillation, sleeps but does not escape “the 
irremissibility of existence.”44 It seems clear that sleep can offer only a promise of escape, 
a dream, if one likes, of an escape that is then lost in the return to waking and to the 
burden of the instant in its solitude. In following this schema from ‘On Escape’ sleep 
would leave us still ‘within being’. 
 
Sleep is a modality of being, in which a being withdraws from itself, and is 
delivered of its own self-control. This freedom does not involve nothingness; it 
is not a “nihilation,” in the contemporary expression. But, on the other hand, this 
freedom is only a “thought.” We must not fail to recognize the event in sleep, 
but we must notice that into this event its failure is already written. Fragile sleep, 
soft-winged sleep, is a second state.45 
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Sleep, in its fragility, offers, we are told, a “freedom [which] is only a “thought.””46 Yet, 
as Levinas’s “on the other hand” illustrates, this limitation of sleep as liberation, this mere 
“thought” of freedom is not limited in its failure to amount to a “nihilation”, to the 
Heideggerian nihilation in death. Sleep, and here in lies both its promise and 
disappointment for Levinas, touches an exit from being before this very same exit slips 
away. Only the Other, and their gift of time, will grant such an exit. 
  
 Indeed, this pattern of interpretation of sleep is repeated in Levinas’s more mature 
work. In particular, in Totality and Infinity sleep is famously a form of exteriority – and 
thus differentiated from the Husserlian account – but nonetheless one from which we live: 
“We live from “good soup,” air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc . . . These are not 
objects of representations. We live from them.”47 Sleep remains part of interiority, one of 
the distractions which pull us away from the true exteriority of the Other and the ethics 
which springs from our relationship to them. By Otherwise than Being sleep is described 
as part of the subject’s “enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to 
the tautological way of identity, and ceaselessly seeks after the distraction of games and 
sleep in a movement that never wears out.”48 
 
 However, and this “however” must act as but a note of an interpretation which 
can only be pointed towards here, there are hints of an-other interpretation of sleep in 
Levinas’s work. An interpretation which would read back from the radical passivity of 
Levinas’s later texts – such as Otherwise than Being, and ‘Substitution’ in particular49 – 
through slightly earlier texts ‘From Consciousness to Wakefulness’50, ‘Philosophy and 
Awakening’51, and ‘In Praise of Insomnia’52, to an alternative reading of the somnolent 
writings of the late 1940s. Such an interpretation would take its cue, and find its spur, in 
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49 Levinas, Emmanuel. Otherwise than Being, pp. 99 – 130 
50 Levinas, Emmanuel. ‘From Consciousness to Wakefulness’ in Of God Who Comes to Mind, translated 
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51 Levinas, Emmanuel. ‘Philosophy and Awakening’, in Entre Nous, translated by Michael B. Smith and 
Barbara Harshav, Continuum, London, 2006, pp. 66 – 77 
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Bettina Bergo’s paper ‘Radical Passivity in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty (Lectures 1954)’. 
In that paper Bergo proposes to read “Levinas through Merleau-Ponty”, in particular, to 
broaden the former’s notion of radical passivity through the latter’s pluralist conceptions 
of it.53 This, alternative and hypothetical, interpretation would find its engine and 
direction in an attempt to read Merleau-Ponty’s account of sleep in his lectures of 5454 
through Levinas’s early account of sleep, position and the promise of escape. Instead, we 
turn here, to The Fall of Sleep, or rather the anticipation of that fall, before the fall. 
 
IV: Before the Fall 
 
The Fall of Sleep is brief. Deliberately, all too brief. For all the pause before the 
fall the fall itself disappears in an instant – as opposed to the instant: blink and you might 
miss it. A fleeting mediation on – or better, a somnolent sojourn in or nocturnal tarrying 
with – sleeping, falling, tombs, water, death and much more besides. Its chapters are short 
as well, like the snatched threads of a dream already slipping away – “a scrap left over 
from sleep.”55 The connections between them are often unclear, hazy but not absent. 
Nancy’s penchant for fragments, as opposed to the traditional essay structure, means it 
would be artificial and violent to now attempt to tie some singular narrative around and 
through this beautiful little book.56 And, for all its brevity, we have seen, in Chapter 1, 
the challenge this text poses to phenomenology. Furthermore, in the body (or corpus) of 
this thesis we have seen how this text stands (though this is an inappropriate word) as a 
monumental treatise when compared to the briefness of those sidelong glances at sleep 
which we have uncovered, sheltered, hidden and faltering, in the body (or corpus) that 
we call the phenomenological tradition. 
 
 Therefore, we will now lay side by side this text and our prior analyses of sleep 
as found in, and awakened from, the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas. What can 
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these naps have in common with Nancy’s deeper and more reinvigorating touching of 
sleep? The following process of comparison and contrasting offers insight into how 
Nancy’s thinking of sleep develops out of phenomenology whilst also constituting a 
radical critique of it. We begin by, briefly, reconsidering the challenge which motivates 
this thesis as it is found early in The Fall of Sleep (Ch. 3). However, here, in contrast with 
in Part I, our focus is not on how this relates to the possibility of a Husserlian 
phenomenology of sleep. Instead, remaining in greater proximity to Nancy and to his text, 
we trace the multiple layers of the fall of sleep – a fall away from significance, self / 
subject, and grounds (earth) (Ch. 1 – 3). Following still the legacy of phenomenological 
approaches to sleep we find, perhaps surprisingly, Nancy’s descent continuing into the 
world of sleep – an ‘Equal World’ [Monde égal] (Ch. 4). Here and in the following 
chapter (Ch. 5) the contrast between Nancy’s account of the sleeper and Heidegger’s 
exiling of the sleeper from world, being and Dasein status – as described in Part II, takes 
shape. However, only via a comparison with Levinas and his account of sleep which we 
have just sketched (Ch. 7) do we strike upon the true radicality of Nancy’s account of 
sleep. In unpacking the new Nancean conception of the sleeper we draw on Gerald L. 
Bruns’ On Ceasing to be Human where he claims that The Fall of Sleep describes an 
‘experience of freedom’.57  
 
 Finally, through a developing of Bruns’ insight we are in a position to explore the 
most positive approaches to the sleeper which Nancy makes, as found in his chapters on 
lullaby (Ch. 6) and death (Ch. 8). These approaches, constituting as they do productive 
proximities between sleep and waking and sleep and death, respectively, awaken us to 
directions for future somnolent, and creative, investigations. These findings, along with 
our comparisons with the phenomenological literature offer an alternative reading of 
Nancy’s challenge to phenomenology. The demand not to cease phenomenology at the 
edge, or limit, of the bed but rather to allow that phenomenology itself is always granted 
by, and from, sleep. Future phenomenological or philosophical questioning will not be 
toward sleep but rather from it – it takes its cue and its origin from “the blind task of sleep 
[la tâche aveugle du sommeil] (Ch. 9).”58 Our Chapter, and this thesis, will thus close 
with preliminary notes towards such a somnolent phenomenology – notes, that is, from 
the sleeper to the phenomenologist. 
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V: Falling 
 
Sleep is proclaimed and symbolized by the sign of the fall, the more or less swift 
descent or sagging, faintness.59 
 
 Sometimes when lying in bed, approaching the edge of sleep, a sudden jolt – a 
“hypnagogic jerk” – wrenches us back to waking. This phenomenon is preceded by a 
sensation of falling and followed by shock, fear, and an elevated heart rate. This surprised 
reaction, this violent return or break in our descent is not an everynight experience for 
most. Nonetheless it points us, for Nancy, towards the “amorphous, hard-to-identify 
substance” of sleep: “none other than that of the fall, of sagging and unfastening”.60 
Nancy hints at the value of this strange phenomenon in his first chapter:  
 
...until that underlying closeness to simple inertia that we know in the bodies of 
sleeping infants, which we sometimes recognize when on the edge of sleep we 
feel that we are beginning to stop feeling the basic energy of our bodies. We feel 
the suspense of feeling. We feel ourselves falling, we feel the fall.61  
 
There is much that we might pick out from these three short quotations. However, for 
now let us consider how this “amorphous, hard-to-identify substance” of sleep, this “more 
or less swift descent”, may relate to the challenge which, two chapters further into The 
Fall of Sleep, led us to seek the slumbering phenomenology of sleep within 
phenomenology itself. 
 
 Sleep, for Nancy, limits itself and the phenomenologist (or perhaps the 
philosopher) approaching it. It allows “the waking phenomenologist approaching the bed 
to perceive nothing but the appearance of its disappearance, the attestation of its retreat.”62 
This allowance, or gift, to the waking phenomenologist, generalises the contact with 
falling which manifests so violently in the occasional hypnagogic twitch. Sleep “shows 
of itself only its disappearance, its burrowing and its concealment.”63 There is nothing 
given of sleep, except the fall. Maintaining, for only a little bit longer, our suspension of 
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the question of dreams – which surely here arises stronger than ever before – let us 
compare this insistent following of the falling thread of sleep with the first response to 
this challenge to phenomenology which we considered. De Warren takes umbrage at 
Nancy claim that this feature of sleep means that “There is no phenomenology of sleep”.64 
For De Warren, this is to make two mistakes: it misdescribes sleep and underestimates 
phenomenology. Through a description of sleep reconstructed from Husserl’s later 
phenomenology of time-consciousness and his fragmentary unpublished comments on 
sleep we saw that phenomenology certainly could offer an account of sleep. An account 
which surely could allow for the phenomenon with which we began this section – that 
occasional surprise, that recoiling from sleep. 
 
 Yet we also saw the philosophical price this thoroughgoing Husserlian 
phenomenology of sleep demands. It requires a demarcating of sleep’s force, scope and 
dominion. We sleep under the ever watchful eye of absolute consciousness.65 The 
question remained at the end of our first Chapter whether that price was worth paying in 
exchange for an extending of phenomenology’s remit into the “night of the lowered 
eyelids”.66 We proceeded into our consideration of Heidegger by asking whether we 
might find an alternative phenomenological approach to sleep, a better deal or lower price 
perhaps. However, now the suspicion arises that the very question is posed on an unstable 
premise. De Warren takes Nancy’s remarks on the limits of phenomenology and sleep’s 
appearance as if they stood alone, or as if they are posed, only within the Nancy’s third 
chapter ‘Self From Absence To Self’. However, these comments do not stand, alone or 
otherwise, they fall or drop through the process of Nancy’s faithful following of sleep as 
“proclaimed and symbolized by the sign of the fall”.67 By tracing this fall, as found in the 
first three chapters of The Fall of Sleep, Nancy touches on a thread which quickly unravels 
attempts to situate, position, or domesticate sleep and the sleeper. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 ibid 
65 This cleaving of the sleeper from that which, waking, underwrites the somnolent journey has been shown 
in this thesis as a point of continuity across phenomenological accounts of sleep. “Wakefulness alone can 
give way to sleep, and wakefulness preserved stems from sleep refused, sleepiness refused.” - ibid, p. 2.  
66 ibid, p. 6 
67 ibid, p. 1 
	   185	  
 An everyday fall, such as from a tree or down some stairs, is from one place and 
to another.68 However, from the very beginning of the book we see that the fall of sleep 
is a different type of fall. A more radical falling: “I’m falling asleep. I’m falling into sleep 
and I’m falling there by the power of sleep.”69 As sleep “sums up” and “gathers” other 
falls to it we see that sleep’s fall itself falls away from the specificity of directional falling 
– falling from the tree to the ground. In fact, it is the sleep’s fall away from ground itself 
which Nancy is describing. What might have appeared an arbitrary, perhaps merely 
linguistic, connection between sleep and falling is, in these short chapters, revealed as the 
essence of sleep.70 Yet, this cannot be seen as the essence of a set state for: “faintness and 
falling consist in not allowing a state to persist with the tension natural to it (a state of 
tension, then, that is not a “state”).”71 
 
 What then can Nancy say of this fall if it is both from sleep, “by the power of 
sleep”, and to sleep? For Nancy the fall of sleep is never merely this fall. As it “sums up” 
and “gathers” falls to it sleep displays the first side of a duality of falls that Nancy 
describes. We might call this the inwards breath of the fall to sleep. Sleep does not fall to 
sleep it falls into itself. “I fall inside my own satiety as well as my own vacuity: I myself 
become the abyss and the plunge, the density of deep water and the descent of the 
drowned body sinking backwards.”72 Nancy calls this “not metamorphosis. At the very 
most... an endomorphosis... the formation of an interiority”.73 However, as the ambiguity 
of this fall “inside my own satiety as well as my own vacuity” shows, this fall is always 
also a fall away, what we might call the out breath of the fall of sleep. “This other fall—
the fall of distinctions—is added to the first one and gives it its real coherence: I fall 
asleep, that is to say,  “I” fall, “I” no longer exist, or else “I” “exist” only in that 
effacement of my own distinctions.”74 This difficult passage warns us away from a 
plausible misinterpretation of the inwards breath – that the fall of sleep falls to some 
radical interiority, the true “I”. This second movement, this outwards breath – more a huff 
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and puff which blows all houses down than a little escape of used-up air, shows that the 
fall of sleep is just as much the falling away of distinctions, of tensions, of divisions.75  
 
 Yet this “effacement of my own distinctions” has a number of further destabilising 
effects. First of all, this, our own, two-step motif of the breath in and then out, if it is 
understood as two separate steps, falls away. “There is simultaneity only in the realm of 
sleep.”76 The “immersion overflows and carries away any sort of analysis.”77 This offers 
us an ambiguity in Nancy’s description of sleep that is worth keeping in mind throughout 
this Chapter – the ambiguity of falling through air or water.  
 
 Secondly, the loosening of the ties that bind together the “I”. The falling away of 
the distinctions underpinning the “I”, the ego. “I fall asleep and at the same time I vanish 
as “I”.”78 It is this aspect of the fall of sleep which has the dual results of drawing us away 
from the questioning of philosophy, and of phenomenology in particular, and reveals the 
self, the “in self”, of sleep.79 The “I” distinguishes itself from other, from world, and thus 
it is that the questions of the questioner find that which is to be questioned. However, 
with the fall, or better the plurality of falls, of sleep, this all collapses: 
 
“Who am I?” disintegrates in the fall of sleep, for this fall carries me toward the 
absence of questions, toward the unconditional and indubitable affirmation—
alien to any system of doubt, to any condition of identification—of a being-in-
self [être-à-soi] that tolerates no unpacking, no analysis of its structure. It is not 
responsible for some problematic of “relation to self” [rapport à soi] or of 
“presence to self” [présence à soi]: neither relation nor presence have to be 
asserted here. Nor can the form or general logic of “to,” of “be to,” be asserted: 
the “to” in sleep has yielded to “in.”80 
 
It is out of this yielding, this laying down of responsibilities, that Nancy’s limiting of 
phenomenology comes. The separation of appearance and reality falters in sleep and with 
it the possibility of a constituting consciousness. The performance of the 
phenomenological reduction might lead to a similar putting aside of this distinction but 
for the sleeper, Nancy contends, this very performance is always already unnecessary, 
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impossible and without motivation. It is as such that the denial of any phenomenology of 
sleep falls, temporarily – like all falls – into view. However, it is the other side of Nancy’s 
third chapter – the sense of sleep that “obscures signification, [that] … makes sense only 
of sensing oneself no longer appearing” – that must concern us as we proceed.81 What 
can Nancy say of this “Kantian thing” about which phenomenology must remain silent?82 
 
 Before moving on to this question and indeed to the many others which this 
tumble after the sleeper has raised – whilst simultaneously denying the traction of 
questioning itself – let us highlight, or predict, one more falling away, or loosening, of 
tensions. In particular, we can already see that our specified suspensions, the dual 
suspending of the questions of sleep’s relationship to the body and to dreams, must, if we 
are to follow Nancy on the trail of the fall, themselves fall away. We will see the specific 
dissipation and falling away of this holding apart of sleep-body and sleep-dream in the 
following sections. Only a body can fall and who can say where/when the dreamer begins 
and the sleeper ends. 
 
VI: Lost in the World of Night: Dreaming from a Somnolent 
World 
 
“Everything is equal to itself and to the rest of the world.”83 So begins Nancy’s 
fourth chapter – ‘Equal World’ [Monde égal]84 – with this reminder that the question of 
place, of the location of the sleeper, has been central to all of our previous engagements 
with phenomenology and sleep. In this chapter Nancy can be seen as extending his 
preceding examination of the into of sleep’s fall whilst also further exploring the 
consequences of sleep’s stripping away of distinctions – the fall continues. In this section 
we will consider how this equality of sleep, sleep’s equal world, reveals a sleeper who 
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has left behind the existential and the comparative analyses which we considered above. 
If Husserl asked a high price for his phenomenology of sleep, Heidegger will spurn any 
and all offers. It is this, Heidegger’s, refusal of sleep which most strikingly contrasts with 
Nancy’s tactful touching of the fall of sleep-night-dream. 
 
 As such this section, whilst following Nancy into the night, develops three points 
of comparison between the Nancean sleeper and that described in our hypothetical 
Heideggerian account. Firstly, and most thoroughly, the sleeper’s relationship with world 
must be considered. Nancy, as the use of the definite article – “the world” – in the opening 
line of Nancy’s fourth chapter suggests, lacks Heidegger’s qualms about describing the 
sleeper, our four-legged cousins, and indeed much else besides, as within the world. 
Secondly, we will briefly consider how this relates to Nancy’s ascription of “silence” to 
the sleeper. This odd “silence”, along with our third point in which Nancy’s account 
touches on Heidegger’s latent somnological thinking, allows us to move onto the question 
of sleep’s making-sense – “Sense, here [in sleep, in sleep’s nightly worlding], neither 
fulfulls [sic] nor enlightens. It overflows and obscures signification”.85 This third point 
of contact concerns the question of posture or stance.  
 
 In order to approach night, as it is here that the question of sleep and world 
emerges, Nancy continues with the egalitarian thinking that followed from the falling 
away of the “I” in his previous chapter. “All sleepers fall into the same, identical and 
uniform sleep.”86 And as such “sleeping “well” or “badly” comes down merely to 
sleeping more or less, in a more or less continuous, or more or less perturbed fashion.”87 
These claims may seem outlandish but it is both hard to see what sleeping well could 
mean except this uniformity or continuity of sleep, and clear how this follows from the 
retreat of distinctions considered above.88 In fact, “Everyone sleeps in the equality of the 
same sleep—all the living—”,89 and this is “why night suits it”.90 
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 “For there to be night, though, there must be day.”91 Indeed, it is in the contrasting 
of night and day that Nancy further develops his situating, his placing, though we will see 
the limit of these terms shortly, of the fall of sleep. Day stands, shining in the “primal 
lux”, and it stands out, it differentiates and is differentiation itself.92 “Day is always 
another day, it is, in general, the other of the same.”93 Nancy is, of course, not denying 
the possibility of “the most repetitive monotony” of “one-day-always-like-another”.94 
Nor that nights can “differ among themselves”.95 Instead he is describing what we might 
call the underlying movements which constitute this “Twofold rhythm, solar and lunar, 
waking and sleeping.”96 Nancy is describing a further difference or distinction, “the 
rhythmic distinction between the inequality of day and the equality of night”, which itself 
situates sleep, as fall.97 Remember that falling is neither a state nor a solid condition but 
in its movement is always a movement into night and thus away from the sharp 
distinctions of day.98 
 
 This egalitarian night, sleep’s fall away from light, does not, as such, fall to 
Rilke’s words, taken up by Krell as a warning against “the error of drawing distinctions 
too sharply, too violently.”99 It is no mere accident that it is here, in this chapter about the 
equal world of sleep, that Nancy describes the “sleeping together” that for many “evokes 
nothing less than what we call in the crudest way (but why crude? except because we 
have thus twisted the sense of words, at least in the French language) “going to bed 
together.””100 Yet for Nancy this together – without losing its intimacy – takes on a global 
sense (as opposed to significance): “In their [those who sleep together] “together” is 
refracted the entirety of all sleepers: animals, plants, rivers, seas, sands, stars set in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 ibid, p. 20 
92 ibid 
93 ibid, p. 21 
94 ibid 
95 ibid 
96 ibid, p. 20 
97 ibid 
98 All this talk of movements should return us to the missing analysis of the motility of life in Heidegger’s 
comparative examination and the parallel movements of sleep and phenomenology suggested in our 
Chapter 1. 
99 Krell, David F. Daimon Life, p. 13. Referring to his epigrams from Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duino Elegy, 
no. 1: “Aber Lebendige machen alle den Fehler, / daß sie zu stark unterscheiden. [Yet living beings all 
make the same / mistake – they distinguish too sharply.]”, on p. 1 of Daimon Life. 
100 Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Fall of Sleep, p. 18. This aspect of the “together” of sleep – the sexual, the intimate, 
the loving – is striking and Nancy’s insights into it will be briefly explored in our next section. Though a 
more thoroughgoing treatment of sleep and sex is both justified and opened by our concluding statements. 
	   190	  
crystalline spheres of ether, and ether itself, which has fallen asleep.”101 One might blink, 
or quickly rest ones eyes, and miss that here for Nancy the ‘uncertainty’ that Heidegger 
describes when considering what sleeps never even arises: “We do not say that the stone 
is asleep or awake. Yet what about the plant? Here already we are uncertain.”102 Here, 
embracing the other(s) and embraced by night, this uncertainty and this assignment of 
sleeping and waking, these distinctions, have no place. 
 
 Sleep, for Nancy, does not draw us into the poverty of animals, nor deaden us to 
world as in the case of the stone. Instead it offers the world shared by all things. It grants 
equality across all beings. In this sense, and in many others, Nancy enacts an egalitarian 
conversion of Heideggerian philosophy. In The Sense of the World, published in French, 
as Le sens du monde, some twenty four years before Tombe de sommeil, at the beginning 
of a chapter entitled ‘Touching’, Nancy cites Heidegger’s famous passage contrasting the 
“touching” of lizards, stones and humans.103 For our purposes the following four 
questions will help us to situate Nancy’s difference from Heidegger on world: 
 
Why, then, is “access” determined here a priori as the identification and 
appropriation of the “other thing”?… why does one have to determine “access 
to” a priori as the only way of making-up-a-world and of being-toward-the-
world? Why could the world not also a priori consist in being-among, being-
between, and being-against? In remoteness and contact without “access”?104 
 
As we have examined above the question of access – or transposition – is central to 
Heidegger’s treatment of animality and offered resources for the parallel Heideggerian 
account of the sleeper which we developed. Yet for Nancy the question of access – an 
access which is surely lost in the fall of the sleeper away from distinctions and distinctness 
– misses the prior relationship with world which all beings have. As Marie-Eve Morin 
puts it: “world-forming is not a human activity but an ontological one: it worlds, or there 
is sense, sense itself circulates.”105 
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 Thus we can, in fact, say that the Nancean sleeper does sleep with the fishes, à la 
Heidegger, or indeed with the stones, Sphinxes,106 stars and everything else besides. But 
what we cannot say is that this equalising sleep amounts to a loss of world. Rather, and 
we will come back to this in a moment, world, as sense making, is touched upon in sleep 
without the usual obscuring of sense by the glittering significances with which we are so 
surrounded in waking life. “The problem with phenomenology [and Heidegger], 
according to Nancy, is that it thinks access (significance, light) only in terms of 
appropriation.”107 We discussed earlier the risks of such appropriations, such 
anthropomorphisms, and in a moment we will return to this question of sense, significance 
and world. For now it is enough to see that, in sharp contrast with Heidegger’s exile of 
the sleeper from world, in The Fall of Sleep “Sleep itself becomes the return to the 
immemorial world, to the world from beyond the world, to the world of obscure gods 
who utter no creative word.”108 
 
 Here, as words fail us – slip away from us and lose their significance, their pull – 
the second of our points of contact comes into view. Night, for Nancy, “suits” sleep not 
only because of its movement towards the indistinct, its “darkness”, but also due to its 
“silence.”109 This “silence” of sleep, what Nancy will call “the suspense of creative 
speech” should return us to the centrality of language for Heidegger’s conception of 
Dasein.110 However, not merely in terms of the dumb animal who, lacking discourse, also 
lacks existence and world, but also in relation to the somnolent undertow of sleep’s silent 
uncanniness as found in Being and Time. In our second Chapter we examined whether 
the sleeper possesses discourse [Rede].111 First we considered Heidegger’s claim that “the 
person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an 
understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short 
of words.”112 This, when held alongside Heidegger’s claim that “Only in keeping silent 
does the conscience call; that is to say, the call comes from the soundlessness of 
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uncanniness”, hints at another, more radical, sense to the silence of sleep.113 Of course, 
to cite Winkler once again, “The fact is that Heidegger will say nothing of the sort.”114 
As with the animal and the “man [who] is dumb” the sleeper does not keep silent at all 
for Heidegger.115 However, Nancy here finds in sleep’s curtailing of language its very 
‘divinity’:  
 
...the most uniquely divine thing revealed in it [sleep] is the suspense of creative 
speech. No “Let there be this!” is uttered, no commandment to make something 
come to be. There is a silent obedience to the difference of the being: to this 
“nothing,” to this “no thing,” to this ex nihilo that light first drove back to the 
heart of darkness in the movement by which it sprang from it.116 
 
Defying dogma and affirming the originary difference of day and night mentioned above 
Nancy insists that God slept after the first day of creative work. It is the uncanny silence 
to which sleep owes its loyalty that Nancy seeks when he follows the fall of sleep, when 
he seeks the sense of putting aside creating and naming. 
 
 Our third and final point of contact, like our last two, brings us one step closer to 
the sense of sleep and away from the meaning, significance, of sleeping, waking, and 
Dasein. The sleeper does not stand-up, they cannot take-up a stance. In our earlier 
treatment of Heidegger we wondered whether the giving-up of standing, of our upright 
posture, in sleep signalled, as opposed to causing, the forfeiting of understanding as 
well.117 Thus, when we also remember the benumbed animal and its lack of comportment, 
its inability to stand in relation to another being as being, we begin to see that here again 
Nancy’s account of sleep lies at some distance – a distance taken and granted by sleep – 
from Heidegger’s. Laying our head down, giving-up on the erect stance with which we 
undertake our day to day life is also to lay aside significance and to open the sense of 
sleep. Taking Morin’s summary of this key distinction in Nancy’s thought we should note 
“the relation of significance is vertical while that of sense is horizontal.”118 For Morin 
significance concerns “the relation of reference”, as commonly understood, whereas 
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sense “concerns what happens between things, ideas, bodies and people in their 
encounters, their movements of attraction/ repulsion.”119 
 
 How then do we, the awake, approach the sense of sleep, “this eclipsed thing... 
the eclipse itself: not the fiery ring around it, but the perfectly dark heart of the eclipse of 
being”?120 One means is hinted at in the “between” that sense names. Dreams seem a good 
contender as situated between waking and sleeping – in contact with both but restricted 
to neither. “Perchance to dream, that is to say, perchance something of night passing into 
day, by chance, by misfortune or by capricious luck.”121 Nancy’s focus on the chance 
nature of dreams, that perchance we may dream when we sleep, is more than just a 
reference to the eponymous Danish play. In Hamlet’s perchance Nancy finds the fragility 
of the dream, a vulnerability to “the acidity of day”, and this delicacy signals the care of 
touch as opposed to the blinding light underpinning sight, understanding and grasping.122 
 
 Yet, despite – or perhaps through – this fragility, the dream is “like waking, similar 
to it, and [we] dream as waking. Dream in place of waking.”123 This bridging, this 
between, offers, perhaps a mode of ‘contact without access’ to sleep. Furthermore, and 
once again surprisingly, the “daydream already shapes sleep in broad daylight, sleep in 
the midst of waking.”124 This “reverie” opens “a somnolent world into which the dreamer 
sinks and is lost.”125 Nancy proceeds to describe this sinking in a beautiful and technical 
– with attention being paid to the similarity to our technical reproduction of dreamlike 
images in cinema – fall into dream and dreams. This account closes, appropriately with 
the falling away of the dream, that sensation everyone knows of having lost the dream, 
and losing with it “the sleep that now escapes” us.126 Fundamentally this in-between, this 
uncertain, indistinguishable, “weight” and “heavy presence” of dreams returns us to the 
question of world and sense.127 “Something was brought back from nothing, and in effect 
it is a configuration of nothing” – this offering, in its resistance to significance (contra, 
and yet with, psychoanalysis), is the movement of sense making. This movement, in its 
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richness, is what Nancy affirms in direct contrast with Heidegger’s sleeper who sleeps 
always in a poverty made all the worse by its former, being-questioning, wealth. 
 
Shouldn’t we, rather, esteem this considerable increase of our world as equal to 
the night of an outside-the-world within which we come to float like astronauts 
who work in space wearing those enormous spacesuits that make their gestures 
look clumsy and their thoughts hazy? But beneath their blurry appearance, 
astronauts carry out precise maneuvers and delicate operations. Like the 
maneuvers, operations, conducts, techniques, and arts deployed in the broad 
spaces of sleep.128 
 
VII: From Insomnia to a World without Sleep 
 
Sleep presupposes the fear of night has been conquered—but night is the 
wilderness of fears.129 
 
 Let us now stray from the path of Nancy’s reverie. Where he follows his chance 
encounter with dreams with the soothing [berceur] refrain of the lullaby [berceuse] – that 
rocking between waking and sleep, from and to, back and forth – we turn now to what 
motivates this search for the sense, the between, of sleep.130 This question of motivations 
will also furnish us with a consideration of what underpins Nancy’s interest in sleep more 
generally. The question of the presence of sleep, in Nancy’s work, brings us to the 
connection between his work and that of Levinas. As such this section will assess what 
these thinkers share in their encounters with sleep, in both instances a reaction to 
Heidegger, and what distances them, the specific nature of these reactions. 
Fundamentally, their differences will be ontological and not ethical, or normative. Here 
we will see the emergence of a ‘normativity of sleep’ – or, better, ‘for sleep’. A shared 
demand to do justice to sleeping and waking. 
 
 We saw in our opening sections of this Chapter how Levinas’s post-war work 
enacts a departure from Heidegger and Heideggerian thought. These texts, following the 
path already set out on in ‘On Escape’, seek an exit from being. In effect, as is particularly 
clear in Existence and Existents, they reverse Heidegger’s search for that most general of 
all things – being – from the singularity of our own being-there. Instead Levinas asks after 
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the possibility of difference, alterity and singularity given the overwhelming presence of 
being.131 It is in this context that the question of sleep appears for Levinas – as, that is, a 
search for “a hesitation in being.”132 It might seem strange, given what Nancy explored 
above of the equality of night, to search for difference in sleep. However, as we saw above 
Levinas is not so much searching for the annulment of waking life in sleep but rather an 
escape from radical insomnia, an escape from the horror of the il y a. 
 
  The il y a, for Levinas, is accompanied by the existential (and truly 
indistinguishable) affect of ‘horror’. In these early texts horror is described in a number 
of ways but its fundamental structure is the return of presence in, and within, absence: 
“Horror is the event of being which returns in the heart of this negation, as though nothing 
had happened.”133 The two main ways that this horror is encountered are through a 
thought experiment inspired by a famous section of Husserl’s Ideas I134 – “imagine all 
things, beings and persons, returning to nothingness”135 – and the appeal to radical 
insomnia. It is this second encountering of the horror of the il y a, which “manifests itself 
particularly in certain times when sleep evades our appeal”, that must concern us here.136 
The il y a of insomnia is characterised by a horror from which we cannot turn away – it 
does not fix our attention137 but commands a terrible vigilance: 
 
It’s very occurrence consists in an impossibility, an opposition to possibilities of 
sleep, relaxation, drowsiness, absence. This reverting of presence into absence 
does not occur in distinct instants, like an ebb and flow. The there is lacks 
rhythm, as the points swarming in darkness lack perspective. For an instant to be 
able to break into being, for this insomnia, which is like the very eternity of 
being, to come to a stop, a subject would have to be posited.138 
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Nancy and Levinas share a horror in the face of this lack of “rhythm” this “opposition to 
possibilities of sleep”.139 They share a horror of “this anonymous nightwatch”, but where 
they differ is that for Nancy this nightwatch will not amount to a “where [in which] I am 
completely exposed to being”.140 We return to this loss of rhythm, and exposure to being, 
shortly. 
 
 The complex web of similarities and differences between Nancy and Levinas here 
deserve more space than we can offer but it is, for now, enough to see that they share a 
fundamental abhorrence of, and appreciation for the power of, the denial of sleep. In both 
cases, as we noted above this worry and its parallel turn to sleep itself can be seen as a 
reaction to Heidegger. Furthermore, in both cases these thinkers move from specific 
“phenomena” to the diagnosis of a more general, and harder to approach, dilemma.141 
However, the devil – and here we are dealing with the devilish (and as we will see evil) – 
is in the details; in, that is, the specific phenomena Nancy and Levinas move from, what 
it is they move towards identifying, and how they differ in their responses to Heidegger. 
 
 For Nancy “[i]t is not a matter of insomnia”, as with Levinas, but rather “of the 
world in which it is forbidden to sleep because of a process of torture whose effectiveness 
is not in doubt.”142 Sleep deprivation reveals the normative weight of sleep – the 
obligation to let sleep – as radical insomnia did for Levinas. It is worth picking out that 
this torture is effective, for Nancy this “is not in doubt”. It is telling that Nancy names it, 
with a certainty which we all must share, torture. One need not have experienced, have 
lived through, sleep deprivation torture to be certain not only of its effectiveness but also 
that it is torture. What is more Nancy has chosen a phenomenon which is striking in its 
justification – in that it is justified. The world of sleep deprivation is also the world in 
which torture is justified, its justification is proclaimed by governments, television, 
cinema and causal thinking more generally. Perhaps here “we must ask ourselves whether 
it isn’t the unjustifiable that, in spite of everything, we want to justify?”143 The “positive 
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wickedness”, “the measure of a new “knowledge of good and evil”” must involve “the 
affirmation that evil is strictly unjustifiable”.144 Though Nancy does not name sleep 
deprivation as this new evil he sought to describe in The Experience of Freedom twenty 
years earlier, we can, nonetheless, see something striking in his horror at the denial of 
sleep. Something akin to Levinas’s horror and yet different. 
 
 Their difference lies, as in our previous section, with the question of world. For 
Levinas, insomnia is prior to world or rather enacts its dissipation. In this way the journey 
to sleep – which, as we saw, Levinas concentrates on in contrast with Husserl’s worry 
about the return to waking – is itself the forming of the hypostasis that founds world – our 
position, our here, from which a world is unfolded. As such night, the night which “in 
insomnia... itself... watches”, is not a world, for Levinas, but rather the “impersonal 
vigilance” of the il y a itself.145 This vision of night might seem to contrast with Nancy’s 
earlier discussion of the night of equality, the night which “engendered” sleep – Nyx 
giving birth to Hypnos.146 However, even at the end of Ch. 4, Nancy hints at the nuancing 
of his account of night: “Without night it [sleep] would have no place to exist, and living 
beings would be organized in such a way that they could bustle about in perpetual day 
without wearing out.”147 This perpetual day, seemingly innocuous and merely a harmless 
philosophical thought experiment, takes on a very different tone by the last three pages 
of Ch. 7. “World in shambles, out of balance, uneven enough to make sleep itself 
devastated by unevenness.”148 
 
 Such a world, “the world in which it is impossible to sleep”, is, of course, also 
Heidegger’s world – the world which the sleeper appears within, for waking Dasein, but 
only ever as poor, and as denied access, scratching with piteous mewls at the edges of 
imperious Dasein’s domain.149 This denial of access to world, which already appeared 
illegitimate given the falling away of distinctions in sleep, here takes on a more sinister 
character – here it appears to be a universalised, perhaps a totalised, form of sleep 
deprivation torture. The urgent tone of Nancy’s text increases, however, with his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 ibid, p. 123 
145 Levinas, Emmanuel. Existence and Existents, p. 63 
146 Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Fall of Sleep, p. 22 
147 ibid 
148 ibid, p. 38 
149 ibid 
	   198	  
suggestion that this “World in shambles” is not only a phantasm of Heideggerian 
philosophy but rather “It is possible that the world today is that way: without sleeping or 
waking.”150 This world, which we all inhabit, is for Nancy threatening not only to sleep 
but, and through that threat, to waking as well – we will return to this shortly. This too 
resembles Levinas’s productive account of sleep – for without sleep, without an escape 
from insomnia, there can be no subject, no distinctions, no waking life as we know it, 
only the return of the indistinct rustling of the il y a. 
 
 Yet, for Nancy the question of “the world in which it is impossible to sleep” takes 
us one step further back. Insomnia “which is a wandering from sleep itself” is a 
distraction, for him, from the true threat, the threat of an attack on that which modulates, 
allows, and senses waking and sleeping – which Nancy will call world and soul.151 The 
character of the world, as that which offers both sleeping and waking existence, or rather 
simply existence as we will see, is what worries Nancy. This world, which we live in and 
suffer from, transforms night and thus sleep too: 
 
Nights shot through with flashes of fire, of frenzy, of famine. Nights stripped of 
their very night, uprooted from darkness and shadow, thrown into the harsh light 
of a nuclear blinding. Sleeps that are nothing but parodies, caricatures of sleeps, 
heads kept buried beneath muddy water but kept from giving themselves over to 
the abandon of deep waters.152 
 
Nancy’s placing of the sleeper, alongside the wakeful, within the world – in contrast to 
both Heidegger and Levinas – allows him to situate the horror of radical sleep denial, of 
a world without sleep, in relation to waking life, and its politics and ethics. “It is not a 
question of an Other (the inevitably “capitalized Other”)
 than the world; it is a question 
of the alterity or alteration of the world.”153 In contrast to Levinas who searches for – and 
is disappointed by the supposed lack of – an escape in sleep, Nancy pushes the proximity 
of sleeping and waking and so reveals the essential sense of their communication – which 
in our shambolic world threatens to collapse into a communion. 
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 In order to understand the danger of this “World deprived of rhythm, world that 
has deprived itself of rhythm” we must turn to Nancy’s conception of the soul – the soul, 
which as the title of Ch. 7 tells us “never sleeps”. “Absence belongs to the body and to 
the mind; it is foreign to the soul.”154 This, at first, appears to be nothing but a return to a 
conception of the soul as old as Western philosophy itself – or, at least, as the Socratic 
dialogues and the father of philosophy we know from them. The soul, seems to be 
Nancy’s ‘absolute consciousness’, his Dasein, his return to vigilance: the moment, that 
is, at which sleep is denied in Nancy’s philosophy. If we have been tracing in this thesis 
not only the accounts of sleep found in phenomenology but also phenomenology’s 
delimiting of sleep, ‘sleep this much but never more’, then here we surely come to the 
equivalent moment in Nancy’s thinking. 
 
 And yet Nancy is careful, wisely, to avoid this fall amounting to a retreat back to 
a pre-critical, pre-phenomenological, and pre-deconstructive privileging of the 
permanent, present, and pristine conception of the soul which it at first appears.155 Nancy 
is as ever interested in the way in which beings are with each other and the case of the 
sleeper and the wakeful is no exception. This connection, this proximity, this 
‘modulation’, he names the soul. Once again we are returned to the between as Nancy’s 
point of focus in his examination of sleep. However, this time the between is not of sleep 
and its world – though the shadow of the world looms large here as ever – but rather of 
the communication between waking and sleeping – perhaps just a chance echo of the 
intermediate position of the sleeper in our previous work on Heidegger, but perhaps 
something much more. Fundamentally, this is achieved by refusing that the soul’s lack of 
sleep makes it an “insomniac... quite the contrary, it is indeed the soul that sleeps with the 
sleep of the sleeper and that wakes with the wakefulness of the one awake. It is the soul 
that watches in the midst of sleep and that sleeps only in waking.”156 
 
 Already the ambiguity in this description of the soul – as “never sleeping” and yet 
that “sleeps with the sleep of the sleeper” – signals something distinct from the traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, p. 35 
155 Nancy’s ‘soul’ must be distinguished from the spirit or subject of self-consciousness. The presence of 
sleep in Nancy’s work was from the start situated alongside his critique of spirit: “Immortal, unengendered, 
insomniac: this is the triple negation over which the life of the spirit rises, imperturbably adult and awake.” 
‘Identity and Trembling’, The Birth of Presence, p. 12, also cited in Gerald Bruns’ On Ceasing to Be 
Human, p. 5. 
156 Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Fall of Sleep, p. 37 
	   200	  
spike of presence securing waking with waking through sleep – making one wakefulness 
across or, better, over and above the sleeper. 
 
But the soul animates sleep as well as waking. The soul is both sleeping and 
vigilant, and for that very reason it does not sleep. Nor is it awakened: in waking 
it is that which ceaselessly dozes, in sleeping it is that which wakes and 
watches—from all quarters, every time, it is that which, giving form and tonality 
to a presence, adheres to the edges, to the outlines.157 
 
This soul adhering “to the edges” offers the “sleeper huddled inside the waker” and “the 
waker circling inside the sleeper.”158 It speaks not of the limit of sleep as the surrounding 
of it159 but rather of limits as edges that touch, of the skin of the body which touches the 
world of the night – which is still the world of the waking – even when the “night of the 
lowered eyelids” has taken us.160 The soul “itself is the rhythm... the gently dancing 
shadow that keeps watch all the time over the possibility of alternation and rocking, over 
this turn-by-turn without which we would be either dead or else would be living beings 
standing stiff in their heroic posture, like that Socrates able to spend the whole night 
standing up: vigilance itself, the idea bright without shadow, and also without music.”161 
And yet, and with all of this, “In the end it [the soul] has to stop watching over sleep.”162 
And here, with this account of the soul between waking and sleeping, and animating both, 
in hand, we see the true depth of Nancy’s worry about our world: sleep does not suffer 
the torture of its own deprivation, rather the soul must live in this world “without sleeping 
or waking”.163 “How to sleep, distraught soul, soul without soul, soul that floats lifeless 
over the field of battle or muck whose inanity an operating-room lamp garishly 
exposes?”164 
 
VIII: Experiencing, Ex-isting, Entering and Leaving Sleep 
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The person who sleeps is a mental body or a bodily mind, one lost in the other, 
and in both cases, in both aspects, a subject extravasated, aspirated, ex-posed or 
ex-isting in the strongest and most problematic sense of these words.165 
 
 Nancy and, the early, Levinas share an abhorrence of unceasing vigilance, of the 
end of rhythm and the silencing of all music. What, however, does this make sleep in its 
interruption of that which would be incessant and all dominating? Gerald L. Bruns, in 
opening his On Ceasing to be Human, finds a peculiar liberation, or freedom, in Nancy’s 
The Fall of Sleep. This freedom of sleep mirrors, Bruns suggests, that found in the act of 
writing according to Maurice Blanchot: “...it is a kind of limit-experience in which the 
one who writes is turned inside out, evacuated, becoming something entirely other, 
without identity.”166 Sleep, as described by Nancy, offers an experience, a limit-
experience or experience of the touching of limits as we just saw, of freedom and Bruns 
allows us to approach this freedom of “becoming something entirely other, without 
identity.” This reminds us that sleep is not merely a break from incessant wakefulness but 
also from subjectivity – it is “where consciousness and subjectivity become empty 
concepts.”167 
 
 A number of puzzles ensue. How can there be experience of anything in sleep? 
What kind of freedom could be experienced in sleep? And, who, or what, has this 
experience of freedom? In progressing through these questions we, with the help of Bruns, 
find Nancy’s most concrete account of the sleeper – though this account is, 
fundamentally, marked precisely by its lack of concreteness, by the falling away of all 
foundations. 
 
 Beginning, then, with experience. What could it mean to speak of experience in 
sleep, of somnolent experience? The clue lies in Nancy’s early discussion of the falling 
away of the “I” in sleep – the loss of subjectivity in sleep precludes any attempt to 
understand this experience as relating to something gained, or grasped, by the subject or 
consciousness. Knowledge will have nothing to do with this experience: 
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Experience is neither knowledge nor nonknowledge. Experience is a passage, a 
transport from border to border, an endless transport from shore to shore, all 
along a tracing that develops and limits areality.168 
 
Experience, in all its movement plays, between and as, two equal and equiprimordial roles 
according to Nancy’s earlier work The Experience of Freedom. It “is the testing of 
something real” and a keeping to the limits.169 In both cases Nancy draws on the 
etymological origin of the word experience: “the origin of the word “experience” in peirā 
and in ex-periri, an experience is an attempt executed without reserve, given over to the 
peril of its own lack of foundation and security in this “object” of which it is not the 
subject but instead the passion, exposed like the pirate (peirātēs) who freely tries his luck 
on the high seas.”170 And yet, “The act of founding is indeed the act par excellence of 
experiri, of the attempt to reach the limit, to keep to the limit.”171 
 
 This perilous founding act of experience in sleep cannot be of a subject as we 
might mistakenly believe given the word “act” which Nancy speaks of: “the founding 
gesture, the experience of the limit, does not belong to a founding subject, nor does it 
support a founded object.”172 As such we begin to see that the freedom Bruns finds in 
Nancy’s account of sleep “is not the property of a subject but rather belongs to existence 
at the level of its singularity, irreducibility, and irrepressibility.”173 Before returning to 
this word which is welling up out of our discussion of Nancy’s account of the sleeper 
more and more – existence – and with it the quotation with which we began this section, 
let us first consider this freedom which is experienced as the subject falls away. 
 
 Bruns, citing ‘Identity and Trembling’ again, contrasts Nancy’s thinking of 
freedom, “a finite thinking that no longer depends on concepts of consciousness or the 
self-possessed spirit, or indeed that no longer depends on concepts at all”, with that of 
Hegel.174 Freedom, for Nancy, is thought as that which makes self-possession impossible, 
like experience it finds no subject, or object, which it is founded upon. “Freedom is, in 
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effect, the excess of things with respect to any determination, their anarchy with respect 
to any principle or rule.”175 For Bruns this thinking and its writing, that is Nancy’s texts, 
are a “bursting [of] the seams of the propositional style of philosophical thinking”.176 
Sleep, who does not practice philosophy and who hides away from the phenomenologist, 
offers in its generous embrace the freedom from concepts, from significance, which, for 
Bruns, frees “you and me—from any denomination, including the epithet “human”.177 
Remember that, for Nancy, in the “together” of those who sleep intertwined “is refracted 
the entirety of all sleepers: animals, plants, rivers, seas, sands, stars…”.178 
 
 Yet, and here we must distance ourselves from Bruns and his narrative, our third 
question remains: ‘Who, or what experiences this freedom from concepts, at the limit of 
all things?’ We know, by now, that only one word can name – though this too will say 
too much – that which experiences, freely, sleep: ‘existence’. The sleeper ex-isting is “a 
mental body or a bodily mind, one lost in the other, and in both cases, in both aspects, a 
subject extravasated, aspirated, ex-posed or ex-isting in the strongest and most 
problematic sense of these words.”179 This quotation bears repeating180 as it marks the 
point at which Nancy’s claims about the sleeper reach their greatest distance from both 
Heideggerian and Levinasian approaches to sleep – and it is a matter of approaches. The 
sleeper, unlike Heidegger’s animal and sleeping human, ex-ists for Nancy and, as such, 
sleep offers not even the promise of an escape from existence, of a move out of being. 
Nancy’s notion of existence, as Morin argues, amounts to a dissolving of the ontological 
difference: “there is no difference between existence and the existent, the existent’s 
“reality” is nothing other than the putting into play of its own existence.”181 The 
ontological difference, which permitted Heidegger’s lifting of Dasein out from amongst 
other living beings and which described the neutrality of being from which Levinas 
demands an exit, in sleep merely falls away. Of course, for Nancy sleep will not be alone 
in this type of existence. It is not as if waking existence holds the ontological apart from 
the ontic whereas in sleep we slip away from such actions. Perhaps this slipping away is 
announced more wholeheartedly but the thought that existence could isolate it off – the 
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sleeper from the wakeful – is precisely what Nancy is denying in his talk of the soul as 
between and in his account of existence more generally. 
 
 Rather than focusing on the technicalities and distinctive features of Nancy’s use 
of the term ‘existence’ we are better served by seeking a more robust and concrete 
description of the sleeper, as ex-isting. Such a description is to be found in Nancy’s 
holding of sleep in proximity, not to itself, but instead with those forms of existence which 
border, neighbour, and touch sleep. In particular, Nancy’s consideration of the movement 
from waking to sleep, through the phenomenon of the lullaby, and his treatment of sleep 
and death according to and through their proximity, offer useful insights. 
 
 We saw above that it is the soul which communicates between waking and 
sleeping, which negotiates their differences and their contacts. This soul is the name 
Nancy gives to this originary difference and contact between waking and sleeping but in 
the previous chapter, Ch. 6, he had already discussed the conditions for the possibility of 
entering sleep. We noted in our first Part that Nancy finds the question of our entrance to 
sleep more problematic than Husserl. Whereas, absolute consciousness can put waking 
consciousness to sleep, for Husserl, Nancy insists that “No one puts himself to sleep”.182 
From the assigning of the power over sleep to sleep itself, and its stripping from the 
subject, Nancy realises the value of a consideration of the “access road to its realm.”183 
Of, that is, the lullaby. 
 
What leads to sleep has the shape of rhythm, of regularity and repetition. It is a 
matter of nothing but mimicry, since sleep itself is rhythm, regularity and 
repetition. Sleeping does not consist of a process like that of walking, eating, or 
thinking. The only processes that belong to sleep are those of respiration and 
circulation. They themselves are put to rest, they find a slower cadence there, a 
deeper amplitude scarcely differentiated moment by moment. When it goes to 
sleep, the body is rocked to the rhythm of its heart and lungs.184 
 
There is much in this paragraph which we could pick out but let us first note that the 
mimicking of sleep in that which “leads to sleep” is, despite the word “mimicry 
[mimétisme]”, essential and fundamental, it is a condition for the possibility of sleep at 
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all, “no one enters sleep without some sort of lullaby.”185 Furthermore, this passage to 
sleep, this soothing [berceur] into sleep, as with the fall, is itself part of sleep – sleep’s 
processes “respiration and circulation” are processes of “rhythm, regularity, and 
repetition.” In this pairing of the respiratory, spirit, and the circulatory, processes Nancy 
again brings the mind-body, body-mind into communication in the rhythm of sleeping 
existence. For sleep is, at its heart, a matter of the rhythmic “so also does sleep compose 
in itself the rhythm in which its profound nature is reflected.”186 What is this rhythm, what 
is this “profound nature”? Nancy’s answer to this question is to destabilise existentially 
this approach to sleep: “Rocking movements put us to sleep because sleep in its essence 
is itself a rocking, not a stable motionless state.”187 
 
 Here, at the gates of sleep, heralded by yawns (the uncontrollable in and out of 
breath) and by the falling away of inhibitions, by the “to-and-fro of hands, of lips, tongues, 
and moist genitals”.188 Here, already, sleep is as ex-isting. As the limit by which waking 
tests itself, by which we experience. The rocking of sleep, back and forth, neither within 
nor without but with, was already presaged in the “Twofold rhythm, solar and lunar, 
waking and sleeping” of Nancy’s ‘Equal World’.189 The essential lullaby, without which 
the fears of night – that “wilderness of fears” – would never be conquered, shows that 
sleep, like experience, freedom, and existing, is not to be thought of as one, or any, thing 
at all.190 It is the passage, the fall, the rhythm, the with. This is why Bruns praises Nancy 
for steering clear of definition “Wisely Nancy does not try to give sleep a definition”.191 
Motion, “defines” sleep, just as rocking and rhythm does but only if one realises that this 
motion is never internal to sleep. Sleep, as the essentiality of the lullaby proclaims, is 
spread throughout waking – remember as well that the soul sleeps within waking – and 
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this should remind us of the similar findings of our earlier work on Heidegger. The 
delimiting of sleep to one state does not hold water in post-Heideggerian thinking.  
 
 What we might call Nancy’s ‘phenomenology of proximities’ continues when we 
consider that the sleeper is, as with any passage, rhythm, and rocking, temporary. The 
fall, like the rhythm, points, pointedly in the case of a physical fall, towards its conclusion 
– towards its ending. The leaving behind of sleep must surely also be part of sleep, be 
part of the rhythm of sleep’s existence. Nancy beautifully articulates the proximity 
between sleep and its posthumous neighbour – death – in his penultimate chapter, ‘The 
Knell [Glas] of a Temporary Death’.192 “Like death, sleep, and like sleep, death—but 
without awakening. Without a rhythm of return, without repetition, without a new day, 
without tomorrow.”193 Here, near the end of his mediation on sleep, Nancy mediates 
between sleep and death which are like one another, which are so close that the Greek’s 
named them twin brothers – Hypnos and Thanatos.194 Furthermore, even in these opening 
lines, we are already warned away from seeing this relation from only one side – Nancy 
does not write “Like death, sleep” alone but also “and like sleep death”. In the course of 
this chapter – so near the ending of the text and yet not that ending, we see the inquiry 
broaden out from a consideration of sleep through death to a consideration of death 
through the passage and rhythm that is sleep as ex-isting. The title of the chapter itself 
enacts just such a modification, or modulation, of death through sleep. 
 
 This double movement of this chapter is all the more productive and important as 
it prevents us from a key misunderstanding. Namely; sleep’s ending in death – the good 
death of modernity – is not the ending of rhythm, it is not the ending of existence. Holding 
firmly to the connection between sleep’s ex-isting and the passage to sleep, the lullaby, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Our reading of this striking chapter must be, of necessity, selective – as indeed have been all the readings 
offered above – and so at this stage it is worth noting that we will not discuss the manner in which Nancy’s 
account of death relates to his work on the ‘deconstruction of Christianity’. Though, as we will point to in 
a moment, one of the ways in which a future somnolent phenomenology could develop would be to do 
exactly this – to connect the tombe of sleep and the tomb from which Jesus was raised up. Texts such as 
Noli me tangere (Noli me tangere. On the Raising of the Body, translated by Sarah Clift, Pascale-Anne 
Brault, and Michael Naas. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) and Adoration (Adoration. The 
Deconstruction of Christianity II, translated by John McKeane. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2012) would be of particular use in such an undertaking. 
193 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, p. 41 
194 “The one holds much-seeing light for those on the earth, but the other holds Sleep in her hands, the 
brother of Death—deadly Night, shrouded in murky cloud.” Hesiod’s ‘Theogony” in Theogony, Works and 
Days, Testimonia, Edited and translated by Glenn W. Most, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2006. 
	   207	  
we see that this possible leaving of sleep, death, only spells the end of “a rhythm of 
return”,195 of the “possibility of alternation and rocking, over this turn-by-turn”.196 If the 
dead lie apart from the sleeper in their lack of a rhythm of return then what do they share, 
what, if anything, lies between the rhythm of life’s beating and rocking and that of death? 
 
 Nancy is playing on a productive, and ambiguous, proximity between the dead 
and the sleeper. Reminding us of Rimbaud’s sleeper in the valley “who has two red holes 
in his right side” and yet appears to all the world to be sleeping is to remind us to look 
both ways or through both neighbours windows.197 As such Nancy suggests that we 
consider not only the sleeper’s temporary death but also that “one could also say that 
death is necessarily temporary, for it lasts only as long as time lasts.”198 This is because 
the dead, “like any sleeper... has joined eternity: the reverse of time.”199 The reverse of 
time is, according to Nancy, not time’s “stretching out flat in torpor and in coma”, not 
“its turning back to duration deprived of rhythm” but rather its “annulment”.200 And here, 
for it must be a matter of a here or a there “there where, of course, and not when, for no 
time is given for that, only a place apart from all places”, again the word rhythm returns 
– what rhythm remains in death and in sleep, what rhythm survives this “annulment of 
time”?201 
 
 Nancy’s answer lies in the “form of not [which] outlines a hollow, it presses a 
footprint [pas] in the sand of shores that we keep approaching and leaving. A hollow, a 
hollowing out, an elevation, the immobile and immutable rhythm of the grave and the 
tomb, the respiration of the death sleep.”202 The not [pas] and the without [sans] mark 
this chapter and it is in them that this shared rhythm is announced “Not—says the sleeper 
as well as the dead man, I am not there.”203 Here Nancy finds a presence, or sense, or 
existing, in the not, in the place of “death sleep”. “Tomb of Sleep, says this cemetery”.204 
The place of death and the place of sleep share, but are never united, in this rhythm of the 
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without [sans] “a sleep of earth or ash, a sleep without sleep and without insomnia, 
without awakening and without intention, a limitless sleep: the infinite brought down to 
the rhythm of each finite existence. [d’un sommeil de terre ou de cendre, d’un sommeil 
sans sommeil et sans insomnie, sans réveil et sans intention, un sommeil sans bords : 
l’infini déposé selon le rythme de chaque existence finie.]”205 This “rhythm of each finite 
existence [existence finie]” is what connects the dead and the living through the between 
of sleep. Nancy expresses this through the sharing of this place of the not and the without 
which we, the living, watch over – whether it is the place of sleep or the place of the dead 
– the cemetery. This is why to “deprive someone of a grave” is connected with the horror 
of a world without sleep, it is to deprive “the dead [of] the sleep that comes back to 
them”.206 Only at such a place, which stands in for the nowhere of sleep and death, can 
we, the living and waking, undertake our vigil: “our vigil opens a rhythm between the 
living and the leaving”.207 
 
 What remains of this “leaving”? Only existence, existence in all its singular 
plurality. Existents which “cannot help but sketch out a strange, unsettling, indecipherable 
sign, the sign without signification of an inconsistent but insistent complicity with no 
other analogy than that of a common sleep, shared since unsharable.”208 The rhythm of 
existence remains. Sleep in all its “fluid being” holds together the rhythm of life and that 
of death.209 The sleeper, ex-ists, and floats between the time of life and the place of death 
– the “deathbed”.210 
 
IX: The Blind Spot [Tache] of Sleep, or Notes Towards a 
Somnolent Phenomenology 
 
Not seeing connects with some possibility of help or hope for sight.211 
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 Nancy begins his final chapter – ‘The Blind Task [Tâche] of Sleep’ – by returning 
to the figure of the insomniac – that point at which he touches, at a distance, Levinas’s 
thinking. “Whoever does not know how not to wake up, whoever remains on the lookout 
in the hollow of sleep, he, she, is stuck with his or her fear.”212 As such Nancy remains 
with the demand to ‘let sleep’, but also with that which draws us away from sleep, with 
the fear of sleep itself – of leaving our nightly terrors and “entering the night.”213 And 
yet, we might think that this return to the problematic of entering sleep is premature, or 
that it misses out, is blind to, another problematic. Nancy considered the fall of sleep, the 
lulling into sleep, the soul’s modulation of waking and sleeping, and the leaving of sleep 
by the route of death – the slipping from the bed to the deathbed. What about the rising 
again at dawn, what about our everyday awakening? We might think that, at the end of 
Nancy’s “sojourn” with sleep, that the rhythm of sleep’s return to waking has not been 
described or articulated in full.214 Are we here returned, as if we had never left Husserlian 
phenomenology, to the problematic of ‘how we wake again?’ 
 
 Let us rephrase this worry: we have, with Nancy, travelled to Hypnos’s realm, 
shrouded by his mother Nyx, and with his dreadful brother, Thanatos, ever near, at the 
limits of our vision and at the limits of our experience. But what, upon our return, upon 
our awakening, do we retain from this journey – from the passage that sleep is in its ex-
isting? What have we learned, not only about sleep, but about existence more generally? 
Surely we have learned much about what we cannot hope for: we cannot hope for a 
completed definition of sleep; nor for a sharp distinction between sleep and waking; nor, 
indeed, for a separation between sleeping and death, for, in other words, a safety in sleep. 
These lessons, Nancy’s lessons about or of sleep, can be illustrated by reference to two 
Ancient Greek gods and their proximity to Hypnos. Firstly, Charon, Hypnos and 
Thanatos’ brother and like them the son of Nyx and Erebos (Darkness or Shadow), the 
ferryman or boatman who carried, for a fee, those crossing the river Styx one way or the 
other. There is much which we might investigate between these deities but perhaps most 
striking is their connection to water and journeys across water – sleep’s lack of 
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foundations, its “fluid being”,215 echoes the perilous journey of those travelling with 
Charon.216 
 
 The second Ancient Greek deity which can, in its connections to sleep, illustrate 
the lessons of Nancy’s text is the messenger with the winged sandals – Hermes. Hermes, 
a god of transitions and messages, commands Hypnos, perhaps through his winged staff, 
his Caduceus. His directing of Hypnos and with Thanatos, is beautifully depicted on the 
Euphronios Krater.217 On one side of the vase is represented a scene from The Illiad 
where, after Sarpedon falls in battle, Zeus sends Hermes, who in his turn enlists Hypnos 
and Thanatos, to save Sarpedon’s body from the Achaens.218 Sleep and death, like Hermes 
who here commands them, stand for not only the transitions from one state to an-other, 
they also take on the messenger quality of their master – they carry a body and a bodily 
message. Sleep as communication but never communion or unification, that is Nancy’s 
message. Sleep’s singularity, it’s existence, is never an isolation – we never, for Nancy, 
sleep alone.219 But what about the content of Sleep’s message, which cannot be reduced 
to a set of words or anything subjective or objective? All we can say is that it is the sense 
that wells up in the freedom of sleep’s fall, of the falling away of signification. 
 
 And yet can we not hope for something more? Can we not hope for something 
more concrete, some account of sleep’s essence? As the quotation with which we began 
this section illustrates Nancy sees “some possibility of help or hope for sight” in the 
“absence of all vision and all visibility.”220 For Nancy, following a close – and surely 
phenomenological – examination of “the instant just before [sleep], when eyelids have 
slipped over our eyes and they for one moment have remained seers behind their curtain”, 
identifies this hope for sight with a “seeing... that is like seeing the invisible”.221 In seeing 
the absolute blindness that is sleep, in that instant on the edge of sleep, we realise “that 
there is nothing to see”.222 But what, concretely, can we build upon this seeing, if we can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 ibid, p. 42 
216 I would like to thanks Christos Hadjioannou for bringing this connection between Charon and Hypnos 
to my attention along with many other interesting conversations somewhere between myth and philosophy. 
217 Now on display at the National Etruscan Museum in Rome. 
218 A scene which should put us in mind of Nancy’s connecting of allowing a place for sleep and allowing 
a place for the dead in the world. 
219 As Nancy put it some twenty years earlier “One never sleeps alone. And one never dies alone.” ‘Identity 
and Trembling’, The Birth of Presence, p. 35 
220 Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Fall of Sleep, p. 48 
221 ibid 
222 ibid 
	   211	  
call it such? Nancy’s answer, with which he ends this text and his own somnolent sojourn, 
is that such efforts are, whatever else they are, foreign to “the blind task of sleep” they 
are still efforts “to try to discern the invisible” and they are limited just as 
phenomenology, as we knew it before, was. 
 
 However, there remain avenues for inquiry. There are still roads, or rather watery 
ways, not travelled by Nancy and left open by sleep, philosophy and phenomenology. 
Here, at the ending of our revere let us offer just two broad directions of future 
investigation. Firstly, we may follow Nancy’s instructions and tarry with, “sojourn in”, 
the sleeper.223 We may seek means, within Nancy’s writing, for attending to the sleeper 
and to their message further. Two such means would surely be a listening224 to sleep and 
its message, an effort to hear, sleepily, the “mumbles” that amount to “a confused 
attestation of existence”, “a kind of grunt or sigh that escapes from barely parted lips.”225 
And, of course, the touching of sleep which crosses between waking, the parent cradling 
the child and cradling their sleep too, and the sleepers embracing and entwined.226 
 
 Though this course would lead to a more thoroughgoing and multifaceted 
understanding of Nancy work and its relation to sleep a second direction is available to 
us. It is to follow in Nancy’s sleepy footprints, to trace, from his sojourn, a method from 
sleep. We have already, in passing mentioned the idea of a phenomenology of 
proximities. This model, where the description is never that of a detached observer and is 
never merely from and to but always back again as well. This model follows Nancy’s 
treatment of sleep, lullabies, dreams, and death and asks ‘what of waking’? As such it 
seeks that which remains proximal and touching sleep as our eyes open and we ex-it sleep, 
without ever leaving it. This course of research, this future project, summons the 
resources of close description and priority of ex-perience to trace a somnolent 
phenomenology within the day and between us, as waking, and sleep. It will not be found 
in the lucid writings of phenomenologists but rather in the limits, at the edges, of those 
writings. The moments when these writings give out and give-up, when they fall from 
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exhaustion, there “we feel the fall.”227 To touch on an example, Merleau-Ponty’s 
unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible offers, in its falling away, an opening for 
discussions of just this proximity between the invisible of the day and that which Nancy 
finds but does not pin down in sleep.228 And, of course, the truth remains that these two 
course, these two routes – perhaps that of night and day, sleeping and waking – are not 
truly separable and must, in fact exist in communication with each other. 
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